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This report sets out the elements for the design of a streamlined and future-proof 
policy on innovation and entrepreneurship in Europe. It is the result of a collective 
effort led by CEPS, which formed a Task Force on Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
in the EU, composed of authoritative scholars, industry experts, entrepreneurs, 
practitioners and representatives of EU and international institutions. 
The result of these deliberations is a set of policy recommendations aimed at 
improving the overall environment and approach for entrepreneurship and 
innovation in Europe and a new paradigmatic understanding of the role that 
innovation and entrepreneurship can and should play within the overall context 
of EU policy. These recommendations are based on a new, multi-dimensional 
approach to both innovation and entrepreneurship as social phenomena and to 
the policies that are meant to promote them.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
his report provides the elements for the design of a streamlined and 
future-proof policy on innovation and entrepreneurship in Europe. It is the 
result of a collective effort led by CEPS, which formed a Task Force on 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship in the EU, composed of authoritative scholars, 
industry experts, entrepreneurs, practitioners and representatives of EU and 
international institutions. The group met on five occasions during the second half 
of 2015 (see the Annex for a list of the members and invited guests and 
speakers). The result of these deliberations is a set of policy recommendations 
aimed at improving the overall environment and approach for entrepreneurship 
and innovation in Europe and a new paradigmatic understanding of the role that 
innovation and entrepreneurship can and should play within the overall context 
of EU policy. These recommendations are based on a new, multi-dimensional 
approach to both innovation and entrepreneurship as social phenomena and to 
the policies that are meant to promote them. The figure below summarises our 
overall conceptual framework for innovation policy, based on a combination of 
three basic concepts identified in the Task Force: 
 3S principles. Innovation policy should become more socially relevant, 
systemic and simple. 
 3D criteria. Innovation policy should focus on development, diffusion and 
direction. 
 3P pillars. Innovation policy should be centred on three channels: people, 
places and policies.  
T 
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We present below a list of 55 policy recommendations that we formulated 
and disseminated in the course of the Task Force’s proceedings. These are 
elaborated throughout this report (and repeated in the concluding chapter), 
grouped according to each of the three channels through which we advocate 
their implementation, i.e. the 3Ps: people, places and policies.  
Recommended actions - People 
1. Strengthen policy efforts to promote a variety of skills, including STEM 
education (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) and coding 
skills, starting in early school years throughout the EU-28. 
2. Promote the inclusion of entrepreneurial skills, managerial skills, creativity 
and the ability to think outside the box as basic skills to be taught during 
school years and university.  
3. Strengthen public-private cooperation to ensure the exposure of young 
European citizens to entrepreneurial role models and success stories to 
encourage emulation among youngsters. 
4. Launch a systematic reflection on the security and flexibility needs of the 
future European job market, with a specific focus on employability, self-
employment features and work-train-life balance for the coming years. 
5. Promote open access to government-funded research and government-
held data to boost data-driven innovation in Europe. 
6. Foster legal certainty for data-driven innovation and more generally for 
text and data-mining activities, especially with respect to EU copyright and 
data protection laws.  
3S	
Simple	
Systemic	
Socially	relevant	
3D	
Development	
Diffu
s
i on	
Direc on	
3P	
People	
Places	
Policies	
What	 How	 Channels	
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7. Strengthen ‘citizens’ science’ in Europe by creating effective platforms and 
calling on EU-funded research projects to involve citizens and adopt 
bottom-up approaches where possible. 
8. Promote openness to foreign talent in all member states. 
9. Develop guidance on regulatory flexibility to make regulation more 
conducive to innovation, implementing where appropriate the concept of 
‘permissionless innovation’. 
10. Eliminate useless and redundant red tape, by distinguishing it from 
regulatory costs that generate benefits and help achieve policy goals. 
11. Create one-stop-shops for entrepreneurs by consolidating contact points 
for access to EU and national funds and streamlining rules for financial and 
non-financial support.  
12. Avoid creating perverse incentives with legislation, e.g. by creating rules 
that discourage scale-up.   
13. Design policies to promote public-sector innovation at all levels of 
government, including innovation prizes and awards. 
14. Promote and foster smart institutional design in innovation agencies and 
other relevant institutions. 
15. Consider the creation of ‘entrepreneurs in residence’ and other fellowship 
and mentoring programmes to promote entrepreneurial thinking in 
institutions.    
16. Promote successful role models and success stories more widely, in 
particular among students, especially among women.  
17. Promote, at the local level, the participation of students from late school 
years and older in gatherings of entrepreneurs and start-ups.   
Recommended actions - Places 
18. Promote open science and data-sharing and the improvement of data 
quality and management. 
19. Ensure that publicly-funded research communities: i) represent all aspects 
of basic and applied research, innovation, etc., ii) include stakeholders 
4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
from various fields (not only one industry sector) and iii) become the main 
source of information for the drafting of innovation agendas and 
technological roadmaps. 
20. Develop new performance measures for academia that encourage further 
valorisation of research. 
21. Develop skills for open science and promote commonly agreed open 
science standards of research integrity.  
22. Promote cooperation between public and private players in shaping and 
implementing legal rules for platforms.  
23. Engage with platforms by seeking their cooperation on nurturing 
entrepreneurship, shaping university curricula and defining technology 
roadmaps to be used as a basis for future policies.   
24. Develop initiatives on platforms at both European and national levels to 
encourage evidence-based research to inform policy.  
25. Launch foresight activities to explore the future of the platform economy 
and its implications for policy and society at large. 
26. Improve conditions for the platform economy by fostering investments in 
broadband, the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry 4.0, by removing 
unnecessary regulatory barriers and by addressing market concentration 
and barriers to competition. 
27. Preserve the open Internet and the free flow of data, enhancing trust in 
the digital economy.  
28. Reduce barriers to entry, e.g. red tape, growth, e.g. size-specific 
regulations, and firm exit/failure, e.g. penalising bankruptcy legislation, 
overly strict employment protection legislation. 
29. Address regulatory incumbency: Policies often favour incumbents, e.g. 
R&D tax credits, some environmental regulations, subsidies that delay exit, 
visa rules. 
30. Develop ecosystems through enhancing incentives and access to (risk) 
capital, developing networks (including the valorisation of research), 
mentoring of entrepreneurs and developing skills.  
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31. Complete the Single Market and reduce trade barriers, so firms can scale 
more easily across borders. 
32. Promote scale-up culture through education and media, celebrate success 
of scale-ups and encourage entrepreneurs to share their success stories. 
33. Initiate studies providing evidence on the impact of financial supply-side 
interventions.  
34. Foster pan-European innovation ecosystems that connect diverse and 
disruptive talent across Europe, and stimulate local entrepreneurship 
ecosystems in regional policy. 
35. Reformulate smart specialisation strategies to encompass coordination 
and acceleration across European borders and beyond. 
36. Coordinate better the various funding mechanisms at EU level to ensure a 
sharper focus on innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Recommended actions - Policies 
37. Refocus policies for large and small to high-growth companies. 
38. Promote healthy cooperation between existing and new business. 
39. Establish a suitable balance between direct and indirect support schemes. 
40. Facilitate intermediation in access to finance through increased 
transparency and accountability.  
41. Complete the Single Market while pooling public procurement, including 
‘innovation deals’. 
42. The European Innovation Council (EIC) should be sufficiently 
‘authoritative’ to effectively advise governments on good practices to 
overcome barriers to growth and scale for start-ups.  
43. Integrate systemic innovation with better regulation by refining the 
guidance on innovation impacts in the better regulation guidelines. 
44. Align policymaking and better regulation to be in accordance with the EU’s 
long-term impacts and objectives.  
45. Set up mission-led platforms to inform policymaking at an early stage 
about impacts on innovation. 
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46. Strengthen the better regulation toolkit with more information and 
guidance on adaptive, experimental policymaking that favours systemic 
innovation. 
47. Reformulate European added-value and focus EU support in interventions 
that make sense only at EU level, e.g. the European Research Council 
(ERC), the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) the 
Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) programme, etc. 
48. Delegate collaborative undertakings like ERANETs, Joint Programming 
Initiatives (JPIs) and Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs) to long-standing and 
experienced intergovernmental networks, such as Eureka and Cost in 
particular. 
49. Empower governments with enabling functions while embedding the 
European dimension fully in their programmes and agencies to create 
scale of policy. 
50. Shift policy coordination away from project cooperation as this has shown 
its limitations and actually reached a plateau in recent years. 
51. Structure a stable policy framework at European level consisting of two 
Councils and progressive consolidation of instruments around a limited 
number of agencies. 
52. Link action on the ground for stronger institutions at regional and local 
level. 
53. Consolidate and strengthen the role of research and innovation platforms 
as sources of policy inputs. 
54. Streamline the role of the EIC and the Joint Research Council (JRC) in 
converting existing science and research into actionable policy 
recommendations. 
55. Refocus REFIT (Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme) exercises 
towards coherence with long-term goals.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: IS EUROPE SUFFERING FROM 
AN INNOVATION EMERGENCY? 
here has been no shortage of emergencies in the European Union over the 
past few years. From migration in the Mediterranean and the Balkans to 
Brexit, the eurozone crisis, the Greek crisis, the rise of populist movements 
and the decline of pro-EU sentiment, almost every key aspect of the Union has 
been placed under the spotlight and subject to unforeseen, sometimes rushed 
and messy policy changes. The perennial state of uncertainty that this has 
created has been at one and the same time cause and effect of Europe’s 
relatively poor performance from an economic, social and environmental 
perspective, with sluggish growth being increasingly coupled with widening 
inequality, deteriorating social cohesion and growing unemployment, especially 
among younger generations. Among the most widely felt problems in Europe 
(and also in most other OECD economies) is the slowdown in productivity 
growth, which hampers Europe’s chances to achieve long-term improvements in 
living standards.  
The current stalemate is almost paradoxical, especially if one recalls that 
the current decade had started with a resounding commitment by EU leaders to 
achieve “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” in the now-neglected Europe 
2020 strategy launched by José Manuel Durao-Barroso. Six years down the road, 
the current President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
denounced Europe’s “existential crisis” in his relatively dismal State of the Union 
address in September 2016, which followed, inter alia, the shock caused by the 
Brexit referendum. Meanwhile, the EU project appears shaky when faced with 
upcoming game-changing events, such as the French, Dutch, German and 
(probably) Italian elections during 2017.  
Innovation is clearly no exception in this landscape. Already a few years 
ago, calls to face Europe’s “innovation emergency” came from very prominent 
T 
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political actors, as well as from industry.1 Statistics and scorecards have shown a 
gradual distancing of EU member states from leading countries such as the US, 
Japan and South Korea, with China slowly catching up with Europe in a number 
of dimensions of innovation.2 Commissioners, politicians, scholars and industry 
representatives have taken action to denounce the meagre state of European 
innovation, pointing the finger at Europeans’ lack of entrepreneurial skills and 
attitude, as well as at the existence of a plethora of regulatory obstacles to 
revamping both human and social factors of innovation.  
International organisations such as the OECD (2012) have highlighted that 
the economic crisis that started in 2008 has negatively affected business 
innovation and research and development (R&D) in all countries. The World 
Economic Forum (2016) has observed that “European countries simply must fix 
their productivity problem to generate long-term growth” and that “in 
innovation and digitisation, Europeans often seem obsessed with data privacy 
and protection rather than grasping new opportunities”. When looking at key 
innovation outputs, a report for the European Commission recently concluded 
that the EU performs at a similar level as the US, but is clearly outperformed by 
Japan; whereas in terms of employment in knowledge-intensive activities, the 
EU is outperformed by both the US and Japan.3 The EU also appears to be slightly 
less technologically specialised than the US, Japan or South Korea. Other 
publications (Sachwald, 2016; Veugelers, 2015; Gill & Raiser, 2012) refer to 
various types of European deficits, in both research and innovation, linked to the 
comparative differences in Europe regarding young world-leading innovative 
firms and less knowledge intensive business sectors. And perhaps in a more 
                                                        
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/research/index.cfm?lg=en&pg=newsalert&year=2011&na=na-
090611. And see also E. Aho, J. Cornu, L. Georghiou and A. Subira (2006), “Creating an 
Innovative Europe: Report of the Independent  Expert Group on R&D and Innovation 
appointed following the Hampton Court Summit”, European Communities, Brussels, January 
(http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/aho_report.pdf).  
2 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm. 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/scoreboards_en. See also 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Europe_2020_indicators_-
_research_and_development.  
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balanced way, recent reports have mostly emphasised the EU’s widening gap 
between laggards and frontier firms.4 
Against this background, is there really hope for the European Union to 
improve its innovation performance and in turn increase living standards? In our 
opinion, it is not entirely correct to speak of an “innovation emergency” in 
Europe. Rather, as observed by, inter alia, the OECD in its report “The Future of 
Productivity”, Europe faces a “diffusion deficit”: in other words, technologies are 
developed and made available but very often do not adequately permeate 
society or do not gain sufficient market exposure due to a variety of factors, 
which often have to do with incumbency problems, inadequate regulatory 
regimes, or simply a badly designed policy mix (Ashford & Renda, 2016).  
As authoritatively remarked by Dani Rodrik (2016): “The consequences of 
any innovation for productivity, employment, and equity ultimately depend on 
how quickly it diffuses through labor and product markets.” In this respect, the 
roots and causes of Europe’s innovation problem might be more multifaceted 
and systemic, but also, probably, less hopeless than often presented. This does 
not mean that the problem is in the pipeline or in ‘technology transfer’, rather 
the opposite: we argue that policies are not holistic, resulting in an insufficient 
flow of opportunities. Sadly, most European countries declare that they have 
holistic policies while, de facto, their implementation remains linear (Edquist, 
2014). 
All in all, Europe’s innovation and entrepreneurship problems can be 
related to a variety of factors, which deserve adequate analysis. Most important, 
the scholarly literature increasingly considers innovation and entrepreneurship 
as the results of a combination of skills and attitudes, platforms and exchanges 
and overall processes and policy. Both innovation and entrepreneurship cannot 
be described as linear processes but rather as ecosystems (albeit reproposing an 
often abused terminology) that require a multitude of concurring factors and 
interactions to fully realise their potential. In Europe, the innovation ecosystem 
is evidently and prominently represented by the Single Market, but 
entrepreneurship inevitably flourishes at a much more local level, whenever the 
right combination of ingredients allows for such development (Isenberg, 2011). 
                                                        
4 http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/competitiveness-
rankings/. 
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Managing this ‘tension’ between local conditions and global ambitions is not 
easy for policy. This is so because ‘strong ties’ in geographically close 
environments are key but might be principally responsible for incremental 
innovation, while ‘weak ties’ through global pipelines may bring about more 
radical innovation. Recently, Kuhlmann & Edler (2003) proposed three scenarios 
for the ‘Europe of Knowledge’, including “a vision of a centrally ‘mediated’ 
mixture of competition and cooperation between diverse regional innovation 
cultures and a related governance structure.” One of the most evident problems 
generated by the proposed approaches is that on the one hand, innovation 
happens locally, which leads 80–85% of public funding for innovation being 
managed nationally or sub-nationally; on the other hand, competition is 
increasingly global, which requires policies that allow innovation to be scaled up 
and accelerated across markets. This, in turn, calls for policy interventions that 
are less national/local and increasingly trans- or supranational. 
This report tries to provide elements for the design of a streamlined, future 
innovation and entrepreneurship policy in Europe. The report is the result of a 
collective effort led by the Centre for European Policy Studies, which convened 
a Task Force on “Innovation and Entrepreneurship in the EU” in early 2015 and 
relied on the cooperation of the Madrid-based Insight Foresight Institute led by 
José Manuel Leceta (Chairman of the Task Force) and Totti Konnola (co-
rapporteur of the Task Force). The CEPS Task Force was further supported by a 
scientific director (Andrea Renda, CEPS Senior Research Fellow) and another co-
rapporteur (Felice Simonelli).  
The Task Force met five times between June and December 2015, and 
counted on the input of many authoritative scholars, industry experts, 
entrepreneurs, practitioners and representatives of EU and international 
institutions (a list of all attendees and speakers is attached at the end of this 
report). The result was a set of policy recommendations that aim at improving 
the overall environment and approach for entrepreneurship and innovation in 
Europe; and a new paradigmatic understanding of the role that innovation and 
entrepreneurship can and should play within the overall context of EU policy. 
These recommendations are based on a new, multidimensional approach to 
both innovation and entrepreneurship as social phenomena and to the policies 
that are meant to promote them. This is presented below as a combination of a 
3S, a 3D and a 3P approach.  
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1.1 Socially relevant, systemic, simple: Three principles for innovation 
and entrepreneurship policy in Europe 
The CEPS Task Force agreed upon three key principles, which provide an 
important background for the remainder of the work. In a nutshell, the future EU 
policy for entrepreneurship and innovation should be tied to societal needs 
(‘socially relevant’), systemic and simple. These principles can be summarised as 
follows: 
 Socially relevant. Entrepreneurship and innovation are means, not 
ultimate policy goals.5 This means that public policy, besides striving to 
create a suitable environment for entrepreneurship, should seek to 
incentivise those entrepreneurial ventures and innovation efforts that 
help addressing the outstanding societal challenges that Europe faces. 
Policy-makers must seek to promote the type of entrepreneurship and 
innovation that can help Europe solve its present and future challenges, 
e.g. youth unemployment, aging population, stagnation, and contribute to 
solving those of global nature, e.g. climate change, food security, water 
supply, etc. 
 Systemic. Innovation is broader than industrial R&D. While R&D still plays 
a crucial role in many sectors, it is clear that other forms of innovation, 
such as social and user innovation, and new business models are just as 
important when it comes to addressing Europe’s thirst for new solutions 
to outstanding challenges. This variety should also be reflected in the 
choice of innovation policy tools and entrepreneurial support schemes. 
Policy should look not only at all the actors but increasingly at their 
dynamic interconnections in the innovation and entrepreneurship 
ecosystem to ensure that they contribute to the emergence of a suitable 
                                                        
5 This view was shared by several representatives of the Commission attending the Task Force 
meetings, who stressed the need to foster, e.g. growth and jobs via innovation. In this 
respect, Philippe Aghion presented empirical evidence confirming the role played by 
innovation in fostering long-term growth in advanced economies. In addition, Johan Schot 
and Jan Fagerberg emphasised innovation as a driver to introduce systemic changes and 
address societal challenges. 
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and enabling environment for new ideas to emerge and diffuse throughout 
the economy.  
 Simple. Entrepreneurs and innovators often do not have time and 
resources to dedicate to complex procedures and administrative 
requirements; the governance of EU and national innovation and 
entrepreneurship policies often does not offer the single points of contact 
and the multi-stakeholder platforms that entrepreneurs need to test their 
ideas and apply for funding, mentoring and support.  
The consequences of these principles are far-reaching and also involve the 
way in which policy is designed and implemented at the EU and national levels. 
Many emerging societal challenges call on innovation policy to depart from 
academic disciplines, enabling technologies or sector-specific industrial policy, 
and to take a more systemic and transformative approach that crosses academic, 
technology and sectoral boundaries. Moreover, EU policy should enable 
experimentation and learning and avoid creating biases in favour of incumbent 
business models: this requires new approaches and adaptive regulation tools at 
all levels of government and the creation of policy spaces for testing new 
business models and services that can benefit end users, at the same time 
without lowering protection levels for consumers. Accordingly, EU policies and 
better regulation tools should include an adequate consideration of innovation 
and entrepreneurship from the genetic moment (foresight and ex ante impact 
assessments) to the ex post evaluation and feedback phases, e.g. in ex post 
evaluation and REFIT. 
The 3S (socially relevant, systemic and simple) approach to innovation 
policy would transform current policy approaches and provide new regulatory 
stimuli that are essential for entrepreneurship and innovation to flourish in 
Europe, which would be locally rooted but with global ambitions. How to achieve 
this goal should be the main concern of EU policy-makers in the coming years, 
starting from the revision of Horizon 2020 and the governance of EU innovation 
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policy, from its R&D-centric ‘innovation policy’ today to an enabling and holistic 
understanding of ‘policies for innovation’ (OECD, 2015).6  
1.2 Development, diffusion, direction: Three criteria for innovation 
and entrepreneurship policy in Europe 
Over the past few years the understanding of innovation as a policy subject has 
followed new, important trends, in addition to the ones highlighted in the 
previous sections. Not only has innovation (and our understanding of it) become 
more multifaceted, systemic and open. The modelling of the interaction 
between players that compose the innovation system has become more 
sophisticated, and the notion of ecosystem, rather than merely system, has been 
adopted (not without a degree of uncertainty and variance in definitions) to 
encompass, inter alia, the institutional and policy interrelations and constraints 
that characterise the life and activity of entrepreneurs and innovators, the 
proactive role of end users and the involvement of several players in innovation 
projects. Scholars have increasingly argued that not all innovation exerts a 
significant impact on long-term policy goals such as sustainable development 
and growth. More in detail, there are innovative products, processes and 
services that contribute more than others to addressing grand societal 
challenges, such as climate change, water scarcity and, for Europe, 
unemployment and the needs of the ageing society. This has led to growing 
emphasis on the so-called ‘purpose’ of innovation, which bears substantial 
relevance for innovation policy. As a matter of fact, both innovation and 
entrepreneurship should be approached in public policy as intermediate, not 
ultimate goals, and as such functional to social welfare in the long run. In 
particular, the diffusion of innovation and its widespread availability to end-
consumers are as important as the innovation process itself.  
The consequences of this shift in the approach to innovation as an 
essential element of a sustainable development strategy are far-reaching. As a 
preliminary set of remarks: 
                                                        
6 It is worth stressing that the Commission is already moving in this direction. In fact, Horizon 
2020 represented a breakthrough compared with past Framework Programmes: for the first 
time, in addition to the traditional support for research and development, the programme 
placed great emphasis on innovation and close-to-market activities. 
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 Innovation policy cannot focus only on product and process innovation but 
rather on many forms, including social and organisational innovation. This 
leads some authors to refer, more generally, to “systemic innovation” 
(Mulgan & Leadbeater, 2013). The OECD recently observed that “social 
and organisational innovations, including new business models, are 
increasingly important to complement technological innovation”.7 
 Innovation policy cannot focus only on the supply side. Demand-side 
policies such as the strategic use of public procurement, policies that 
encourage the consumption of sustainable and innovative products, and 
policies that aim at improving the accessibility of innovative products 
(including education policy and even trade policy) are as important as 
traditional supply-side innovation policies such as R&D subsidies and tax 
breaks, patent law, or public funding of innovation and entrepreneurship.  
 Innovation policy is chiefly related not only to the development but also to 
the diffusion of new products, processes and services (Freeman, 1994). 
Public policy in support of innovation (especially in Europe) should look 
beyond the so-called ‘innovation deficit’ to encompass the ‘diffusion 
deficit’ that prevents new technologies and business models to reach the 
market or to become affordable for the majority of consumers. The recent 
Staff Working Document published by the European Commission on Better 
Regulation for Innovation-Driven Investment acknowledged the key role 
of public policy in removing obstacles to the commercialisation and 
diffusion of existing technologies, which lack a sufficiently large market in 
Europe (European Commission, 2015).  
 Innovation policy cannot rely exclusively on sector-specific industrial policy, 
since this would not constitute the best approach to trigger those 
organisational, transformational, disruptive changes that often create 
innovation by displacing existing business models.8 In short, innovation 
policy has to take a systemic view, not a sector-specific view. This is 
important also in order to avoid so-called incumbencyF problems, which 
emerge whenever policies crafted for a specific sector end up hampering 
                                                        
7 www.oecd.org/sti/OECD-Innovation-Strategy-2015-CMIN2015-7.pdf, at 6. 
8 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/pdf/ 
ecp438_en.pdf  
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disruptive innovation by empowering existing players and disadvantaging 
new entrants (OECD, 2015).  
 Innovation policy is increasingly in need of ‘direction’ (Fagerberg, 2015), in 
addition to facilitation of private sector entrepreneurship, R&D investment 
and knowledge transfer. The direction element implies that governments 
steer innovation efforts towards emergent and urgent societal challenges. 
This is done, as a matter of fact, by the Horizon 2020 programme (in 
particular in setting up European Innovation Partnerships) and even more 
explicitly in the US Strategy for American Innovation adopted by the 
Obama administration and recently updated and relaunched in October 
2015. This requires that governments choose to support those 
technologies that are more likely to bring social, economic and 
environmental benefits over time and to avoid creating biases or 
misalignments in their policies, which would disadvantage sustainable, 
systemic innovation. 
 Moreover, history and geography appear to be very important for a 
proactive innovation and entrepreneurship policy. The literature on 
innovation and entrepreneurship ecosystems suggests that not every 
portion of territory can become equally innovative, and therefore the role 
of government should be to select those environments in which 
entrepreneurship can flourish more easily and strengthen the ties 
between the various players that populate those environments whenever 
possible. This finding is potentially in line with the ‘smart specialisation’ 
approach adopted in EU regional policy. 
Most important, innovation policy is now focusing specifically on diffusion, 
for a number of reasons. First, while picking winners has been successful by 
governments promoting big science innovation (Mazzucato, 2014), institutions 
may often lack adequate knowledge of ‘which winners to pick’, and thus would 
not necessarily be able to choose the right technology on which to focus in order 
to accelerate deployment. For this reason, multi-stakeholder involvement should 
supplement governmental intervention. As reported by the OECD (2015): “The 
kinds of breakthrough innovations that can generate significant environmental 
benefits can come from fields as diverse as ICT, materials sciences and 
biotechnology.” And within these areas, several options exist. Innovation policy 
16 | INTRODUCTION: IS EUROPE SUFFERING FROM AN INNOVATION EMERGENCY? 
can contribute to this challenge if governments invest in the skills possessed by 
civil servants and, most important, if the institutional framework for innovation 
includes transparent multi-stakeholder, mission-oriented R&I platforms that can 
convey technical information and technology forecasts to policy-makers.  
Second, even if R&D were successfully promoted on a given technology, 
the market conditions for its uptake might not necessarily exist: in particular, not 
all innovative technologies are produced by incumbent players, and in most 
cases they imply a reshuffling of the status quo in a given sector. For example, 
many new business models in the energy or financial sector are not being 
adopted by incumbent players, who are typically less agile and more affected by 
sunk costs compared to new entrants; and in other cases, e.g. for smart grids, 
the need to cooperate with other players, e.g. telecoms, IT companies, could end 
up threatening the market position of the incumbent electricity companies, 
leaving them with little urge to move forward. In contrast, see Reinaud et al. 
(2016) for documentation of incumbents that have become innovators/players 
in this innovation space. 
Third, lack of skills, collective action problems and path dependency in 
consumption habits are often major obstacles to the uptake (deployment) of 
disruptive technologies and business models. Lack of skills can emerge both 
along the value chain (for example, repairers may lack the skills needed to work 
on electric vehicles); collective action problems can emerge whenever 
technological uptake is favoured by interoperable standards, e.g. recharging 
stations for electric vehicles or hydrogen-powered cars. Finally, path 
dependency can emerge whenever the technological breakthrough requires 
changing long-term contracts and switching providers; changing the way in 
which a given service or product is used by residential customers; changing 
equipment; etc. All these conditions have to be part of an overall assessment of 
the measures that would be needed in order to facilitate the smooth, swift 
penetration of more sustainable technologies into the market.  
All these problems deserve careful scrutiny in themselves and also for 
what concerns the role of the public sector, which is typically invoked whenever 
markets fail (as in the case of collective action problems). As observed, inter alia, 
by Mariana Mazzucato (2014), governments play a fundamental role in changing 
economic direction by creating and shaping markets, taking on risks at research 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 17 
and development stages and at stages of technological diffusion, by supporting 
manufacturing and commercialisation. Governments influence the direction of 
innovation when they manage training and educational institutions, produce 
information, set regulations, supply funds (with conditions attached), purchase 
goods and services, and set targets. The case of decarbonisation is no exception. 
There seems to be growing consensus on the need for strong public presence 
and direction, not just through regulation but also through systemic innovation 
policy, to lead the world towards long-term sustainable development.  
1.3 People, places, policies: Three pillars of innovation and 
entrepreneurship policy in Europe 
These basic principles (3Ss) and criteria (3Ds) presented above can be articulated 
based on a conceptual framework that relies on the interaction of three main 
pillars (our 3Ps): people, places and policies. For each pillar, the Task Force 
suggested a number of coherent policy recommendations. Figure 1 below 
summarises our overall conceptual framework based on the described 3Ss, 3Ds, 
3Ps approach.  
Figure 1. Conceptual scheme of the book 
 
 
The remainder of this book is structured as follows. The next section 
summarises the current understanding of innovation and entrepreneurship and 
their determinants, diffusion and impacts, based on contributions presented to 
the CEPS Task Force as well as recent academic literature. Then we present our 
3Ps as the key components of a well-designed innovation and entrepreneurship 
strategy, with backing materials, data and case studies.  
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 The People section mostly deals with skills and entrepreneurship and 
reflects on the future needs that the job market must meet feature in 
order to put EU education policy under pressure to deliver radical change.  
 The Places section looks at the various ways in which governments and 
private players can become vehicles of innovation and entrepreneurship 
and reflects on emerging patterns such as open science, open government 
and open innovation.  
 The Policies section looks more specifically at two aspects: i) the EU policy 
process and the formation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
the many rules that exert an impact on innovation and entrepreneurship, 
including the often-criticised ‘precautionary principle’ and the recently 
evoked ‘innovation principle’; and ii) the ways in which existing EU policies 
can be reviewed in order to provide innovators and entrepreneurs with a 
streamlined, predictable and effective framework within which to test and 
market their ideas.  
The final section concludes by summarising our main recommendations 
and outlining some avenues for future research.  
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2. INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: 
PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS AND EMERGING 
TRENDS 
here have been various attempts to define innovation and 
entrepreneurship. One commonly used definition of innovation points at 
“the process by which individuals and organisations generate new ideas 
and put them into practice”.9 Alternative definitions that have been frequently 
used in the past decades are market-focused and customer-oriented, such as “a 
process by which value is created for customers through public and private 
organisations that transform new knowledge and technologies into profitable 
products and services for national and global markets”;10 or “creating or 
improving goods, services, or methods of production” (Van Schewick, 2009). 
However, today these definitions appear too narrow, especially if one observes 
the peculiar dynamics of innovation and their likely evolution in the coming 
years.  
One of the most authoritative and pioneering scholars in this field, Joseph 
Schumpeter, used to define innovation way more broadly, as “the introduction 
of new goods…new methods of production…the opening of new markets…the 
conquest of new sources of supply…and the carrying out of a new organisation 
of any industry” (Schumpeter, 1934). Industrial economists tend to define 
innovation in terms of productive and dynamic efficiency, i.e. the ability of a 
society to push outwards the efficiency frontier by finding new ways to use 
existing resources, or creating new resources that can be added to the 
production mix.  
                                                        
9 White House, Strategy for American Innovation, 2011.  
10 This is the definition given by the Alliance for Science & Technology Research in America. 
T 
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Overall, there seems to be growing consensus on the fact that innovation, 
however defined, does not relate only to new products that come into the 
marketplace. Innovation may well occur in market processes and products but 
also outside the marketplace, including among end users and without the need 
for any R&D process. Innovation is more than science, which is not always 
needed and never enough. Against this background, defining and capturing 
innovation becomes even more difficult today, as markets and forms of 
exchange change continuously, often departing from the traditional chain of 
innovative activities, which took place mostly in universities and large public or 
private labs.  
Today, the most diverse forms of exchange are emerging, most often 
based on reciprocity and collaborative schemes, not on traditional market 
exchange (good examples being open source software, the collaborative 
economy, or distributed ledger models such as blockchain). In addition, 
innovation takes place inside and outside firms, through new mechanisms of 
collaboration such as open innovation chains and innovation hubs; moreover, 
users can be innovators just like big entrepreneurs are: some markets require 
significant R&D investment, others only a good dose of creativity and luck; 
industry clusters are moving online and becoming global, they do not need 
geographical proximity and they rather seek complementarities and synergies. 
Finally, the boom of data availability observed in the past few years – the so 
called ‘big data’ age – opens entirely new windows of opportunities for designing 
innovative products and anticipating societal needs, which in turn disrupt 
existing models of innovation (McKinsey & Co., 2011).  
In our view, adopting a sufficiently broad definition of innovation and its 
role in modern economies is essential for the design of effective innovation 
policy. Granieri & Renda (2011) propose a definition that encompasses two 
major elements: (i) the creation of new value (including through the efficient 
reallocation of existing resources) (ii) which contributes to progress.11 The first 
element is to be intended in the broadest possible sense, thus leaving space for 
user-generated innovation, automated innovation, industrial R&D projects, 
                                                        
11 To quote Professor Bijker, “While a new idea is a thought about something new or unique, 
and making that idea real is an invention, innovation is an invention that has a socioeconomic 
effect. Innovation changes the way people live.” 
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public investment, etc. The second element simply states that a new product is 
to be considered innovative only to the extent that it contributes to social 
welfare in the long run, without depriving society of resources that could have 
been more usefully allocated elsewhere. In a nutshell, innovation’s main features 
are allocative efficiency and progress.12 
Economists and social scientists have devoted significant efforts to the 
understanding of the dynamics and phenomenology of innovation. Initially, 
scholarly efforts were mostly devoted to the analysis of the innovation process, 
with peculiar emphasis on what happens inside a given firm during such a 
process. One of the leading authors in the analysis of developing innovation 
process models, Roy Rothwell, distinguished between various generations of 
innovation process models. Below, we provide a brief description of these 
generations, also recently summarised in Renda (2016). 
The first generation of innovation process modelling is called “linear 
technology push” and was widely used until end of 1960s. These models 
interpret innovation as a linear process, with research, development and the 
outputs of new successful products standing on the same level. The 
chronological alignment of each phase starts from research and encompasses 
pre-production, production, marketing and final sale.  
The second generation is what Rothwell calls the “market pull model”. This 
model reflects the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s innovation changed to 
include what was seen as a result of perceived customers’ needs, sourced 
through market research. The needs and demands of the market determined the 
work of R&D departments in companies. As a result, during that phase many 
companies engaged mostly in incremental rather than disruptive innovation.  
The third generation was characterised by the coupling of R&D and 
marketing (leading to the so-called ‘interactive model’) and refers to a period 
(the end of the 1980s) in which it became clear that neither technological push 
nor market pull strategies were enough to successfully handle the innovation 
process. The combination of technology push and market pull models was 
improved with the addition of feedback loops between science and innovation 
                                                        
12 See R.J.R Peritz (2006). And by the same author, the forthcoming “The Political Economy 
of Progress”.  
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and labelled as the ‘interactive model’ of technological opportunities and the 
needs of the market.  
Later, a fourth generation of innovation process models led to the 
identification of a more integrated, ‘chained model’ of innovation (Kline & 
Rosenberg 1986), characterised by the parallel use of integrated research teams 
and the involvement of the supplier and important customers. This generation 
of innovation clearly stands out from the previous one and models a stronger 
parallel process of innovation. Cooperation between research, development and 
production is enhanced, and horizontal collaboration, regardless of the 
company’s boundaries, is also considered. Due to the constantly shortening 
product lifecycle, this generation of innovation process models include time as a 
strategic variable. The (chained) model represents a further step towards a 
comprehensive innovation process actively involving research and existing 
knowledge. This model demonstrates the necessity of integrating knowledge 
into the innovation process, where knowledge is not understood as a result of 
scientific activities, but rather as a result of interaction between the individual 
units of a company, the company itself and its environment. The novelty of this 
model lies mostly in the fact that the market represents both the beginning and 
the end of the innovation process, and knowledge is integrated in all phases of 
the innovation process (though mainly in the research phase) and, therefore, 
considered a necessary prerequisite for innovation.  
The fifth generation of innovation process modelling is characterised by 
the identification of system integration and networking as dominant features of 
innovation. This also entails much stronger interaction with external research 
facilities and cooperation in the marketing area. This model also emphasises the 
vertical linkages with suppliers and customers along the whole innovation 
process, e.g. suppliers are involved in the co-development of new products 
and/or share the technical systems used for it, and the horizontal linkages take 
place in a variety of forms (joint ventures, alliances, consortia, etc.). For these 
reasons the fifth model represents a first step in the emergence of distributed 
innovation. This generation also marks the transition towards a vision of 
innovation that is broader and more systemic than the one adopted in the 
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previous four generations. As such, this model contains some elements than the 
subsequent open innovation models would capture more explicitly.13  
The sixth generation of innovation models is what is often termed open 
innovation, which implies, inter alia, the use of internal and external R&D 
sources; openness to external business models, a variety of IP generators and 
collaborations (SMEs, academics, etc.) and a proactive IP asset management. 
This is leading to an increase in the number of companies collaborating in 
innovative activities. In the words of Henry Chesbrough, the academic who 
coined the term, open innovation is a paradigm that assumes that firms use 
external ideas as well as ideas developed in-house, and internal and external 
paths to market, as firms look to advance their technology (Chesbrough et al., 
2006). Open innovation is not only concerned with sourcing of external 
knowledge into the firm (‘outside-in’) but also with exploring new channels of 
revenue generation by granting usage rights (joint ventures, licensing or outright 
sale) of in-house developments to other firms (‘inside-out’), “especially when the 
technology has future potential but is not part of the firm’s core strategy” (OECD, 
2008: supra note 126, at 11).  
While the original perspective of innovation primarily focused on research 
and development of firms, open innovation has outgrown this narrow view and 
today integrates different streams and perspectives (Gassmann et al., 2010). 
Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West (2014) explain that open and closed 
innovation are to be understood as two extremes of a spectrum, along which 
most business models can be found. The spectrum they describe is a function of 
the extent to which in-house R&D is involved in product development. Figure 1 
below shows Chesbrough’s latest description of open innovation. 
                                                        
13 As reported also by the OECD, “[T]he organisation of innovative activities (technological as 
well as non-technological) across firm boundaries is clearly on the increase, with more 
balance between internal and external sources of innovation...Industries such as chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and information and communication technology (ICT) typically show high 
levels of open innovation.” See OECD (2008). 
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Figure 2. Chesbrough’s description of open innovation 
 
Source: Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West (2014). 
In its original definition, open innovation mostly related to large 
corporations, which could act as catalysts of innovation efforts by becoming 
purchasers and orchestrators of streams of R&D, which involved much smaller 
companies, whose agility and flexibility usefully complement the capacity and 
organisation of larger firms.  
Since the emergence of the open innovation model, a number of trends 
have led to the emergence of even more distributed forms of innovation. Such 
trends include the following:  
 Increasingly proactive user involvement. The emergence of open innovation 
as a dominant mode of generation of new market solutions in several 
sectors of the economy was just the beginning of a new trend, which has 
led to the gradual involvement of many actors along the supply chain as 
key contributors to idea generation and testing. This led at once to the 
gradual rise of the end user as a protagonist of the innovation landscape 
and to enhanced possibilities for organisational innovation as an important 
new phenomenon. Part of this emerging paradigm of innovation is the so-
called ‘user innovation’ (Von Hippel, 1988, 2005). As explained, inter alia, 
by Henry Chesbrough, the difference between open and user innovation 
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is that the user innovation model advocates a decentralisation of 
innovation that changes the locus of innovation from firms to users and 
leads to the ‘democratisation of innovation’. In the user innovation model, 
innovation results from a collaborative and co-creation process, where 
users share tasks and the cost of developing innovative products and 
services, and then reveal their results. In other words, the motivation for 
innovation revolves around the concept of user utility gains rather than 
pecuniary returns. According to von Hippel (2013), users are firms or 
individuals that “expect to benefit from using a product or a service, in 
contrast to manufacturers that expect to benefit from selling a product or 
a service.” Therefore, users who contribute to the development of the 
innovative product or service (users-innovators) will adapt the innovation 
to their specific needs. The user-innovators, although they freely reveal 
the innovation, will receive greater utility from the use of this innovation 
than free-riders, as the innovation may not completely fulfil the needs of 
the latter. 
 Cumulative innovation. A specific case of user innovation, sometimes 
presented as a stand-alone category, is ‘cumulative innovation’ in which 
innovation is generated incrementally and collectively by a community of 
users that share similar values and are bound by formal or informal rules. 
The typical examples here are open source communities (Von Hippel, 
2001) for software development and creative commons communities for 
content production and sharing. Often these communities emerge on a 
local scale due to geographical proximity; the advent of the Internet, 
however, has made it possible to create global-scale communities and 
even industry clusters without the need for geographical proximity; in 
addition, the nature of information goods allows for easy versioning and 
reconfiguration, as well as incremental changes: this is a key feature for 
what concerns software and online content production. Importantly, users 
in this form of innovation may include both intermediate users (for 
example, users firms, downstream firms in the supply chain) and final users 
such as end consumers (Bogers et al., 2010; Berthon et al., 2006). User 
innovation is normally considered as an opportunity for innovating firms, 
as user creativity can be usefully employed in a co-creation process: 
however, in some cases user innovation can also threaten the firm, in 
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particular for what concerns its intellectual property (Baldwin & Von 
Hippel, 2011). The consequences of a massive shift towards user 
innovation and co-creation, especially in some sectors or sub-sectors of 
the economy, e.g. at the application layer of the ICT ecosystem, are also 
potentially disruptive to the ability of firms to secure intellectual property 
protection.  
 Social Innovation. Social innovation refers to new ideas, institutions and 
innovation processes that meet societal needs through new forms of civic 
participation and collaboration. The challenge of social innovation is to 
involve society in finding alternative and novel ways to face current 
societal challenges such as climate change, epidemics, increasing 
inequality and poverty. Social innovation often exploits Internet network 
effects and Internet collaborative power to harness the collective 
intelligence of communities in order to tackle these social challenges. 
Among the benefits of social innovation are the fact that “the involvement 
of users on a voluntary basis in the co-creation process reinforces people’s 
recognition by their communities, increases motivation and commitment, 
and results in the development of more solid innovation practices” 
(Murray, Caulier-Grice & Mulgan, 2010). The ultimate goal of social 
innovation models is ‘systemic innovation’, which entails “fundamental 
changes to the social system, affecting many elements which shape 
society: e.g. social movements, business models, laws and regulations, 
data, infrastructures, and the development of new frameworks and new 
ways of thinking and acting”. This definition is different from other existing 
definitions, which tend to portray social innovation as a “novel solution to 
a social problem that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than 
present solutions and for which the value created accrues primarily to 
society as a whole rather than private individuals” (Phills et al., 2008); or 
as “new strategies, concepts, ideas and organisations that meet the social 
needs of different elements which can be from working conditions and 
education to community development and health — they extend and 
strengthen civil society” (OECD, 2011). Social innovation can take place 
within government, the for-profit sector, the non-profit sector (also known 
as the third sector), or in the spaces between them. Research has focused 
on the types of platforms needed to facilitate such cross-sector 
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collaborative social innovation. Typical examples of social innovation are 
microcredit, e.g. the Grameen Bank, and the Indian frugal innovation 
model, which refers to innovative products and services that “seek to 
minimize the use of material and financial resources in the complete value 
chain (development, manufacturing, distribution, consumption and 
disposal) with the objective of reducing the cost of ownership while 
fulfilling or even exceeding certain pre-defined criteria of acceptable 
quality standards” (Tiwari & Herstatt, 2012b).  
 Distributed co-creation. Recently, scholars have observed even more open 
forms of innovation, called “distributed co-creation”. This practice mostly 
consists of organising R&D among a number of independent groups 
working in parallel and complementary streams of research and composed 
of both providers and customers looking for tailored solutions. Once again, 
this will require a cocktail of new talents, researchers and users (often in 
constant online contact) as well as clear and transparent rules on revenue-
sharing and IPR management. The peculiarities of this form of organisation 
and production are summarised by Yochai Benkler (2006: 100-101) in his 
description of granularity, as being an even more advanced form of 
modularity, allowing for micro-contributions to an ever-growing 
innovative product, the typical example being that of Wikipedia and the 
creative commons approach to content production. A number of 
companies have implemented co-creation strategies over the past few 
years, including notable examples such as LEGO and Threadless.14 In the 
software sector, open-source platforms developed through distributed co-
creation since the very beginning and ended up forming entire stacks of 
products such as the ‘LAMP’ (Linux, Apache, MySQL and PHP/Perl/Python), 
which have become standard components of the IT infrastructure at many 
corporations.  
The resulting phenomenon is our seventh generation of innovation models: the 
so-called ‘Open Innovation 2.0’ model. In particular, Curley & Salmelin (2013) 
have brought together the concepts of open innovation, user innovation and 
                                                        
14 LEGO, for instance, famously invited customers to suggest new models interactively and 
then financially rewarded the people whose ideas proved marketable. The shirt retailer 
Threadless sells merchandise online – and now in a physical store, in Chicago – that is 
designed interactively with the company’s customer base. 
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social innovation in new a model they call Open Innovation 2.0 (OI2). The authors 
emphasise three main points: 
 Co-opetition, i.e. collaboration between competitors (Brandenburger & 
Nalebuff, 1996). This goes beyond joint ventures: interdependent 
competitors work together to find solutions and develop new products 
(mashed-up products of multiple concepts and ideas).  
 The user as an integral member of the innovative process. The user, the 
fourth element of the quadruple helix, intervenes earlier in the innovation 
process to experiment, even before the innovation reaches the pilot stage, 
and actively participates in the co-creation of new markets for innovation. 
According to the authors, the co-creative process embedded in the 
quadruple helix approach leads to a win-win situation, as users get the 
products and services they need, and the suppliers get scalable products 
and services. This allows immediate feedback on which innovation is 
successful and enhances the probability of success, speeding up the 
scalability and quickly dismissing innovation in unsuccessful areas. 
 Value networks and interdisciplinarity. Intermediaries must connect value 
networks to form value constellations. They point out that interdisciplinary 
approaches must be taken that go beyond the traditional boundaries of 
disciplines such as ICT, chemistry, or mechanics, which should be mixed 
together. 
The European Commission points to five main elements that define Open 
Innovation 2.0, to be intended as “a new paradigm based on a Quadruple Helix 
Model where government, industry, academia and civil participants work 
together to co-create the future and drive structural changes far beyond the 
scope of what any one organisation or person could do alone”:15 networking; 
collaboration (involving partners, competitors, universities and users); corporate 
entrepreneurship (enhancing corporate venturing, start-ups and spin-offs); 
proactive intellectual property management (creating new markets for 
technology); and research and development (achieving competitive advantages 
in the market). 
                                                        
15 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/growth-jobs/open-innovation. 
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In summary, models of innovation used in the literature have significantly 
evolved over the past few decades, along with the modes of innovation observed 
in reality. Needless to say, and as already mentioned above, open innovation has 
been strongly facilitated by the development of new networking technologies, 
and in particular by the Internet and, inter alia, the versioning possibilities that 
the information economy has brought. In cyberspace, modularity and end-to-
end communication have determined the emergence of entirely new patterns of 
innovation, such as open source software and creative commons. This stimulated 
both collaboration between programmers, distributed and collective creation of 
new products and also co-innovation between customers and creators, shifting 
the frontier of intellectual exchange and co-creation towards previously 
unattainable levels. Table 1 below summarises the main features of the seven 
models of innovation described in this section. 
Table 1. Seven generations of innovation process modelling 
 
Source: Renda (2016), based on Kotzemir & Meissner (2013). 
2.1 Defining entrepreneurship 
Innovation requires entrepreneurs in the broadest sense of the word. A term 
thoroughly explored and researched by Austrian School economists, as 
illustrated by, inter alia, De Soto (2009), the concept of entrepreneurship implies 
Generation Period Authors of fundamental ideas Innovation model Essence of the model
1 1950s-late 1960s Technology push Linear Process
2 Late 1960s-First half 
of 1970s
Myers and Marquis (1969) Market Pull R&D on customer wishes
3 Second half of 1970-
end of 1980s
Mowery and Rosenberg (1979); 
Rothwell and Zegveld (1985)
Coupling model Interaction of Different Functions; 
Interaction with research institutions 
and market
4 End of 1980s-early 
1990s
Kline and Rosenberg (1986) Interactive model Simultaneous process with feedback 
loops; "Chain-linked model"
5 1990s Rothwell (1992) Integrated model System integration and networks (SIN)
6 2000s Chesbrough (2003) Networking Model Innovation collaboration and multiple 
exploitation paths
7 2010s Chesbrough (et al.) (2014) Open Focus on the individual and framework 
conditions under which to become 
innovative
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creativity and capacity to organise knowledge in a way that generates innovative 
commercialised products.  
The word “entrepreneurship” derives from the Latin term in prehendo, 
which means to discover, to see or to realise something (De Soto, 2009: supra 
note 14). Accordingly, entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who possess the 
ability to detect proﬁt opportunity offered by the environment in which they 
operate. This is why the concept of entrepreneurship implies vigilance and 
alertness. De Soto (2009) defines the main characteristics of entrepreneurs as 
follows: 
 Entrepreneurship always generates new information.  
 Entrepreneurship is fundamentally creative, which means that any social 
maladjustment is embodied in a proﬁt opportunity which remains latent 
until entrepreneurs discover it.  
 Entrepreneurship transmits information.  
 Entrepreneurship exerts a coordinating effect.  
 Entrepreneurship is competitive.  
 The entrepreneurial process never stops or ends.  
Likewise, the OECD (2011, 2015) defines entrepreneurs as the principal 
actors in innovation, since they “bring about change in an economy by providing 
‘new combinations’: new or improved goods, methods of production, markets, 
sources of supply of inputs, organisation of an industry, or management 
processes within a firm”. Entrepreneurs are defined as opportunity identifiers 
(Kirzner, 1973, 1997), risk-takers (Knight, 1921); resource shifters (Drucker, 
1985) and breakthrough innovators (Baumol, 2002).  
In other words, entrepreneurs are the engine of a national innovation 
system. They are the main actors in charge of detecting potential opportunities 
for profitable innovation that matches existing, potential or future market 
demand. In doing so they combine available information and knowledge to 
produce and disseminate new information in the form of new products and 
possibilities for consumption and production. It is important to clarify that 
entrepreneurs can also be the end users of innovation. They do not need to be 
producers of knowledge themselves: they can use knowledge produced in 
universities, R&D labs and anywhere else to develop new products and services.  
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Of course, entrepreneurs have limited information: this means that the 
greater the contribution of other actors to the production and dissemination of 
knowledge and the creation of innovative skills, the easier it will be for them to 
perform their crucial task for the achievement of progress and prosperity within 
a national innovation system. 
2.2 The innovation policy-industrial policy conundrum: Towards the 
quintuple helix? 
The need to promote entrepreneurship and innovation that contributes to 
addressing societal challenges is reflected also in recent attempts to steer the 
direction of innovation through next generation industrial policy. Such industrial 
policy approaches, e.g. Industry 4.0 in Germany, embed the so-called quadruple 
helix concept and are based on enhanced collaboration between universities, 
entrepreneurs, business and government.16 Any innovation policy intervention 
should be carefully aligned to industrial policy strategies. The nexus is provided 
by the so-called Smart Specialisation Strategy which aims at achieving 
knowledge-based transformation/development of the industrial/business 
texture of a region or nation. This strategy focuses on the strengths of the local 
ecosystem with an entrepreneurial approach and combines more entrepreneurs 
with more entrepreneurial approaches in research institutions and universities. 
Smart Specialisation should be supported by policy-makers at several levels (EU, 
national, regional). At these levels in particular, to link innovation and industrial 
policy within Smart Specialisation, four transformation models are envisaged: 
 Transition. A new economic domain emerges from existing industrial 
commons, e.g. sustainable chemistry sector. 
 Modernisation. Improvement of the efficiency and quality of an existing 
sector generated by the development of specific application of a general 
purpose technology, e.g. modernisation of traditional value chains. 
                                                        
16 At a more micro-level, evidence suggests that the percentage of turnover that companies 
generate from ‘novel products’ is positively correlated to their collaboration activities with 
universities (Faems, Van Looy & Debackere, 2005). On the contrary, this kind of collaboration 
does not have any significant impact on turnover from ‘improved products’, which is 
positively correlated with collaboration activities with suppliers and customers (the civil 
society). 
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 Diversification. Potential synergies materialising between an existing 
activity and a new one.  
 Radical foundation. R&D and innovation creates new economic domains 
that were not previously attractive. 
These possible policy options lead to important consequences for the mix 
of instruments that can be used by policy-makers to promote sustainable, 
systemic innovation. For example, public support for R&D, when well designed 
and accurately awarded, can make an important contribution to innovation.17 
Evidence suggests that subsidies have a positive effect on the level of R&D and 
on the innovation intensity of the recipient firms, and no significant crowding-
out effects are registered (Debackere, contribution to CEPS Task Force, 2015).18 
Non-funded firms would have certainly invested more in R&D and innovation if 
they had received public support. In addition, there are very important 
additionality and complementarity effects: in a nutshell, those firms that are 
funded by both national and EU sources invest more in innovation.  Hence, there 
are neither any crowding-out effects between different sources of public support 
to research and innovation. EU funds are complementary to national/regional 
funds: this is also important for the future of innovation policy in the EU, since it 
is not always possible to aggregate and cumulate the funds available at different 
levels of government, nor is it always easy for would-be recipients.  
                                                        
17 The ratio between R&D and GDP in the EU is still at 1.9%, the worst figure in developed 
economies. Many stakeholders suggest looking at the quality of R&D investment rather than 
at a merely quantitative target; and many argue that an outcome indicator, not an input one, 
would be needed to reflect the effective progress of innovation in Europe. That said, 
investing in R&D is still an important driver of economic growth (“technological progress” is 
the third production factor explaining economic growth, together with labour and capital, 
Solow equation). See Konraad Debackere’s contribution to the CEPS Task Force.  
18 Two main data sources: Mannheim innovation project (Community Innovation Survey for 
Germany) comprising all types of companies, including those that are not really involved in 
innovation. A set of 10-year panel data was adopted. The econometric analysis looked not 
only at public funds but also at internal investment, and no crowding out effect was 
registered. In addition, the private sector (including venture capital) is shifting to financing 
innovation (higher TRL) rather than R&D, so there might be not so much to crowd out when 
investing public money on R&D. 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 33 
Against this background, there seems to be room for deeper involvement 
of financial institutions in the overall innovation ecosystem, especially in the 
framework of the current EU Strategic Investment Plan.19 In its contribution to 
the CEPS Task Force, the European Central Bank argued for a quintuple helix 
approach, which would involve also the financial sector as a key intermediary.20 
Several challenges are posed by this sector. For instance, ECB via the EFSI wants 
to trigger financial ‘additionality’ in R&D&I investment. Nonetheless, the 
question shifts to the risk profile of this kind of investment and risk acceptance 
in the financial sector. It is worth stressing that four major Belgian banks before 
2008 were largely involved in private equity; today, as a result of Basel III, their 
involvement in private equity is close to zero. How to regulate the financial sector 
to foster innovation becomes then a very serious and important question. In the 
EU, venture capital is very limited; hence, the involvement of banks is still key 
and EU rules are probably not helping innovation flourish. In the same vein, 
looking at the national budget deficit, public funding might also be very limited 
due to current financial rules. Funding universities, research institutes or 
companies can clash with EU rules on budget deficits. This is a potential problem 
for EFSI, because mobilising additional investment in innovation might be less 
successful than expected. The fifth force in the quintuple helix is therefore as 
important as it is problematic in Europe. Various options are potentially 
available, including excluding innovation and R&D expenditure from the 
equation adopted to compute compliance with Maastricht parameters in the 
context of the European Semester. 
Another key aspect of innovation and entrepreneurship is the possibility 
for entrepreneurs to take risks and experiment with possible solutions. Venture 
capitalists usually focus on business planning and this has a negative effect on 
the survival rate of funded start-ups. Start-ups need flexibility and greater room 
for experimentation rather than strict adherence to initial business plans. Hence, 
start-up programmes within the EU require room for flexibility (“Fail fast fail 
small”).  
                                                        
19 https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment/investment-plan_en. 
20 The key role played by financial markets as well as financial education was emphasised by 
several participants in the Task Force meetings. 
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2.3 Future technologies and the challenges for innovation policy – 
revolutionising ICT and society as a whole 
This book is not specifically focused on information and communications 
technologies (ICT). However, when discussing innovation and its potential to 
contribute to emerging and future societal challenges, it is inevitable to mention 
ICT as both an enabler of innovative solution and the potential driver of emerging 
challenges for society, if not existential risks (Bostrom, 2016). In this respect, it is 
useful to recall that both ICT-producing and ICT-consuming sectors will be 
significantly reshuffled and revolutionised by the pervasive nature of new 
generation ICT. Already today, ICT (together with managerial competences) is a 
major component of Europe’s productivity gap with the United States. The 
OECD, among others, has repeatedly stated that “from the mid-1990s, many 
countries, particularly in Europe, did not keep pace with the acceleration of 
productivity growth associated with rapid diffusion in ICT in the United States, 
and gaps in productivity levels between the US and other advanced economies 
started to widen again”.21  
Since Solow (1987), there has been a hectic debate on the impact of ICT 
on economic performance and, particularly, on productivity. Most firm-level 
studies show that investment in ICT is positively correlated with product, process 
and organisational innovation, as well as with productivity. The literature overall 
suggests that R&D mostly contributes to innovation in manufacturing, while ICT 
affects positively all types of innovation in services but not in manufacturing 
(Alvarez, 2016). Today, ICT represents a separate, ever-expanding, layered 
ecosystem which pervades more and more sectors of the economy every year. 
Such an ecosystem, as more specifically observed in Renda (2016), features a 
number of foundational, differentiating features that must be taken into account 
when crafting innovation policy. These include Moore’s law (according to which 
the number of transistors – the fundamental building blocks of the 
microprocessor and the digital age – incorporated on a computer chip will double 
every two years, resulting in increased computing power and devices that are 
faster, smaller and lower cost); modularity, which leads many industry players to 
converge on a single de facto industry standard (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1999; 
                                                        
21 www.oecd.org/global-forum-productivity/library/The-Productivity-Inclusiveness-Nexus-
Preliminary.pdf. 
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Shapiro & Varian, 1998); an end-to-end architecture, which implies the 
possibility, for every end user, to engage in communication and exchange 
information with every other end user; and the predominance of digital 
information goods, which feature endless replicability and non-rivalry in 
consumption, near-zero or zero marginal costs;  plasticity and granularity. These 
foundational characteristics have determined the emergence of some of the 
features that are typically attributed to the ICT ecosystem by industry analysts.  
 First, R&D intensity and innovation rates tend to be greater than in other 
sectors. This depends on a number of factors, including the acceleration in 
computing power (Moore’s law); the possibilities for diffusion guaranteed 
by the common architecture (Metcalfe’s law); and the possibilities for 
participation secured by the choice of open protocols, i.e. anyone can in 
principle develop a software or hardware that is compatible with existing 
Internet protocols.  
 Second, innovation was initially largely incremental, due to modular 
architectural design that followed ‘big bang’ inventions such as the 
computer chip and the Internet protocol: this feature is however not as 
evident today due to the platformisation of the Internet and the 
permeation of a number of economic sectors by new and disruptive 
business models (see below).  
 Third, product life cycles become increasingly shorter due to the 
acceleration of technological change: several companies in the ICT 
ecosystem (and, to an even greater extent, the ones active at higher layers, 
such as operating systems, other middleware and applications) reportedly 
work on at least three successive generations of products (the current one, 
the next one and the one after that).  
 Fourth, the end-to-end architecture of the Internet and the digital nature 
of information goods have led to the emergence of network effects and 
large economies of scale in the ICT ecosystem: this, in turn, has led to the 
emergence of multisided platforms that are gradually changing the 
architecture of the network.  
Based on these peculiarities, today a number of trends are affecting the 
ICT ecosystem. They include the following. 
36 | INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS AND EMERGING TRENDS 
From the ‘neutral’ to the ‘platformised’ ICT ecosystem. As observed, inter 
alia, by Palacin et al. (2013) and by David Clark and K.C. Claffy (2014, 2015), this 
transition is now evident if one confronts the original (three-tier) model of the 
connectivity and logical layer of the ICT ecosystem with the emergence of 
vertically integrated platforms that make extensive use of traffic acceleration 
techniques and developed their own semi-walled gardens to improve their 
customers’ experience and capture the bulk of the end users’ attention. A 
company like Apple uses content delivery networks (CDNs) like the ones 
provided by Akamai to accelerate traffic to its FaceTime users; and at the same 
time hosts more specialised providers such as Netflix, which in turn use traffic 
acceleration techniques to enable video streaming services to subscribers 
through a multitude of existing platforms (iOS, Android, public Internet). A 
company like Spotify can be defined as a two-sided specialised platform 
(matching users with rights holders), but access to it mostly occurs through 
existing large platforms (iOS and Android). This phenomenon, often called 
“platformisation” of the ICT ecosystem, bears far reaching consequences for 
both innovation and innovation policy. In particular, understanding the 
economics of platforms is essential to understanding the direction and pace that 
innovation might take in various parts (layers) of the ICT ecosystem, as will be 
discussed in the next section. 
Virtualisation and the cloud. With cloud computing, technology has made 
it possible for small companies to avoid buying or leasing hardware and 
downloading software and applications: these traditional transactions were 
replaced by “everything as a service”, which led to enormous advantages both 
for individuals and businesses.  
Openness and collaboration. Open source software is evolving and growing 
from the initial models of “copyleft” licensing, based on reciprocity and the 
voluntary commitment to refrain from claiming the exclusive right to 
commercially exploit a given invention, towards a variety of models, which 
include the making available of entire patent portfolios for free exploitation by 
users and small entrepreneurs. Openness has become an increasingly dominant 
paradigm in research and innovation, thanks to the Internet evolution. Key 
examples include, in the public sector, the recent decision by NASA to make 
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hundreds of patents available for free for developers;22 and in the private sector, 
the decision by Google to open up its Android patents;23 as well as the decision 
by Tesla’s Elon Musk (later followed by other car manufacturers such as Ford) to 
open up for free the company’s patent portfolio to external developers.24 This 
example is being followed by governments: for example, the United States Open 
Government Plan is increasingly geared towards the diffusion of all information 
held by public administrations for use by researchers and individual citizens as 
users or contributors to innovative projects (Renda, 2016). Overall, this trend 
leads to the identification of a new strategy for the launch of innovative, 
disruptive platforms, which chiefly depends on making technical information 
available royalty-free to maximise diffusion and achieve first-mover advantage. 
A similar strategy is being used by Toyota for the hydrogen car.25 And needless 
to say, the open, collaborative economy is emerging in many more sectors than 
the often-mentioned taxi (Uber, BlaBlaCar) and hotel/accommodation (Airbnb) 
sectors.26 
The data-driven economy. Another important trend is the breath-taking 
surge in the availability of data, coupled with the dramatic reduction in the cost 
of data storage and processing. The power of big data analytics, according to 
many experts, still has to be fully discovered, especially if one considers that the 
                                                        
22 www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-offers-licenses-of-patented-technologies-to-start-up-
companies/. 
23 http://techcrunch.com/2015/07/23/google-offers-to-sell-patents-to-startups-to-boost-
its-wider-cross-licensing-initiative/. 
24 www.digitaltrends.com/business/ford-to-open-electric-vehicle-patents-news-pictures/. 
25 www.zdnet.com/article/toyota-pushes-hydrogen-fuel-cell-cars-with-open-patent-
portfolio/. 
26 Owyang & McClure (2015) describe the ever-changing landscape of collaborative economy 
champions as now composed (based on the jargon used in Silicon Valley) of three Pegasus 
companies (Uber, Airbnb, Wework); a few Unicorns (Didi, LendingClub, Ola Cabs, HomeAway, 
Lyft, Instacart, Beepi, Blue Apron, Prosper, GrabTaxi, Thumbtack, BlaBlaCar, Etsy Tuja, Rocket 
Taxi); and Centaurs (Freelancer, Chegg, Rent the Runway, Postmates, Shyp, Inspirato, Circle, 
Hailo, RelayRides). The authors do not list the ‘ponies’, defined as companies with a 
capitalisation of less than $10 billion; and the hundreds of start-ups that have the legitimate 
ambition to join one of those other categories. Most likely, these companies will further 
proliferate in the coming years. The total capitalisation of sharing economy players calculated 
by the authors as of 24 October 2015 totalled $128.7 billion. 
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overwhelming majority of data available for analytics (some say, 99%) has been 
produced in the past two years; or, as others have observed, “the amount of data 
generated in two days is as much as all data generated in human history before 
2003”.27 Big data applications are encompassing many sectors of the economy, 
but also many forms of innovation, including, increasingly, Open Innovation 2.0.  
Connecting everything (the IoT revolution). Machine-to-machine 
communication (M2M) is an enabler for data-driven innovation in many 
industrial applications and services, including logistics, manufacturing and even 
health care. With at least 20 billion devices expected to be connected at the end 
of the decade, it is easy to recognise why M2M is considered an impending 
revolution, likely to connect the ‘remaining 99%’ of things and humans that have 
not yet been connected. Again, the Internet of things (IoT) revolution will mean 
essentially an extension of the features of ICT (in particular, network effects, 
platformisation and re-intermediation) to many other sectors of the economy, 
even those that are typically characterised by more ‘linear’ models of innovation, 
e.g. automotive and more generally manufacturing. Such a transition is likely to 
result in very important consequences for the industrial organisation of several 
sectors, especially due to the foreseen transition towards the so-called ‘factory 
of the future’. This will imply a ‘cocktail’ of many different technologies, including 
smart objects (the IoT), advanced and secure cloud computing for central data 
storage, infrastructure and frequencies for multi-tech, always-on connectivity 
(starting with 5G wireless communications, but including sensor infrared 
technologies and others, e.g. Bluetooth); advanced robotics; 3D printing; and of 
course big data analytics for optimised management of the supply chain. This will 
be coupled with granular business models that will enable mass customisation 
and real-time reconfiguration of the supply chain. In Europe, this trend has been 
accompanied by an ambitious strategy originated by Germany with its Industrie 
4.0 initiative launched in 2011, and is currently being scaled up at the pan-
European level.  
The Internet of value. In emerging sectors such as FinTech, distributed 
architectures born thanks to the Internet are reaching new levels of 
sophistication and are empowering unprecedented, disruptive innovation. One 
                                                        
27 www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/ 
Data%20Report%20Final%2010.23.pdf. 
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key example is the blockchain technology that backs all crypto-currencies such 
as BitCoin and empowers distributed processing of data, robust transaction 
verification and potential applications on a variety of platforms, including on 
virtual reality systems such as Oculus Rift or Google Cardboard. Among others, 
Taylor (2015) explains that both permissioned and unpermissioned blockchains 
have tremendous potential in fields such as smart contracts, virtual transactions, 
dis-intermediated mortgage and investment markets, and many more, creating 
what some commentators have defined as the “Internet of value”.28  
Artificial intelligence and human-machine interaction. Last but not least, 
artificial intelligence (AI) is already becoming pervasive in many sectors. In the 
online environment, ChatBots are replacing humans and Microsoft recently 
announced the development of the first software that is more accurate than 
humans at speech recognition. Self-driving cars implement increasingly AI-
powered software, prompting both the European Parliament and governments 
in Germany, the US and the State of California to actively work on regulations 
aimed at governing the moral decisions that AI will have to make.  
All these trends outlined above are very important for the future of the ICT 
ecosystem. However, even more important is the fact that they are occurring 
simultaneously. The combination of disruptive innovation in network 
architectures, e.g. blockchain, new sensor and wireless communication 
technologies, e.g. 5G, nanotechnologies, robotics and artificial intelligence is 
likely to create unprecedented possibilities for innovation, most often based on 
predominantly open standards and free/open source software, low entry 
barriers and completely innovative funding and management arrangements. In 
the next sections, we will take these trends into account when suggesting policy 
changes for the EU. 
                                                        
28 www.finextra.com/finextra-downloads/newsdocs/ 
The%20Fintech%202%200%20Paper.PDF. 
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2.4 The age of openness: Crafting a new role for government and 
citizens 
2.4.1 Open science and citizen science: The emerging role of 
empowered citizens as drivers of innovation 
Generally speaking, “open science” refers to an approach to research based on 
greater access to public research data, enabled by ICT tools and platforms, and 
broader collaboration in science, including the participation of non-scientists, 
and finally, the use of alternative copyright tools for diffusing research results. 
As reported by the OECD, “open science has the potential to enhance the 
efficiency and quality of research by reducing the costs of data collection, by 
facilitating the exploitation of dormant or inaccessible data at low cost and by 
increasing the opportunities for collaboration in research as well as in 
innovation”.29 Greater access to research data can also help advance science’s 
contribution to solving global challenges by enhancing access to data on a global 
scale, e.g. in the case of climate change data.  
The conceptualisation of open science goes back to the work of sociologist 
Robert Merton, who in the early 1940s laid down the foundations for the analysis 
of science and its role in society. Merton argued that science had developed 
norms of behaviour that cumulatively contributed significantly to the growth and 
quality of scientific knowledge: these norms were summarised in the acronym 
CUDOS (communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, originality and 
scepticism). In 2003, economist Paul David first coined the term “open science”, 
mostly as a way to highlight the contrast between norms in science and the 
tendency towards limiting the availability of information observed in the 
innovation world, where intellectual property has long been a prevailing way to 
incentivise the production of knowledge. Chesbrough (2015) observes that the 
Internet age has led the “Mertonian” norms to find expression in new institutions 
that again create even greater volumes of knowledge that diffuse even more 
rapidly, a key example being open source software. In other words, as recalled 
by the OECD (2015), “open science is the encounter between the age-old 
tradition of openness in science and the tools of information and 
                                                        
29 www.oecd.org/sti/outlook/e-outlook/stipolicyprofiles/interactionsforinnovation/ 
openscience.htm. 
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communications technologies (ICTs) that have reshaped the scientific enterprise 
and require a critical look from policy makers seeking to promote long-term 
research as well as innovation” (OECD, 2015: 9). 
The key aspects of the Internet age that have boosted the potential of 
open science are the digitisation of (increasing amounts of) information and the 
end-to-end Internet architecture. Over the past two decades, the emergence of 
digital content compression technologies and the Internet, with its end-to-end 
architecture, have determined a massive change in the way information is 
created, shared and distributed between end users. On the one hand, the digital 
nature of information has led to new forms of production, e.g. creative 
commons, open source software, and enabled new forms of versioning and 
reconfiguration of products, to such a significant extent that today the concept 
of “mass customisation” is conceivable only in, or thanks to, the ICT sector 
(Renda, 2016).  
On the other hand, the end-to-end architecture of the Internet has 
exponentially amplified the possibility for information goods to be produced, 
modified and disseminated: this is also due to the fact that digital goods can 
feature high fixed costs (in particular, R&D costs) but often very negligible 
marginal costs. Suffice it to think about the shift in music consumption and 
production that was enabled by digital technology coupled with the Internet’s 
end-to-end architecture. While the former technology already enabled new 
forms of production, e.g. through sampling, already before the advent of the 
Internet era, the late 1990s witnessed the emergence of peer-to-peer file-
sharing platforms that led to a major reshuffling of the music industry, e.g. 
Napster. 
Furthermore, open science and collaborative creation have become 
gradually cheaper thanks to the mind-boggling reduction of computing and 
storage costs. The OECD, among others, reports a drastic fall in the cost of data 
storage costs between 1998 and 2012. In addition, the gradual increase in 
broadband connectivity and the fall in the costs of hardware such as 3D printers 
have made accessing and reproducing research results easier over time, 
potentially leading to what some authors already call the “democratisation” of 
science.  
42 | INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS AND EMERGING TRENDS 
There are, however, other factors that can be said to have played a 
decisive role in the emergence of open science over the past few years. In 
particular, the decision by computer scientists such as David Clark and Tim 
Berners Lee to design and preserve the Internet as a ‘dumb’ end-to-end network, 
as well as the decision by policy-makers to shield Internet service providers from 
liability for the conduct of their users has certainly contributed to the 
development of the Web as an environment where information sharing could be 
possible and indeed became part of the overall ‘netizen’ culture. And needless 
to say, the fact that the Internet was built on open, interoperable standards has 
been essential for this development. 
That said, it would be misleading to state that open science is a well-
defined domain. Fecher & Friesike (2015), in a recent literature review, define it 
as “an umbrella term encompassing a multitude of assumptions about the future 
of knowledge creation and dissemination”, and identify five open science schools 
of thought, as shown in Figure 3 below: the infrastructure school (which is 
concerned with the technological architecture), the public school (concerned 
with the accessibility of knowledge creation), the measurement school 
(concerned with alternative impact measurement), the democratic school 
(concerned with access to knowledge) and the pragmatic school (concerned with 
collaborative research). 
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Figure 3. Five Schools of Open Science 
 
Source: Fecher & Friesike (2015). 
Depending on the definition and perspective adopted, open science is 
today considered as incorporating at least six main sub-pillars (Majer, 2015):  
 Open data, which implies that data and content can be freely used, modified 
and shared by anyone for any purpose.30 This sub-pillar of open science can 
encompass both the requirement to keep data open for all government-
funded research projects, but also more pervasive strategies aimed at 
opening up data in the possession of government agencies, as will be 
explained below (Tran & Scholtes, 2016). 
                                                        
30 See http://opendefinition.org/.  
44 | INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS AND EMERGING TRENDS 
 Open source, which entails that the underlying source code of data and 
content is made available and complies with a number of well-specified 
criteria and principles.31 
 Open methodology, i.e. a methodology which has been described in 
sufficient detail to allow other researchers to repeat the work and apply it 
elsewhere.  
 Open peer review, which aims at making peer review a collaborative 
process between authors and reviewers; it is about constructive criticism 
but with the goal of helping the authors to get published.32 
 Open access. Content is made available for anyone to read without having 
to pay, and the related license allows secondary use such as text and data 
mining.33  
 Open educational resources, i.e. high-quality, openly licensed, online 
educational materials that offer the opportunity for people everywhere to 
share, use and reuse knowledge. This ranges from sectoral repositories of 
free educational content to massive open online courses (MOOCs).  
Today, there are numerous examples of successful open science initiatives at the 
global level including, inter alia, well-known repositories such as PubMedCentral 
in the life sciences, arXiv in physics, mathematics and computer sciences and 
RePec in economics; new initiatives such as PLOS One and BioMed Central; large 
institutes providing access to a wealth of data such as the Research Data Alliance, 
CODATA, ICSU, EMPL-EBI; private organisations adopting an open access policy 
such as the Wellcome trust, the Open Knowledge Foundation and the Bill and 
                                                        
31 See https://opensource.org/osd-annotated. 
32 Watson (2015). The British Medical Journal gathered convincing evidence that open review 
did no damage to the quality of peer reviews; yet still they insisted that they introduced open 
peer review for “ethical reasons”, believing that removing anonymity would help bring an 
end to the worst abuses of peer review and transform the entire process from one of 
judgment to one of open, scientific discourse. When reading these words, doesn’t it make 
you wonder why peer review was ever anything else? 
33 A good solution are the ‘living figures’ introduced by F1000Research, which are data within 
papers that update in real-time as more data become available. Rather tellingly, 
F1000Research is an open-access publisher. 
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Melinda Gates Foundation; private start-ups such as figshare, public-private 
partnerships such as SHOK and DIGILE in Finland. More generally, the amount of 
data released by institutions such as CERN has led to collaborative efforts that 
have eventually generated scientific discoveries as important as the Higgs Boson, 
which was described in a publication that counts more than 6,000 authors.34 
Available studies confirm that increased accessibility of publicly funded research 
outputs can lead to significant additional benefits to society.35 
Defining open science is, however, different from conceptualising the way 
in which governments can promote openness and knowledge sharing. There are 
compelling arguments, today for governments to try to harness the recognised 
potential of open data for economic development and growth.36 And the 
                                                        
34 See, for instance, Atlas Collaboration (2012), “Observation of a new particle in the search 
for the Standard Model Higgs boson with the ATLAS detector at the LHC”, Physics Letters B 
716,1 (2012): 1–29. doi:10.1016/j.physletb.2012.08.020. As we shall see below, it is unclear 
at this point how helpful it is to each of the individual contributing scientists to be among the 
6,000 authors, in terms of personal recognition and prestige. Merton’s CUDOS implies 
scarcity in academic credit yields prestige and recognition. When such credit is distributed 
among 6,000 people, the social rewards to any one individual may be diluted. 
35 Rasmussen and Sheehan (2010) estimated that a public access policy mandate for US 
federal research agencies over a transitional period of 30 years may be worth approximately 
$1.6 billion and up to $1.75 billion if no embargo period is in place. Approximately $1 billion 
would benefit the US economy directly and the remaining amount would translate into 
economic spillovers to other countries. These figures would be significantly higher than the 
estimated cost of implementing open access archiving. JISC (2014) conducted a study on the 
economic impact of three UK data centres (the Economic and Social Data Service, the 
Archaeology Data Service and the British Atmospheric Data Centre), and estimated that the 
returns to investment of each of these three centres could be between approximately 
twofold and tenfold over 30 years. 
36 Two studies comissioned by the European Commission. In particular, Graham Vickery 
found that the size of the narrowly defined EU direct, “business as usual”, public sector 
information reuse market was on the order of €28 billion in 2008 with an annual growth rate 
of around 7%. This was a conservative estimate, as it excluded domains where reuse was not 
a principal activity, as well as the value of government activities. The Vickery study also 
investigated the indirect benefits of open data, estimating aggregate direct and indirect 
economic benefits for the whole EU economy on the order of €200 billion in 2008, or 1.7% 
of the GDP of the EU as a whole. McKinsey estimated that, globally, seven sectors alone could 
generate more than $3 trillion a year – and up to $5 trillion a year – in additional value as a 
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international community has been particularly vocal in mandating that 
governments open up science and knowledge as much as possible.37 
There are different ways in which an open science strategy can be 
promoted by governments:38 
 Open access to government-funded research. This requires that all 
government-funded activities, including research and innovation projects, 
lead to openly accessible and reusable data. For example, in the United 
States, the National Institutes of Health was required to change its data 
access policies in 2007; the White House’s Increasing Access to the Results 
of Federally Funded Research Executive Directive released in February 
2013 directs federal agencies to develop plans to make the publications 
resulting from federally funded research freely available to the public 
within one year of publication and required researchers to better account 
for and manage the digital data resulting from federally funded scientific 
research with the goal of making these data publicly accessible as well 
(Mauthner, 2013). At the EU level, an open research data pilot has been 
launched within the context of Horizon 2020 and led to the publication of 
Guidelines on Data Management, the last version of which is dated 30 
October 2015.39 Already in 2007, the Council conclusions on information 
in the digital economy called upon member states to take steps towards 
an open access policy, but the landscape still appears heavily 
fragmented.40 
                                                        
result of open data. Similarly appalling estimates came, for example, from the UK 
Shakespeare review of public sector information 
37 Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1949), Article 15 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and Article 15 of the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) all articulate the 
obligation to share scientific knowledge and the right to share in the benefits of scientific 
knowledge. 
38 See also McKinsey (2015), which observes that governments can act as providers, catalysts, 
users and policy-makers in this domain.  
39 http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/grants_manual/hi/oa_pilot/ 
h2020-hi-oa-data-mgt_en.pdf. 
40 See the PASTEUR40A report at www.pasteur4oa.eu/. 
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 A “whole-of-government” open data policy. This implies that government-
held data are made available to everybody for use, editing and 
dissemination. In June 2013 G-8 countries met to agree on the Open Data 
Charter, which specifies a number of principles that signatory countries 
are expected to comply with in the coming years, going way beyond open 
access. These include releasing open data by default in open and machine-
readable formats (unless there is a compelling reason not to, such as 
national security or privacy concerns); ensuring high quality and quantity 
of data; making data usable by all, including through standardised 
metadata, open licenses and other ways to ensure general accessibility; 
releasing data for improved governance and for innovation. The latter two 
commitments imply, more specifically, that government agencies share 
best practices on open data internationally, release certain “key data sets” 
specified in the charter and seek input from civil society, including for data 
sets considered “high value” by the charter, as well as engage with 
developer communities and fund open data start-ups. 
 A full-fledged open government strategy. Even more ambitious, this 
endeavour does not only imply that governments open up their decision-
making process to allow access by external stakeholders, e.g. through 
systematic stakeholder consultation, data releases, Freedom of 
Information Act requests, or merely go beyond the idea that government 
can use digital channels to communicate with citizens and provide access 
to public services as in what is often termed “eGovernment”; it also entails, 
most important, that citizens and civil society are empowered and allowed 
to provide early inputs into the shaping of public decisions and 
expenditure, e.g. participatory budgeting, thus realising the full potential 
of participatory democracy (Noveck, 2015).41 In line with this view, Heller 
(2012) argues that open government includes information transparency, 
public engagement and accountability. 
 Policy-making in support of open science. In recent years it has become 
clear that open science goes way beyond open access to publications or 
data; it includes many aspects and stages of research processes. Open 
                                                        
41 http://thegovlab.org/open-government-whats-in-a-name/ provides a plethora of 
definitions of open government.  
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science is a broader concept that also includes the interoperability of 
scientific infrastructure, open and shared research methodologies (such as 
open applications and informatics code) and machine-friendly tools. This 
approach to government support of open science entails adopting specific 
public policy measures to promote open data, access and standards also 
outside government. This includes, inter alia, the removal of legislative and 
regulatory obstacles to research activities based on text and data mining, 
the clarification of privacy constraints to the use of (big) data, the provision 
of incentives to universities, SMEs and larger companies for the creation 
of open platforms, promoting competition and collaboration on research 
ideas.  
These approaches to openness can also be seen as presenting different 
degrees of complexity. As also acknowledged by the OECD (2015), a whole of 
government open data strategy can be way more difficult than adopting a 
commitment to open access, due to a number of reasons that include problems 
related to the ownership of datasets; significant diversity of datasets in research 
(from excel tabs to large datasets collected by machines); problems in defining 
when a given dataset is ready to be released; confidentiality issues; security 
issues; lack of incentives in the academic community; missing infrastructure and 
skills; and lack of adequate and sustainable funding. 
The emerging evidence on the economic importance of open science and 
data has led governments to increasingly focus on the development of ad hoc 
strategies to boost economic development and growth through openness. In 
order to achieve this result, it is essential that all the key actors and enablers of 
a vibrant open science environment be adequately involved and stimulated. 
More in detail: 
 Enablers include, inter alia, the infrastructure developed to share articles 
or data, initiatives undertaken to develop an open science culture, 
amendments to the legal framework to make them increasingly open-
science friendly or the development of the skills (demand and supply side) 
necessary for researchers to share and reuse the research outputs 
produced by others. 
 Actors include researchers; universities and research centres; ministries 
and research funding agencies or public foundations; libraries, data 
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centres and repositories; private scientific publishers; and businesses. In 
addition, as already explained, international and intergovernmental 
organisations, coupled with private transnational organisations, can play 
an essential role in promoting coordination across governments and an 
overall culture of open science across countries.  
Both enablers and actors are important ingredients of an open science 
policy. Creating a wealth of data through mandatory publication of government-
held information in open, machine-readable format can add significant value to 
the economy, but requires the existence of researchers who can reuse these 
data to build welfare-enhancing new business models and/or bring new, enticing 
products to market. This, in turn, calls into question the importance of education 
policy to create and promote the diffusion of skills related to data science. In 
addition, it requires that, for example, privacy and copyright legislation create no 
unreasonable obstacle to the elaboration and processing of data, as well as their 
use in innovative business models. Such innovative products and services will 
require an overall legal and economic environment that is conducive to 
entrepreneurship.   
2.4.2 Citizen participation in research: citizen science and 
crowdsourcing 
The last frontier of open science in government involves the participation of 
citizens in the research process. The term “citizen science” was introduced in the 
mid-1990s by Rick Bonney in the United States and Alan Irwin in the United 
Kingdom.42 It is a broad term, covering that part of Open Science in which citizens 
participate in the scientific research process. Such participation can take place in 
different ways: as observers or funders, in identifying images or analysing data, 
                                                        
42 Some people equate citizen science with a movement to democratise science. This idea 
likely stems from the 1995 publication of Alan Irwin’s book, Citizen Science: A Study of People, 
Expertise, and Sustainable Development (Irwin, 1995). The goal of citizen science espoused 
by Irwin is to bring the public and science closer together, to consider possibilities for a more 
active “scientific citizenship”, and to involve the public more deeply in dialogue and decision-
making around issues related to risk and environmental threat. Other people equate citizen 
science with public participation in scientific research, in particular, with members of the 
public partnering with professional scientists to collectively gather, submit or analyse large 
quantities of data. 
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or providing data themselves. Bonney et al. (2015), without pretending to create 
a formal taxonomy, distinguish between four different forms of citizen science:  
 Data collection, in which volunteers – who may or may not have any formal 
training as scientists – collect data that can be used in organised scientific 
research.  
 Data processing, sometimes referred to as “crowd science”, which often 
focuses on activities such as data transcription, categorisation, 
management and interpretation, e.g. mapping and classifying images from 
space, modelling the earth’s climate using historic ship logs, mapping 
neurons in the human brain). For example, NASA is relying on 30,000 
volunteers to map the sky and search for clues on the formation of the 
solar system.43 
 Curriculum-based projects, typically developed in pre-college education 
(so-called ‘K-12’44) involve youth, supervised by educators or other adults, 
collecting and submitting data to a larger, ‘parent’ citizen science project, 
and often such projects are aligned to state and/or national science 
standards.  
 “Community science” projects involve data collection but typically seek to 
affect policy- or local decision-making for public health or conservation. 
Community science projects often are developed by members of the 
public who reach out to scientists for assistance. They may involve 
workshops for community members focused not only on data collection 
but also on how to speak to the media and public officials about scientific 
findings; how to use findings to influence land, air and water quality 
regulations and enforcement; and how to ask answerable research 
questions. Bonney et al. (2009) and Shirk et al. (2012) suggest that among 
citizen science projects, co-created projects may have the greatest 
potential to achieve a wide range of public understanding impacts. This is 
                                                        
43 www.datainnovation.org/2015/10/getting-the-u-s-government-on-board-with-citizen-
science/. 
44 K-12, a term used in education and educational technology in the United States, Canada, 
and possibly other countries, is a short form for the publicly supported school grades prior 
to college. These grades are kindergarten (K) and the first through the 12th grade (1-12). (If 
the term were used, ‘13th grade’ would be the first year of college.) 
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primarily because such projects typically involve participants not only in 
collecting data but also in developing research questions and designing 
research protocols, interpreting data and disseminating results. Also, 
many citizen science projects intertwine engagement in the science 
process with the goals of public engagement in governance and science-
based decision-making in ways that Irwin (1995) envisioned two decades 
ago. 
Most citizen science projects provide multiple benefits. For example, a 
2015 synthesis of peer-reviewed literature describes the individual- and 
community-level impacts of volunteer environmental monitoring. Specific 
outcomes reported in peer-reviewed journal articles include “improved 
communication between government and local stakeholders, increased 
knowledge and changed attitudes among participants, better adherence to 
natural resource regulations by community members, and empowerment of 
local stakeholders.”45 Local stakeholders also became more engaged in 
ecosystem management and policy discussions, and the scientific literacy of 
participants grew. In addition, community-based monitoring or management led 
to improved relationships with the communities involved. 
Governments are increasingly reverting to crowdsourcing and citizen 
science to solve complex research problems, which in turn allow for more rapid 
and effective solutions to public policy problems. Authoritative scholars recently 
observed that citizen science is becoming “nearly as big a concept as science 
itself” (Bonney et al., 2016). Citizen science associations are now becoming more 
organised, with chapters in many regions around the world.   
At the same time, there are also critiques to the recurrent use of citizen 
science, in particular about the setup of the projects, their output and their 
quality, which calls for the improvement of standards, guidance and other 
criteria related to the performance of research that extensively relies on the 
participation of citizens.  
                                                        
45 www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/holdren_citizen_science_memo_ 
092915_0.pdf. 
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2.4.3 Open data, open government, open innovation: missing links and 
trade-offs 
The previous sections have offered an illustration of the evolving concepts of 
open science and open innovation and related notions such as open data, citizen 
science, crowdsourcing and distributed innovation. What emerges is a rather 
blurred picture, characterised by a variety of definitions and overlapping 
concepts, some of which have a purely descriptive characterisation, whereas 
others can be given a more prescriptive value. Most important, it is essential to 
distinguish the phenomenology of open science and open innovation from the 
analysis of the public policy aspects of these phenomena, which are typically a 
narrower concept and present peculiar problems and challenges for 
governments. Below, a number of potential policy challenges and trade-offs are 
discussed.  
First, as already mentioned, mere open access requirements represent 
only a tiny fraction of what governments can do to involve the private sector and 
stimulate innovation in the long run. It is therefore very important not to confuse 
open access with open science and at least to encompass in the latter concept 
commitments to open up government-held data, possibly in open machine-
readable format, and incorporate in the open science concept also proactive 
policies aimed at facilitating ‘absorption’ on the private sector side, starting with 
citizens and SMEs. In this respect, other fields of government such as education 
policy and infrastructure policy, e.g. universal access to broadband, appear as 
essential elements of a whole of government approach to open science.  
Moreover, and relatedly, a whole of government approach to open science 
should also include the evaluation and (if appropriate) review of those policies 
that directly affect access to and reuse of data. In this respect, sensitive policy 
fields include the clarification of access rights for citizens, private companies and 
civil society organisations, e.g. through the Freedom of Information Act; 
copyright laws, especially for what concerns the availability of exceptions for text 
and data mining and user-generated content; data protection laws, especially for 
what concerns data ownership and rules related to the liability of data controllers 
and processors; and more generally legislation on intellectual property, including 
patent law and trade secret law.  
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Furthermore, there seems to be an emerging conflict between the 
openness goals pursued by open science policy and the ‘social bargain’ on which 
innovation policy is based, in particular for what concerns patent laws. This 
conflict is reflected in policies aimed at stimulating the commercialisation of 
innovation in universities. For example, Caulfield et al. (2012) denounce the 
existence of conflicting incentives for university-based genomics researchers in 
many advanced economies. On the one hand, researchers are “told to 
commercialize their research by patenting, licensing, and forming close 
partnerships with industry, which has particular skills, financial assets to facilitate 
the translation of knowledge into products, and objectives”. On the other hand, 
“researchers are encouraged to share data and disseminate knowledge quickly 
(that is, to adopt an open science model) so as to foster scientific progress, meet 
humanitarian goals, and (again) maximize the impact of research”. Against this 
background, what is the optimal level of openness that government should 
choose? And does it change across sectors? What instrument mix is most 
suitable to maximising social welfare? 
These questions are particularly important since there seems to be a 
significant “clash of cultures” between science and innovation: such a clash of 
culture is reflected in the underlying values of the scientific and innovation 
communities. The fact that both communities are moving towards more open 
models should not suggest a complete convergence process. In science, 
openness is considered to expand the frontier of researchers, as it provides for 
an expansion of available channels for data collection and processing. Whole of 
government open data policies, even more than simple open access, maximise 
the availability of content that researchers and private companies can use to 
generate new science, contribute to existing products and design innovative 
products and business models based on a combination of big data, innovative 
ideas and managerial/entrepreneurial skills. This, however, does not 
automatically imply that an open science policy should be coupled with an open 
innovation policy, which mandates that all innovation is carried out in an open 
fashion. 
This, in turn, leads to another important observation. Openness, per se, is 
to be considered as a means to greater progress and social welfare. This entails 
that removing the obstacles to open science and open innovation does not 
necessarily mean mandating open innovation. Rather, a whole of government 
54 | INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS AND EMERGING TRENDS 
open science policy can help entrepreneurs develop their innovative products 
and services thanks to the availability of greater amounts of data, further 
strengthened by the enormous amount of data created by end users themselves 
(as well as objects, in the IoT) on a daily basis. Whether this leads to the 
emergence of open, semi-open or closed business models on the market at any 
given moment in time is a completely different policy issue.  
Against this background, the history of the first two decades of the 
Internet can shed some light on the value that openness has with respect to 
progress. Although an in-depth analysis of this issue would require a separate 
report, it is important to observe proprietary business models can prove very 
useful, especially for products that are in their infancy. These closed business 
models tend to be overtaken and replaced by more open models. This occurred, 
for example, in the case of IBM’s first personal computer, later made more 
modular to allow for competition and quality improvements over time; and 
Apple’s iTunes-iPod-FairPlay business model that created the first legal store for 
music downloads a decade ago, now largely superseded by more open models 
such as streaming-based services that operate across platforms (Spotify, Apple 
Music). And even if open models are normally seen as more inclusive, the 
conclusion that open is always good, and closed (or semi-closed) always bad, 
should be resisted (Boston Consulting Group, 2011). 
At a minimum, even if there seems to be little ground for mandating open 
innovation through regulatory measures, it is possible to observe that the market 
is spontaneously evolving towards larger use of open business models, thanks 
also to the enhanced possibilities that Internet’s end-to-end architecture and 
advances in connectivity and data compression allow. Beyond early-stage 
success stories such as Wikipedia or Linux, new examples include the decision by 
Google to open up its Android patents; and in emerging sectors such as FinTech, 
the blockchain technology that backs all crypto-currencies such as BitCoin, and 
that empowers distributed processing of data, robust transaction verification 
and potential applications on a variety of platforms, including on virtual reality 
systems such as Oculus Rift or Google Cardboard.46 
                                                        
46 Among others, Taylor (2015) explains the nature of blockchain and its potential. Both 
permissioned and unpermissioned blockchains have tremendous potential in fields such as 
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In summary, it is essential to understand more deeply the links between 
open science and open innovation, as they appear to be less straightforward 
than it might seem at first blush. And not only governments must strive to 
manage trade-offs within the scientific community, as highlighted above; they 
should also clarify whether and to what extent an open science policy should be 
construed as ‘viral’, i.e. the openness requirement should apply to all subsequent 
uses of the information and data made openly available to third parties. 
Whatever decision is adopted in this respect, the resulting conflicts and trade-
offs with other areas of policy should be adequately approached and discussed.   
2.4.4 Prizes and awards: how government demands innovation 
A major component of the open innovation agenda of many government is the 
increased use of prizes and awards as way to incentivise innovation.47 Challenges 
and prizes have existed in the government sphere since the mid-2000s, 
especially in the United States but increasingly also in Europe. In the past five 
years, there has been an increase not only in the number of challenges and prizes 
but also in the size, complexity and sophistication of competitions. Current 
challenges reflect the diversity of opportunities: in the US, the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission is asking middle school students to enter a poster 
competition on carbon monoxide awareness, and NASA is seeking teams to build 
small spacecraft that can carry out operations near the moon and in deep space. 
More agencies are taking concrete steps to institutionalise challenge and prize 
activities: several agencies have dedicated prize leads, and a number of agencies 
are working on common contracting vehicles to cut down on operational costs. 
Enthusiasm has also grown through the Challenges and Prizes Community of 
Practice, which has over 600 members. The federal government increasingly 
uses cash prizes to promote innovation; these have been a great deal for 
                                                        
smart contracts, virtual transactions, dis-intermediated mortgage and investment markets, 
and many more, creating what some commentators have defined as the “Internet of value”, 
see www.finextra.com/finextra-downloads/newsdocs/The%20Fintech%202%200%20Paper. 
PDF. 
47 OSTP Blog (2015), “Accelerating the Use of Prizes to Address Tough Challenges”, July. 
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taxpayers since the social benefits vastly exceed government funding costs.48 The 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) launched its first “Grand 
Challenge” in 2004; whoever could design a driverless car that completed a 
desert course fastest would win $1 million.49 No car managed to cross the finish 
line that day and no one took home the prize money. But the challenge got 
brilliant minds focused on driverless technology. A decade later, Google is close 
to mastering the technology and most major automakers are working on their 
own driverless prototypes. Since then, there have been more DARPA-sponsored 
competitions involving humanoid robots and radio communications, among 
other fields. 
Challenge.gov recently celebrated its five years of existence, during which 
it reportedly collaborated with more than 200,000 members of the public 
through more than 440 challenges on topics ranging from accelerating the 
deployment of solar energy, to combating breast cancer, to increasing resilience 
after Hurricane Sandy. Agencies have been increasing their use of prizes and 
challenges because they allow the government to pay only for results and 
increase the number and diversity of ‘solvers’ working on important problems. 
In the field of prizes and awards, the administration officials recently announced 
nine new challenges by federal agencies; expanded support for the use of 
challenges and prizes in the federal government; and 14 new challenges hosted 
by multiple non-governmental institutions which will, for example, improve 
screening for lung and breast cancer, improve the physical and brain health of 
165 million children worldwide and improve our ability to treat spinal cord 
injury.50 The May 2015 report to Congress on the Implementation of Federal 
Prize Authority for Fiscal Year 2014 highlighted that Challenge.gov is a critical 
component of the federal government’s use of prize competitions to spur 
                                                        
48 The prizes are at most only a few million dollars, and the competition energises non-
governmental researchers and entrepreneurs to tackle socially significant problems. 
49 A well-known example of a demonstration project is the Ansari X Prize, which was awarded 
in 2004. The Ansari X Prize was awarded to aerospace designer Burt Rutan and financier Paul 
Allen for being the first private team to “build and launch a spacecraft capable of carrying 
three people to 100 kilometres above the earth’s surface, twice within two weeks.” 
50 www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/final_prizes_fact_sheet_ 
100715.pdf. 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 57 
innovation. Numerous federal agencies have discovered that prizes allow them 
to: 
 pay only for success and establish an ambitious goal without having to 
predict which team or approach is most likely to succeed; 
 reach beyond the ‘usual suspects’ to increase the number of citizen solvers 
and entrepreneurs tackling a problem; 
 bring out-of-discipline perspectives to bear; 
 increase cost-effectiveness to maximise the return on taxpayer dollars; 
 inspire risk-taking by offering a level playing field through credible rules 
and robust judging mechanisms. 
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3. PEOPLE: FOSTERING TALENT AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP TO UNLOCK EUROPE’S 
INNOVATIVE POTENTIAL 
3.1 What skills? Looking for the right mix of competence, creativity, 
entrepreneurship  
3.1.1 Problem 
The current mix of competence displayed by the European labour force is not in 
line with the evolution of the market, which exhibits a fast industrial 
transformation and an ongoing polarisation, i.e. either low-skill or high-skill jobs 
will stay in the market). Moreover, Europe needs policy entrepreneurs and 
creative thinkers in public institutions, as well as large and small companies and 
civil society. The issue of intra-preneurship within firms and in public institutions 
is still insufficiently considered among European Union policy-makers.  
3.1.2 Analysis 
Education policy has become a public-private endeavour and a lifelong need. 
From a public policy perspective, school and university education must be 
carefully rethought to ensure that students are exposed to a new mix of 
competence through experiential learning. There cannot be enough emphasis 
on the importance of promoting STEM (science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics) and coding skills already in early school years, both areas in which 
countries such as the US have invested more resources than the EU-28 in recent 
years. In many parts of the world, the emergence of ICT as an enabling 
technology and the gradual expansion of the ICT ecosystem into other sectors, 
not just as ICT-using but as fundamentally ICT-powered, has led policy-makers to 
develop specific policies to promote STEM education even in early school years. 
Recently, in the US the Obama administration launched a $4 billion programme 
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dedicated to computer science, and aimed at increasing access to K-12 computer 
science education by training teachers, expanding access to high-quality 
instructional materials and building effective regional partnerships. In the EU a 
recent report for the European Parliament highlighted “persisting skills shortages 
in STEM fields in spite of high unemployment levels in many Member States”.51 
The European Commission has long denounced the emerging skills 
mismatch in Europe, referring to the slower pace of updating skills compared to 
updating technology: “skills development does not come about as fast as 
technological development, which is why we are faced with a paradoxical 
situation: although millions of Europeans are currently without a job, while 
companies have a hard time finding skilled digital technology experts. As a result, 
there could be up to 825,000 unfilled vacancies for ICT…professionals by 2020”.52 
Notably, missing skills do not include only ICT-related technical skills, but also, 
and importantly, managerial skills, which themselves explain a portion of the 
productivity gap between the United States and Europe in ICT: both these skills 
sets are among the core entrepreneurial skills.53 The full set of competence 
needed includes, inter alia:54 
 coding skills, possibly to be introduced as early as possible in schools; 
 creative skills, to be stimulated through dedicated programmes during 
primary, secondary and tertiary education; 
 science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) education, in order to 
enable the application of ICT to a wide variety of sectors, from health care 
to energy, manufacturing, finance, etc.;  
 cross-disciplinary skills, which require abandoning textbook-style 
education in order to instil students with enough basic knowledge and 
                                                        
51 www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/542199/IPOL_ 
STU(2015)542199_EN.pdf. 
52 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/blog/here-how-we-will-improve-digital-
skills-and-create-more-jobs-europe-0. 
53 http://eskills4jobs.ec.europa.eu/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=b69ba1d7-6db4-
415d-82e4-ac4d700a38b8&groupId=2293353. 
54 For a more detailed description of coding, creativity, cross-disciplinary, managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills, see https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/learning-and-skills.  
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culture and advanced notions to be able to handle more than one 
discipline at once; 
 managerial skills, which include basic entrepreneurship skills such as the 
ability to conceive a business plan or define a start-up and scale-up 
strategy for the first years of a new venture; 
 financial and accounting education, in order to empower individual would-
be entrepreneurs in their relationship with financial intermediaries; 
 leadership and team-working skills, for example, the 2014 European 
Schoolnet e-Skills Manifesto introduced the INSEAD skills pyramid, which 
organises e-skills into literacy and basic skills at the bottom, occupational 
skills in the middle and global knowledge economy skills at the top. The 
manifesto also states that not only programming skills but e-leadership 
skills – that is, the combination of ICT skills and leadership skills – will be in 
high demand in the future.  
The European Political Strategy Centre recently posted a similar analysis of key 
skills, displayed in Figure 4 below.  
Figure 4. Skills and resilience needed in a world of change 
 
Source: EPSC (2016), based on the T-Skill framework. The vertical bar of the T refers to the 
expert knowledge and experience in a particular area or discipline/field. The top of the T 
refers to the ability to collaborate with experts in other disciplines and a willingness to use 
the knowledge gained in areas of expertise other than one’s own from this collaboration. 
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All these skills must be developed and constantly updated. On the one 
hand, the school system must be rethought to accommodate all these skills and 
competence from the early years of education onwards. And workplace, lifelong 
learning should embrace this multifaceted skill set to ensure that the European 
labour force is ‘fit for purpose’. Moreover, the acceleration of the pace of 
technological progress will increasingly require that beyond the work-life 
balance, the work-train balance of individuals is also adequately taken care of.55 
Lifelong learning then must be rethought to mirror the need for a constant 
evolution and update of the skills available in the labour force. Possible policy 
actors to be involved include schools (including, most importantly, retraining and 
empowering teachers), government administrations and businesses themselves.  
More specifically, important efforts must be made to improve the 
availability of e-skills; the effectiveness of current policies, including the ones 
comprised in the Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan and the ones managed 
under the Digital Agenda, could probably be improved through enhanced 
coordination with existing initiatives, e.g. EIPs, KICs, and research projects 
funded under Horizon 2020. To be sure, Europe needs a major reflection on the 
future of jobs, which capitalises on the first steps made with the ‘Grand Coalition 
for digital jobs’, now replaced by the ‘Digital Jobs and Skills Coalition’, which 
brings together Member States and stakeholders, including social partners, to 
pledge action and to identify and share best practices, so that they can be more 
easily replicated and scaled up.56 Education is a fundamental driver of ICT uptake 
and competitiveness and must be broadly intended to include a high-quality 
university system, widespread e-skills and digital literacy among both firms (in 
particular, SMEs) and citizens. 
Needless to say, skills and computer literacy are needed also from a user’s 
perspective, in order to ensure the uptake of new technologies. And these skills 
are increasingly subject to obsolescence in the ICT sector, as a consequence of 
shorter product life cycles and rapid innovation rates. A high quality secondary 
and tertiary education constitutes a fundamental ingredient of the so-called 
                                                        
55 In this spirit, the e-Skills Manifesto 2014 by European Schoolnet argues that the ‘educate 
then work model’ is becoming less relevant as the turnover of skills accelerates, markets 
become more volatile and the linear one-way path from education followed by lifelong work 
is exchanged for an increasingly two-way interaction between learning and working. 
56 See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-skills-jobs-coalition. 
62 | PEOPLE: FOSTERING TALENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP TO UNLOCK EUROPE’S INNOVATIVE POTENTIAL 
‘knowledge triangle’: in fact, when universities produce skilled graduates and 
high quality basic (ICT) research, and the legal and business environment offers 
the chance to translate such research into applied research and innovative 
products, the whole sector can profit from a more dynamic flow of ideas and 
cross-fertilisation in innovation. In a recent study, Osborne & Frey (2013) showed 
that as much as 47% of existing jobs are at risk of computerisation in the coming 
years (see figure below). A recent report for DG Employment also highlights the 
challenges that this trend will create for the labour market in Europe;57 and 
researchers from Bruegel have applied the framework created by Osborne and 
Frey to European data, showing results that are even more worrying, with 54% 
of jobs on average being at risk of computerisation. Even more recent work by 
James Bessen (2015) shows that the ongoing technological revolution is more 
likely to create a skills shortage than a job shortage: a finding that points at the 
education system as responsible for creating the required skills, with the 
required speed. 
In this respect, it is clear that the challenges that are already perceived 
today will only become more pressing in the coming years. Evidence from global 
markets suggests that many industrialised countries do not compete anymore 
on low salaries, but rather on the availability of reliable authorities, world-class 
infrastructure and, most important, a highly educated and skilled workforce. This 
is why relaunching Europe’s objectives in higher education is key to Europe’s 
future innovation and employment policies. As shown in recent research 
performed at the JRC, this may require fundamental changes in the way learning 
occurs both at school and university and over the course of an individual’s life 
(see, inter alia, Redecker et al., 2011; Kampylis et al., 2015), and this in turn 
requires a new framework for entrepreneurial competences (Komarkova et al., 
2015). Figure 5 below shows the mix of entrepreneurial competence developed 
by Komarkova et al. (2015). 
                                                        
57 For a survey of the literature, see http://epthinktank.eu/2015/05/11/tackling-long-term-
unemployment-in-the-eu/. 
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Figure 5. Summary of entrepreneurial competence 
 
Source: Komarkova et al. (2015: Figure 23). 
The private sector is increasingly decisive in the promotion of skills. Large 
companies have become key players in this field, with various models and 
approaches emerging. Examples collected by the CEPS Task Force include the 
following: 
 Google provides services (mail, docs, etc.) that enable collaboration. These 
tools are easily and cheaply available to entrepreneurs, thus reducing time 
and costs to set up a company. The company also provides instruments 
and mechanisms for exchanging knowledge. People need to meet each 
other to transform ideas into business. Google invested in a number of 
campuses and established ‘partnership’ spaces (such as “The factory” in 
Berlin). There, Google engineers interact with start-uppers and potential 
entrepreneurs. This allows both knowledge increase and transfer. It is also 
a good occasion to recruit new entrepreneurs. Being in contact with 
entrepreneurship is important for fostering emulation. 
Google provides capital and invests in innovation through Google 
Venture. The role of acquisition in innovation systems is crucial. The 
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acquisition provides an exit strategy for entrepreneurs and an opportunity 
to look at how large companies work, especially when acquisition leaves 
the management and workers at their place at least for a while. 
Google also contributes directly to the formation of digital skills. 
Google trained 700,000 Europeans by the end of 2015 and is on track to 
reach one million by end of 2016. It is building a Europe-wide training hub 
to support businesses anywhere in Europe to get training online. Google 
also launched a project in Spain with 21 universities based on online 
courses; students can choose the course that is most suitable to them.  
 Telefonica fosters innovation via an open innovation scheme where 
several tools are open to use by partners. All those companies that do not 
have financing and time to develop these tools can leverage them. In 
particular, Telefonica deployed a worldwide network with different 
initiatives and programmes to support talent. Open innovation in large 
corporations must have KPI and can go beyond corporate social 
responsibility and generate new business opportunities. Within this 
context, Telefonica manages: i) programmes to encourage 
entrepreneurship, e.g. a talent programme to help students reach the 
labour market; ii) acceleration programme, e.g. business digital 
accelerator, mainly focused on Latin American countries; iii) investment 
aimed at helping select business to scale up and go international. 
Telefonica has been following this open innovation approach for 10 years 
and invested some €650 million. 
 Orange is very active in keeping their workers’ competence up to date and 
retraining them to help them understand new market needs. Orange also 
needs new talents to move forward. One of the most important needs is 
to find people skilled in customer experience, because innovation needs 
to be customer friendly. Start-ups launching new ideas in customer 
experience are very important players for Orange. Working with digital 
entrepreneurs hence allows Orange to attract new generations, even 
when they are not really interested in a job in a large company.  
 Amway is still a family-owned company, 50 years from its foundation and 
even now that the company is worth $11 billion. Amway encourages 
people to be entrepreneurial. Its associates create micro-business at the 
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pace they want. Individuals can learn skills (Amway also provides training) 
and use them. In Amway’s early days, training was only organic (learning 
by doing). Nowadays, it provides formal training programmes. Helping and 
supporting people is not just a ‘corporate social responsibility’, it can be a 
business model in itself. Amway supports entrepreneurial skills and 
activities. A new programme is now aiming at individuals over 50. Amway 
trains people from every type of background in terms of education and 
skills, age, gender and employment history.  
3.1.3 Recommended actions 
 Strengthen policy efforts to promote a variety of skills, including STEM 
education and coding skills during early school years throughout the EU-28. 
 Promote the inclusion of entrepreneurial skills, managerial skills, creativity 
and the ability to think out of the box as basic skills to be taught during school 
years and university.  
 Strengthen public-private cooperation to ensure the exposure of young 
European citizens to entrepreneurial role models and success stories in order 
to generate emulation among youngsters. 
 
3.2 The future job market: facing the challenge of helping everyone 
reinvent oneself 
3.2.1 Problem 
Technological evolution and the economic downturn are creating substantial 
tensions and persisting unbalances in the European job market, which must be 
addressed by EU policy-makers. Given increases in productivity and increased 
computerisation of skills, as much as 80% of jobs that exist today will not exist 
10 years from now (according to the OECD); while new ones will be created, the 
number and nature of the new jobs is very difficult to predict. 
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3.2.2 Analysis 
The current interplay between existing labour regulations and current market 
conditions is unsustainable. ECB Chairman Mario Draghi recently denounced the 
fact that Europe’s economies are rigged to protect older workers at the cost of 
new employees and that “the side-effect is that young people are stuck with 
lower-paid, temporary contracts and get fired first in crisis times. That also 
means that employers are reluctant to invest in young people, so the incomes of 
this generation stay lower over their lifetime.” What is even more worrying is 
that structural conditions are poised to make this situation worse as markets 
continue to evolve (especially towards the Internet of things, artificial 
intelligence and Industry 4.0). EU institutions should face this challenge through 
smart and adaptive policy-making, such as:  
 More flexible labour markets are to be welcomed, but flexicurity is a 
composite word: without security, flexibility can only result in lower levels 
of protection, which mostly work to the detriment of younger workers.  
 The effects of unemployment are widespread and include possible 
repercussions on consumption and levels of demand, which in turn 
reverberates on the conditions for innovation to spread through the 
market, and on social cohesion. The situation for young people is made 
worse by the current deflationary spiral in Europe. 
 Due to technological evolution, in the future a reduction in working hours 
and a relative increase in average hourly salaries might be required, to 
reflect the increase in productivity and the need to ensure that the entire 
population has a chance to be employed. This, in turn, means that labour 
policy should be fine-tuned to facilitate employment, avoiding deterrent 
effects created by overly cumbersome tax wedges on labour income.  
 Employability requires an update in the competence and skills available to 
young and older individuals who actually or potentially belong to the work 
force (see above).  
 The acceleration in technological evolution will soon require a different 
‘work-train-life’ balance, with employees not only in need of protection for 
the balance between personal life and working hours, but also between 
working and retraining, which in many sectors is likely to become a 
growing need.  
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3.2.3 Recommended actions 
 Launch a systematic reflection on the security and flexibility needs of the 
future European job market, with specific focus on employability, self-
employment features and work-train-life balance needs in the coming years. 
 
3.3 The age of openness and people: from citizen science to the 
attraction of talent 
3.3.1 Problem 
As science and innovation models become gradually more open and distributed, 
access to large swaths of data and the proactive involvement of citizens in 
science, innovation and public policy becomes essential. But public policy at the 
EU level seems hardly equipped for this transition, considering the widening 
identification of citizens with European institutions and an ‘ever closer Union’ 
project. The level of openness of the EU is limited also when it comes to 
attracting talents from other countries: most EU member states appear hostile 
to foreign researchers.58  
3.3.2 Analysis 
Openness is an emerging paradigm in all aspects of research, innovation and 
policy. In the United States, the Obama administration has invested heavily in 
promoting access to government-funded research, in ensuring the release of 
data possessed by public administrations, and in opening up government to 
more bilateral, proactive and constant cooperation with citizens and civil society. 
In the private sector, open innovation has become a dominant paradigm, even 
more as the ICT sector permeates many other industries. While new 
technologies increasingly gain diffusion with the help of open patent strategies, 
                                                        
58 Difficulties in attracting talent, especially from outside the EU, also affects EU companies 
as confirmed by Kumardev Chatterjee (European Young Innovators Forum), Nicholas Davis 
(World Economic Forum) and Lenard Koschwitz (Allied for Startups) during meetings of the 
CEPS Task Force. 
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e.g. Tesla, Toyota and NASA, in cloud computing and big data analytics open 
source software and entire ‘stacks’ of open hardware and software are coming 
to dominate the scene, lowering entry barriers in an unprecedented way. The 
European Commission has recently adopted a new “open science, open 
innovation, open to the world” strategy capturing the vision of Commissioner 
Moedas. It is important that this strategy be reinforced to include the release of 
data in the possession of public administrations, and the creation of channels for 
communication and cooperation with stakeholders and citizens.  
The role of people, again, is essential for research and innovation not only 
in performing different functions but also to build up the synapsis beyond 
‘institutional cooperation’. Citizen science can lead to very important discoveries 
at very low cost for government, and can foster social innovation. But the 
regulatory framework has to be compatible with this trend: currently, lack of legal 
certainty on key activities such as text and data mining (in copyright law), scope 
and breadth of the unitary patent, a rigid framework for data protection (the 
new GDPR) and conditions for open access to government-held data create limits 
to the possibility for Europe to harness the potential of citizens as an engine of 
innovation and development.  
As already mentioned above, suitable infrastructure and adequate literacy 
and numeracy skills can further empower citizens as drivers of growth. This calls 
for even more urgent actions on these two fundamental dimensions. But skills 
and talent are not only found in Europe; attracting talent from abroad can prove 
essential to restoring Europe’s growth path, and too little is being done in most 
member states to open up the doors of academia and industry to non-nationals.  
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3.3.3 Recommended actions 
 Promote open access to government-funded research and government-held 
data to boost data-driven innovation in Europe 
 Foster legal certainty for data-driven innovation and more generally for text 
and data mining activities, especially with respect to EU copyright and data 
protection laws.  
 Strengthen citizen science in Europe by creating adequate platforms and 
calling on EU-funded research projects to involve citizens and adopt bottom-
up approaches where possible. 
 Promote openness to foreign talent in all member states. 
 
3.4 ‘Permissionless’ innovation and smart policy: making room for 
entrepreneurs 
3.4.1 Problem 
Europe, on average, displays relatively low levels of entrepreneurship. Creating 
an environment that is conducive to entrepreneurship is a complex, multifaceted 
endeavour, which involves all actors of the innovation ecosystem and policy 
stakeholders. Increasingly, the legal system is recognised as a key driver of a risk-
oriented culture, which lies at the basis of entrepreneurship. Europe also needs 
entrepreneurial policy-makers, as the fundamental role of the public sector is to 
realise things that individuals alone cannot make happen. 
3.4.2 Analysis 
Legal rules shape the context in which entrepreneurs test their ideas, and their 
willingness to take risks to realise them also contributes to showcasing a culture. 
Too often, the legal system acts as an obstacle rather than a facilitator and driver 
of entrepreneurship.  
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 Bankruptcy laws often do not give a second chance to an entrepreneur, 
and this is a serious problem since failure is an inherent element of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
 Several sector-specific laws contain an inherent bias in favour of 
incumbents. This can happen in many ways, e.g. when the law establishes 
strict entry conditions, or is implicitly tailored towards a given business 
model or a given pattern of service provision. In other cases, laws require 
that new entrants – often small companies – meet very stringent 
requirements in order to start operating, which discourages entry. And 
finally, some laws simply leave almost no room for experimentation with 
new business models, often due to their extremely prescriptive nature.  
 Many laws and expenditure programmes at the EU and national levels 
impose unnecessary red tape. Many practitioners and entrepreneurs 
addressed the CEPS Task Force to advocate a simplification and 
consolidation of the ‘access points’ to EU funding, especially since most 
applicants are micro-firms of individual entrepreneurs.  
 At the same time, often legislation does not encourage scale-up by 
differentiating the treatment of small versus larger firms, nor new versus 
established firms, this being even more worrying as new entrants are 
responsible for a significant share of breakthrough innovations. Firms that 
want to grow by hiring more employees and expanding activities could be 
discouraged by the prospect of a changing legislative framework and being 
subject to more stringent requirements.  
 Increasingly, policy-makers in some countries are discovering the value of 
legal systems and business models that allow for ‘permissionless 
innovation’: this is still not the case at the EU level, and it would be 
essential both to creating entrepreneurs and in related fields such as 
financial intermediation (see below). One good example is the ‘regulatory 
sandbox’ initiative of the UK Financial Conduct Authority and the recent 
‘innovation deals’ launched by the European Commission modelled on the 
Dutch experience with green innovation deals. 
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3.4.3 Recommended actions 
 Develop guidance on regulatory flexibility to make regulation more conducive 
to innovation, implementing where appropriate the concept of permissionless 
innovation. 
 Eliminate useless and redundant red tape, by distinguishing it from regulatory 
costs that generate benefits and help achieve policy goals. 
 Create one-stop-shops for entrepreneurs by consolidating contact points for 
access to EU and national funds and streamlining rules for financial and non-
financial support.  
 Avoid creating perverse incentives with legislation, e.g. by creating rules that 
discourage scale-up.   
 
3.5 Intra-preneurs: unleashing innovation in large companies and 
public administrations 
3.5.1 Problem 
Public administrations and large companies are, of course, composed of people. 
The importance of promoting a more entrepreneurial and creative attitude in 
both settings is often overlooked in the debate on EU policy. This should 
change.59  
3.5.2 Analysis 
Both large companies and the public sector are important players in the 
innovation ecosystem. Their coexistence and cooperation with entrepreneurs, 
smaller companies and educational institutions is key to creating a vibrant setting 
for innovation. However, very often mainstreaming a more innovation-oriented 
attitude inside these entities can be difficult, as they lack the agility and the risk-
                                                        
59 During the kick-off meeting of the CEPS Task Force, Professor Martin Fransman argued that 
creating a culture of innovation within large organisations is crucial to spurring innovation. 
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taking attitude that is needed to support, favour and nurture new ideas. 
Problems identified in the literature range from path dependency and structural 
difficulties in changing business model, e.g. due to specialised competence, to 
behavioural biases such as the familiarity trap, the maturity trap and the 
propinquity trap (Deloitte, 2015).  
In a setting in which large companies play a major role in driving and 
orchestrating innovation, as occurs in the EU-28, ensuring that intra-preneurship 
is adequately promoted is essential. Public policy, however, can only encourage 
the private sector to do so through constant dialogue and initiatives that favour 
competition and the constant disequilibrium that characterises competitive, 
dynamic markets. On the contrary, public sector innovation is an open wound in 
many member states, where the relatively low quality and scant dynamism of 
public administrations can put sand in the engine of innovation. After all, as 
already observed in the introduction to this report, the public sector plays a 
decisive role in steering and coordinating innovation efforts; having innovation-
hostile civil servants may fatally undermine this role if the system rewards those 
avoiding mistakes rather than those trying something unconventional.  
Policies to promote public sector innovation and creativity include 
initiatives to mainstream innovation at all levels of government, use of 
innovation prizes and awards for civil servants and other incentives, reliance on 
academics and entrepreneurs as mentors of civil servants, e.g. entrepreneurs in 
residence, increasingly frequent in leading city halls in the US, such as in Los 
Angeles and New York), and the creation of innovation labs inside public 
administration, e.g. the 2015 US Innovation Strategy). Emphasis on citizen 
science and open innovation platforms is also conducive to a more outward-
oriented, creative public administration. Finally, institutional design of smart 
innovation agencies can be an important factor in modernising the relationship 
between the public and private sectors and fostering a thriving innovation 
ecosystem.  
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3.5.3 Recommended actions 
 Design policies to promote public sector innovation at all levels of 
government, including innovation prizes and awards. 
 Promote and foster smart institutional design in innovation agencies and 
other relevant institutions. 
 Consider the creation of ‘entrepreneurs in residence’ and other fellowship and 
mentoring programmes to promote entrepreneurial thinking in institutions.    
 
3.6 Leading by example: Europe needs new role models and success 
stories 
3.6.1 Problem 
Lack of entrepreneurship in Europe can lead to fewer future would-be 
entrepreneurs. Attempts to highlight success stories in Europe and beyond are 
being made, but they should be strengthened, also at the local level, in order to 
create the right conditions for entrepreneurship ecosystems to flourish. Women 
should receive special  attention, as the lack of role models is particularly serious 
for them. 
3.6.2 Analysis 
Emulation and inspiration are key factors in entrepreneurship. Scholars such as 
Daniel Isenberg have shed light on the need for a collective mindset oriented 
towards entrepreneurship, and the role that role models and success stories can 
play in this respect. The European Commission has started to work in this area 
relatively recently, with Commissioner Kroes and with the Startup Europe 
programme. New associations of start-ups and young entrepreneurs, coupled 
with gatherings such as the Startup Weekend, are bringing success stories closer 
to would-be entrepreneurs, enabling forms of mentoring and advice by those 
who have succeeded for those who still strive. Often institutions are absent from 
these privately organised meetings, and this should change: entrepreneurs and 
innovation are an EU concern and should be for public stakeholders as well; it is 
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thus essential that entrepreneurs do not see EU and national institutions as far 
from their core interests. The more public administrations are populated by 
creative thinkers and dynamic intra-preneurs, the easier making such contact will 
be, and the easier it will be for public policy to steer innovation towards societal 
needs.  
Role models and success stories are particularly needed for women, who 
represent the majority of Europeans but less than a third of the entrepreneurs. 
Fewer female entrepreneurs means fewer success stories, and this in turn can 
lead to even fewer female entrepreneurs in the future. European Commission 
efforts should be stepped up to promote entrepreneurship among women, as 
female creativity and entrepreneurial potential are an under-exploited source of 
economic growth and jobs that should be further developed. Similarly, public 
and policy entrepreneurs could be publicly acknowledged through prizes and 
awards. 
Again, the promotion of role models and the creation of an overall 
favourable environment for entrepreneurship aspirations can only be achieved 
with the help of the private sector, from start-uppers to unicorns and established 
companies wishing to promote entrepreneurship skills in their smaller 
contractors and service providers. It requires also the participation of secondary 
school and university students in gatherings of entrepreneurs. All this should be 
done at the local level: scholars and academics suggest that entrepreneurship 
ecosystems are essentially local phenomena, and should be treated as such in 
EU multi-level governance.  
3.6.3 Recommended actions 
 Promote successful role models and success stories more widely, in particular 
among students and women.  
 Promote, at the local level, the participation of secondary school and 
university students in gatherings of entrepreneurs and start-ups.   
 
| 75 
 
4. PLACES: COLLABORATION SPACES AND 
PLATFORMS AS DRIVERS OF INNOVATION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
4.1 Coupling pan-European innovation ecosystems with regional 
entrepreneurial ecosystems 
4.1.1 Problem 
Two perhaps central structural problems that European Innovation Policy has to 
address are the fragmented policy landscape on the one hand and the 
substantial innovation gap with other world leaders (the US in particular) on the 
other. The scholarly literature shows that these problems are largely explained, 
respectively, by the absence of enabling ecosystems and the few innovative 
world-leading firms rooted in the Old Continent. In addition, regional policies for 
innovation and entrepreneurship have found unprecedented common ground 
under diverse and growing pressures to deliver competitive advantage (Vanthillo 
& Verhetsel, 2012). In European policy this is clearly reflected in the current 
cohesion policy. For the programming period 2014-20, structural funds of 
approximately €100 billion have been earmarked for research and innovation 
and largely coordinated through ‘smart specialisation strategies’ and cluster 
collaboration. Innovation and entrepreneurship policies are increasingly 
considering regional aspects and physical proximity for radical breakthrough 
innovations, for instance initiatives such as the Regional Innovation Scheme (RIS) 
put in place by the Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs) of the 
European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), ERA Chairs, COSME, etc. 
However, further focus and coordination is needed to avoid overlaps and 
maximise the potential of innovation-driven entrepreneurship. Also, cities and 
their districts have not been addressed sufficiently as potential hubs. 
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4.1.2 Analysis 
Stakeholder networks or physically anchored clusters can be directed to 
accelerate innovation through interconnected hubs working closer together, not 
necessarily locally. Moore (1993) applied the notion of ‘ecosystems’ to complex 
configurations of agents, making an analogy between the business ecosystems60 
and the biological ecosystems observed in nature.61 Both biological and business 
ecosystems involve interactions between diverse agents and their evolving roles 
over the succession of analogous stages of emergence, expansion and maturity. 
Such a system can also be characterised as complex and adaptive to their 
broader environmental conditions (Richter et al., 2014). Ács et al. (2014) 
consider that the “National System of Entrepreneurship is the dynamic, 
institutionally embedded interaction between entrepreneurial attitudes, ability, 
and aspirations, by individuals, which drives the allocation of resources through 
the creation and operation of new ventures.” Elsewhere, Russell et al. (2011) 
define the concept of innovation ecosystem to entail: “the inter-organisational, 
political economic, environmental and technological systems of innovation 
through which a milieu conducive to business growth is catalysed, sustained and 
supported. An innovation ecosystem is a network of relationships through which 
information and talent flow through systems of sustained value co-creation.” To 
build the bridge between these two streams (the one on entrepreneurship and 
the other on innovation), we define the entrepreneurial innovation ecosystem 
as “the dynamic, inter-organisational, political, economic, environmental and 
technological milieu of interaction between entrepreneurial attitudes, ability, 
and aspirations, by individuals, which drives knowledge and value creation 
towards the allocation of resources through the creation and operation of new 
ventures.” 
Herein, we define a pan-European entrepreneurial innovation ecosystem 
as one that connects local ecosystems across Europe (see also Pombo-Juárez et 
                                                        
60 Further to business ecosystems (Moore, 1993), this relates to efforts in conceptualising 
innovation (Russell et al., 2011) and entrepreneurial ecosystems (Ács et al., 2014; Mason & 
Brown, 2014).  
61 The biological ecosystem ‘community’ emerges with relatively few pioneering plants and 
animals and expands through increasing complexity until it becomes stable or self-
perpetuating as a mature community. The ‘engine’ of succession, the cause of ecosystem 
change, is the impact of established species upon their own environments (Odum, 1969). 
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al., 2016). How can entrepreneurship be nourished, beyond education and legal 
reform? While the literature on innovation systems and later ecosystems has 
emerged over the last four decades, the literature on entrepreneurship 
ecosystems (verbatim, in the definition given by Isenberg) is younger. The former 
literature is chiefly based on the quadruple helix and how to nurture each link 
and interaction within that context; the latter is not entirely different, especially 
when it comes to choosing the geographic location to create such an ecosystem, 
based on the availability of specific actors such as universities, infrastructure, and 
a good installed base of knowledge and industry: however, it appears to be more 
local, more operationally defined, and linked to specific social interactions, e.g. 
emulation, creation of a positive mindset towards entrepreneurship. 
Taking stock of recent discussion on innovation and entrepreneurship, we 
can consider a number of aspects that should be streamlined for actionable 
policy:  
Clusters and smart specialisation: At the crossroads of innovation studies, 
regional development and strategic management literature, since the seminal 
work of M. Porter in the 1990s, cluster theory has guided regional innovation 
and economic policies with a focus on developing regions as part of industrial 
value chains.  
Michael Porter’s clusters theory focused on frequently observed 
concentrations of interconnected organisations including suppliers, service 
providers, universities, trade associations and so forth whereby “proximity leads 
to shared advantages through the aggregation of expertise and specialized 
resources” (McDonald et al., 2007) and thus explains the structure of certain 
industrial concentrations around the world.  
In the ‘cluster of innovation’ (COI) coined by Engel & del-Palacio (2009), 
“[O]ther agglomeration benefits dominate, defined not by industry 
specialisation, but by the stage of development and innovation” to explain “why 
new and apparently unrelated industries have emerged in specialized clusters, 
already existing…as well as how new technology clusters…have emerged so 
rapidly and robustly in indigenous environments, attracting large concentrations 
of venture capital…accelerated through interactions with other clusters”.   
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Figure 6. COI (clusters of innovation), NCOI (network of COI), super COI, 
and the linkages among COI 
 
Source: Engel & del-Palacio (2009). 
More recently has emerged the concept of smart specialisation (Foray & 
Goenega, 2013), which departs from central planning and considers measures 
building on local resources, competence and entrepreneurship to address 
international opportunities in order to develop regions. In particular, the 
widespread adoption of ‘regional smart specialisation strategies’ (RIS3) makes it  
possible to explore synergies between regional and innovation policies. 
European regions have specific assets that are required to deploy public-private 
partnerships to catalyse talent and creativity. Regions’ interest is reasonable as 
entrepreneurship is a ‘contact sport’ which requires suitable spaces combining 
both knowledge and appetite for innovation into learning by doing. 
Quite clearly, a new geography of innovation and entrepreneurship is 
emerging where regional ecosystems play an increasingly important and visible 
role. This is so as co-location enables both the formal and informal meeting of 
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talent and knowledge in places where people want to live and which can be 
reached easily (see East Berlin, East London Tech City or Boston Innovation 
Districts). This is consistent with the fact that within complex systems, to capture 
not just direct but also indirect outcomes, it is best to focus on processes. 
4.1.3 Innovation systems vs. entrepreneurship ecosystems 
Although entrepreneurship and related topics have gained the attention of 
academics since the early contributions of Joseph Schumpeter, the 
measurement of entrepreneurship and the analysis of systemic conditions that 
favour entrepreneurship have been subject to significant efforts only recently. 
As remarked by Bogdanowicz (2015), significant efforts were made in particular 
by OECD and EUROSTAT (Entrepreneurship Indicators Programme, EIP) to lead 
to a consensual definition of entrepreneurship, a structured perspective on the 
determinants of entrepreneurship and on its economic and social impacts. 
Likewise, there is now a large body of surveys, analysis and research on data 
included in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and the Global 
Entrepreneurship Index (GEDI), but current measurement efforts still fall short 
of adequately capturing systemic factors such as the impact of entrepreneurship 
on innovation, and the role of ‘intra-preneurship’.  
Some of these systemic aspects are currently being factored into a nascent 
literature on entrepreneurship ecosystems, which is linked to the innovation 
systems literature by a peculiarity: the focus specifically and explicitly on the 
systemic factors that foster entrepreneurship.62 In the literature, a variety of 
definitions of entrepreneurial ecosystems can be found. Isenberg (2010) defines 
them as a set of individual elements – such as leadership, culture, capital 
markets, and open-minded customers – that combine in a complex way to 
stimulate entrepreneurship. According to Isenberg (2010, 2011), the key to 
sustainable entrepreneurship lies in the specific combinations of the elements of 
an entrepreneurial ecosystem. Figure 6 below shows the composition of an 
entrepreneurship ecosystem according to Isenberg (2011). It consists of six 
domains which in turn comprise further elements: (1) politics, including 
                                                        
62 Models of entrepreneurial ecosystems have focused so far on “Entrepreneurial 
Personality” (Valdez, 1988), the “Entrepreneurial process” (Gnyawali & Fogel, 1994), and 
“Elements” and “Evolution” (Neck et al., 2004). 
80 | PLACES: COLLABORATION SPACES AND PLATFORMS AS DRIVERS OF INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
leadership and government, (2) finances, (3) culture, including entrepreneurial 
success stories and social norms, (4) infrastructural, professional and non-public 
support, (5) human capital, including education and personnel, and (6) markets, 
consisting of networks and early customers. For a healthy entrepreneurial 
ecosystem each of the six domains should be available in the region and be 
entrepreneurship-friendly. However, there is no easy path towards a sustainable, 
fully functional entrepreneurial ecosystem that is at the same time innovative. 
The creation of an entrepreneurship-friendly environment will be extremely 
difficult in particular if there is no explicit political support of and no high social 
and/or political priority on entrepreneurship. 
Figure 7. Isenberg’s entrepreneurship ecosystem 
 
Source: Isenberg (2011). 
At the crossroads of managerial business ecosystems and policy-driven 
innovation systems literature, and consequently in both private and public 
spheres, we can find diverse forms of initiatives around the globe that build 
ecosystems for incubating and accelerating start-ups and scale-ups. It is 
especially this locus of ecosystems that has fuelled the great increase in 
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theorising and experimentation on the best possible conditions for radical and 
disruptive innovation and high-growth entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial 
ecosystems emphasise ‘shared values’, mobilising resources and collective 
attitudes, and being driven by people and co-creative spaces in particular (Engel 
& del-Palacio, 2009).  
In a broad sense, an entrepreneurial ecosystem refers to the actors and 
the environment affecting the rise and diffusion of entrepreneurship at the 
‘glocal’ level. It encompasses a group of firms, including start‐ups, individual and 
institutional investors, e.g. venture capitalists, banks, business angels, informal 
individual investors, universities and other knowledge creating institutions, and 
one or more coordinating entities, such as firm incubators or accelerators and 
local policy agencies. While these actors derive substantial benefits, in terms of 
scale economies as well as entrepreneurial flexibility, from being embedded in 
an efficient ecosystem and so share broadly similar general goals associated to 
its development, their specific interests may well diverge. For instance, 
entrepreneurs and individual investors may have intrinsic motivations and 
private benefits which are not shared by other actors, while local development 
often is the primary objective of local policy-making bodies. This divergence of 
objectives renders governance issues crucial. 
The rise of new start-ups and start-up ecosystems around the world has 
recently reached its highest level to date. For instance, the 2012 Startup 
Ecosystem Report argues that countries and cities are shifting from service‐
based economies to being driven by a new generation of lightning-fast software 
and technology‐rooted business organisations. Thereby it is becoming widely 
recognised that entrepreneurial ecosystems are inherent drivers of innovation 
and new business energy and power. Successful entrepreneurial ecosystems 
usually foster the long‐term view, process‐structure recombination across 
boundaries, and entrepreneurial dynamics to shore up communities of 
entrepreneurs and investors who share the aspiration to cultivate each other’s 
talent, creativity and network support. Therefore, effective governance of the 
relations between the different agents involved in entrepreneurial ecosystems 
clearly has practical relevance for fostering long‐term growth. 
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4.2 Intervention logic 
Europe has a long standing deficit in technological intensity of business 
compared with that of the US, which some authors point to as one of the key 
explanatory factors of the EU ‘innovation gap'. Creating the conditions for the 
Old Continent to successfully create companies in sectors of mid- and high-tech 
is crucial to ensuring their sustainable, long-term competitiveness. Likewise, 
Europe generates on average more spin-offs than the US does, but it is necessary 
to identify and overcome barriers to growth. 
Both companies and universities are evolving in their strategies to make 
innovation happen. On the business side, from procuring technology to 
collaborating, firms are increasingly exploring new modes through corporate 
entrepreneurship, using venture capital funds and acceleration schemes beyond 
more established models of intra-preneurship (idea competitions, alliances, 
etc.). Similarly, universities are evolving in their third mission, well beyond 
traditional TTOs including professional branches (IP group, etc.) and venture 
funds.  
We need to define open and distributed models of innovation, link it to the 
“open science, open innovation, open to the world” motto currently used by 
Commissioner Moedas, encompassing a ‘holistic’ view of innovation policy 
(Edquist, 2015) by ‘walking the talk’, i.e. emphasise not only the theory but also 
the practice of ‘policies for innovation’ across the board (Pilat, Contribution to 
CEPS Taskforce, 2015) and contrast it with the emerging pragmatism of the EFSI, 
and much more. 
Depending on the case, entrepreneurs can find their way into one or more 
of these communities. It is very difficult to predict which initiatives will succeed: 
as in biological ecosystems, while the strength of the ecosystem or a given 
species might be measured, it is more difficult to foresee the success at the level 
of individuals – life evolves within the system’s conditions, in the form allowed 
by it, and with a degree of selection and randomness. Still, it may be possible to 
identify and foster measures that develop the vibrant ecosystems in various 
dimensions such as culture, talent, knowledge creation and diffusion, finance, 
governance and market access.  
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4.2.1 Towards the governance of entrepreneurial innovation 
ecosystems 
In the last four decades governance has become a prominent issue for scholars 
in management, economics and finance. However, ecosystems, and notably the 
interaction between the different agents that operate within them, have 
peculiarities that have received much less attention by scholars interested in 
governance issues. It is an open question whether and to what extent the 
consolidated body of knowledge relating to both internal governance 
mechanisms, e.g. the board of directors, and external governance mechanisms 
that discipline managerial behaviour, e.g. the market for corporate control, in 
large established firms can offer useful insights into the governance of 
ecosystems, or whether and to what extent we need new models and theoretical 
frameworks. While an audible plea for more integration between 
entrepreneurship in ecosystems and governance issues exists in business 
practice, we have neither consolidated a body of enquiry nor developed one or 
more encompassing interpretative frameworks that coherently address the 
theme of entrepreneurial ecosystems governance. In particular, the dual role of 
governance mechanisms as monitoring and resource-competence enhancing 
mechanisms deserves a closer examination. 
OECD (Pilat, contribution to CEPS Taskforce, 2015) finds evidence that the 
creation of new businesses on the one hand and the creation of ‘favourable 
conditions’ on the other is not enough to secure growth. The literature stresses 
the importance of relational structures, agents, ecosystems and agencies able to 
experience and learn in the field but with global ambitions.  
To date, no one has found the formula to generate a vibrant ecosystem.  
Rather, most of the success stories are presented as a ‘still picture’, as an ideal 
location: Silicon Valley, Singapore, Israel, etc. The literature is silent on the time 
dimension, however. But a recipe doesn’t just list ingredients, it indicates 
proportion and order: tacit knowledge in its purest form. We have some clues. 
One is that talent is key to a vibrant ecosystem. And all success stories 
incorporate an international dimension from the start. 
The fundamental question remains regarding the best possible 
architectural model for reconciling local versus global dynamics, partnership 
composition and level of integration. Regarding local versus global knowledge 
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dynamics, we know that ‘strong ties’ in geographically close environments are 
key but might be principally responsible for incremental innovations, while ‘weak 
ties’ made possible through global pipelines may bring about more radical 
innovations. The results also highlight that the roots of the latter, namely, that 
greater innovative capacity lies in the combination of firm, inter alia, size, share 
of foreign ownership and sector) and culture, e.g. the level of open-mindedness 
of managers e.g. However, the trade-off and balance between local roots and 
global ambitions remains a matter for governance and management. 
 
Figure 8. Tensions between local and global dimension for innovation 
and competition 
 
Source: Leceta et al., forthcoming. 
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But what are the consequences for EU R&I and entrepreneurial policies?  
 First, there is a need for consolidation of the various communities and 
spaces offered by the EU: KICs, EIPs, EPs, JTIs, etc. They simply multiply 
transaction costs and reduce opportunities for entrepreneurs. Here we 
could bring in EIC developments and pooling of national funds (EUREKA, 
JPIs, ERA-NETs, etc.).  
 Second, there is a need to ensure that publicly funded research 
communities (i) represent all aspects of basic and applied research, 
innovation, etc., (ii) include stakeholders from various fields (not only one 
industry sector), and (iii) become the main source of information for the 
drafting of innovation agendas and technological roadmaps which can 
later inform innovation policy for sustainable development.   
 Outside innovation policy, there seems to be little need for intervention 
on private platforms, which seem to be developing in a way that stimulates 
open innovation in the long run. That said, platforms could become very 
important allies of government in enforcing rules and promoting 
entrepreneurship in a variety of fields.  
 Changing the current culture in research from a ‘publish or perish’ ethos 
to open science and data sharing can be promoted through awareness 
raising, training and education, incentives and reward systems and 
monitoring. Open science also requires improvements in data quality and 
management, appropriate infrastructures and funding considerations and 
awareness of legal issues covering intellectual and industrial property 
rights and security issues (ERAC, 2016). 
Consistent with the innovation policy challenges for the 21st century in general 
and for Europe in particular, a paradigm shift is needed: the EU needs to move 
away from the current emphasis of EU-level interventions principally through 
transnational collaborative projects (in R&D) and toward fostering pan-European 
entrepreneurial (innovation) ecosystems whereby the European ‘added value’ in 
knowledge-based partnerships and interventions would be more about 
connecting diverse and disruptive talent rather than plurinational and balanced 
consortia. The long-standing need to reduce the fragmentation of the European 
R&D landscape in order to narrow the innovation gap may find a new policy 
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discourse with co-creation spaces and people-driven innovation. Moreover, 
regions, cities and/or their districts should be acknowledged as the natural 
bedrocks of innovation-driven entrepreneurship policies targeting scale-ups in 
particular.  
Such developments would require regional coordination and acceleration 
across European borders and beyond, engaging not only innovators and 
entrepreneurs, but also the wider set of leaders from different ecosystem 
sectors for training, alignment and planning. At the European level, analysing 
support measures and initiatives could provide improved understanding of their 
intersections and potential synergies and complementarities but also of possible 
blind spots and new rationales for global approaches of potential scale-ups. This 
would allow further connections with other European initiatives aimed at 
creating – in addition to talented and willing individuals – a successful innovation 
and entrepreneurship ecosystem. 
4.2.2 Recommended actions 
 Foster pan-European innovation ecosystems that connect diverse and 
disruptive talent across Europe, and stimulate local entrepreneurship 
ecosystems in regional policy. 
 Reformulate smart specialisation strategies to encompass coordination and 
acceleration across European borders and beyond. 
 Improve coordination of the various EU-level funding mechanisms to ensure 
greater focus on innovation and entrepreneurship. 
 
4.3 Enabling knowledge flows, open science and data-driven 
innovation  
4.3.1 Problem 
The widespread ‘publish or perish’ ethos in research requires urgent change, by 
acknowledging the contribution academia can make to Europe’s long-term and 
sustainable prosperity and well-being. In addition, access to government data is 
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often limited to specialised entities managing the data, mainly due to privacy 
concerns. Yet public data has huge potential for data-driven innovation.  
4.3.2 Analysis 
Open science is a global phenomenon and many countries outside Europe, such 
as Japan, research funders, such as the United States National Institutes of 
Health, and private foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
are also developing open science initiatives. In 2015 the European Commission 
drafted policy actions to support the development of open science in Europe, 
and Japan was clearly influenced by European developments. The United States 
has in turn been developing open data policies at institutional levels since 2003.  
In general terms, the discussion on broadening the science base and on 
novel ways to produce and spread knowledge gradually evolved from two global 
trends: open access and open source. The former refers to online, peer-reviewed 
scholarly outputs, which are free to be read, with limited or no copyright and 
licensing restrictions, while open source refers to software co-created without 
any proprietary restriction on its accessed and use (European Commission, 
2016b).  
Open science is shifting from the standard practices of publishing research 
results in scientific publications towards sharing and using all available 
knowledge at an earlier stage in the research process. Open science is to science 
what Web 2.0 was to economics: allowing end users to be producers of ideas, 
relations and services and in doing so enabling new practices and relationships 
and leading to a new modus operandi for science. For instance, during the 
Human Genome Project, which began in 1990, data was widely shared among 
the scientific community involved in the project while at the same time a 
moratorium on proprietary publishing was maintained in order to encourage 
optimal collaboration. Because of this openness, the human genome was 
sequenced in less than 15 years.  
The Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies (ROARMAP) 
charts the growth of open access mandates and policies globally. There has been 
a steady increase between 2005 and 2016 in the number of registered policies 
adopted by universities, research institutions and research funders that require 
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or request researchers to provide open access to their peer-reviewed research 
articles by depositing them in an open access repository (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Number of registered policies globally that require open access 
 
Source: ROARMAP. 
Academia needs new performance measures that drive research 
development. Apart from the impact factor, Web-based metrics for measuring 
research output, popularised as “altmetrics” since 2010, have recently received 
a lot of attention: some measure the impact at article level, others make it 
possible to assess the many outcomes of research besides articles (data, 
presentations, blog posts, collaborative research and mentions in social media, 
etc.). Researchers engaging in open science increasingly expect their work, 
including intermediate products such as research data, to be better rewarded or 
taken into account in their career development. Vice versa, the use of open data 
will require appropriate codes of conduct requiring, for example, the proper 
acknowledgment of the original creator of the data (European Commission, 
2016b). Open science and data sharing can be promoted through awareness 
raising, training and education, incentives and reward systems and monitoring 
at different institutional levels. Open science also requires improvements in data 
quality and management, appropriate infrastructures and funding 
considerations, and awareness of legal issues covering intellectual and industrial 
property rights and security issues (ERAC, 2016).  
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Box 1. Entrepreneurial universities 
As explained by Alberto Tejero Lopez (CAIT, Technical University of Madrid) to the 
CEPS Task Force, in ‘traditional universities’, innovation is only a byproduct of 
teaching and research. This approach may impinge on the entire innovation 
ecosystem, as there is no fertile ground for start-ups and innovation. In 
‘entrepreneurial universities’, innovation becomes a target. Spin-offs and start-
ups as well as IP are objectives rather than byproducts. In this context, professors 
are incentivised to work on applied research and students can be involved in 
projects and generate new ideas.  
A remarkable example of a ‘entrepreneurial university’ is the Lappeenranta 
University of Technology in Finland, which relies on the Traiblazer strategy to 
“train the next generation of entrepreneurial problem solvers”. More specifically, 
this strategy addresses three main global challenges (clean energy, clean water 
and sustainable entrepreneurship) with a specific action plan aiming, inter alia, to: 
i) increase the number of research-based spin-offs; ii) embed entrepreneurial 
learning in all degree programmes; iii) launch a minor in entrepreneurship for all 
students; iv) support extracurricular activities and involve students; v) increase 
cooperation with businesses; vi) encourage student and staff mobility to 
enterprises; vii) fund entrepreneurship activities; viii) reward staff for 
entrepreneurial activities; and ix) encourage staff entrepreneurship. The 
entrepreneurial and innovative potential of the Lappeenranta University of 
Technology is constantly monitored through the “HEInnovative” tool created by 
the European Commission in cooperation with the OECD.63  
Open science, however, does not mean “free science”. It is essential to 
ensure that intellectual property is protected before making knowledge publicly 
available. This will safeguard subsequent attraction of investment that can help 
translate research results into innovation. Furthermore, in order for the benefits 
that could be derived from new text and data mining tools, techniques and 
                                                        
63 The European Commission and the OECD have joined forces to support higher education 
institutions with the creation of the self-assessment tool HEInnovate, which facilitates the 
assessment of an HEI in a systematic way, opening up discussion and debate on the 
entrepreneurial and innovative nature of higher education institutions (for further details see 
https://heinnovate.eu). 
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technologies to be fully developed for better science, the legal uncertainties 
across different fields of law, in particular copyright and database rights, need to 
be addressed (European Commission, 2016b).  
Determined governmental action can unleash unprecedented sources of 
experimentation and innovation, while regulation can foster creative approaches 
by diverse new entrants. There is a need to ensure that publicly funded research 
communities: i) represent all aspects of basic and applied research, innovation, 
etc.; (ii) include stakeholders from various fields (not only one industry sector); 
and (iii) become the main source of information for the drafting of innovation 
agendas and technological roadmaps, which can later inform innovation policy 
for sustainable development. Here foresight practitioners can provide relevant 
support. In the European Commission’s policy cycle, foresight is a participatory 
process that comes at an early stage, to engage and consult stakeholders well 
before decisions are taken or priorities set. Foresight activities can and should be 
carried out to specifically support the development of proposals for the 
Framework Programme and its biannual work programmes. 
At the European level the Open Science Policy Platform advises the 
European Commission on the development and implementation of cross-cutting 
issues concerning open science. Furthermore, the establishment of a European 
Open Science Cloud under the Digital Single Market Strategy could help to make 
relevant research data searchable, accessible, interoperable and reusable vis-à-
vis all European researchers. The Cloud will bring together existing and emerging 
data infrastructures to create a virtual environment for all European researchers 
to store, manage, analyse and reuse data. The Commission is also setting up an 
Open Science Monitor, which will identify, quantify and assess the quality of all 
the ongoing trends in open science (European Commission, 2016b). 
Despite new online tools, such as social networks for research, e.g. 
ResearchGate, there is a low degree of awareness and adoption of the most 
innovative tools, such as collaborative writing tools or blogs for researchers. It is 
also important to encourage the inclusion of non-institutional participants, in 
other words, the general public, in the scientific process. Citizen science is 
“scientific work undertaken by members of the general public, often in 
collaboration with or under the direction of professional scientists and scientific 
institutions” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). Initiatives such as Galaxy Zoo and 
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Zooniverse have shown that it is possible to get hundreds of thousands of people 
to help with scientific research (European Commission, 2016b).  
All young scientists in Europe should have the necessary skills and means 
to be open scientists, and all publicly funded research in the EU should adhere 
to commonly agreed upon open science standards of research integrity 
(European Commission, 2016b). 
4.3.3 Recommended actions 
 Promote open science and data sharing and the improvement of data quality 
and management. 
 Ensure that publicly funded research communities: (i) represent all aspects of 
basic and applied research, innovation, etc.; (ii) include stakeholders from 
various fields (not only one industry sector); and (iii) become the main source 
of information for the drafting of innovation agendas and technological 
roadmaps. 
 Develop new performance measures for academia that encourage further 
development of research. 
 Develop skills for open science and promote commonly agreed upon open 
science standards of research integrity.  
 
4.4 Platforms foster collaboration and entrepreneurship: policy-
makers should engage with them, not fight them 
4.4.1 Problem 
Companies adopting open innovation models (and especially multisided 
platforms) play a growing role in nurturing entrepreneurship, transferring 
knowledge and skills, creating an entrepreneurial mindset and orchestrating 
innovation, especially but not exclusively in the digital economy. Currently, EU 
legislation is uncertain as regards the role of platforms, which end up often being 
subject to contrasting policy pressures: on the one hand, neutrality advocates 
would propose treating them like ‘dumb pipes’, whereas others would want 
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them to be increasingly responsible and accountable for their social impacts. 
There is an urgent need to develop and engage in adaptive governance with 
platforms for learning about and combining  adequate institutional frameworks.  
4.4.2 Analysis 
Open innovation enables partners, including both customers and suppliers and 
even competitors, to broaden the horizon of established business in order to 
optimise the production and application of useful knowledge. European regions 
host medium-sized and large companies in scale-intensive sectors that can 
benefit particularly from open innovation with new firms (start-ups and spin-
offs): utilities, networks, logistics, services, etc. This is one of the emerging trends 
at international level which can help modernise traditional business models and 
sectors. 
Multisided platforms and open innovation models go hand in hand in the 
digital economy, and are permeating many other markets such as finance, 
energy, real estate, automotive and many more. In this context, alliances, 
knowledge transfer and mentoring between platforms and smaller companies 
often become win-win situations. In fact, in many circumstances, platform 
competition imposes on rivals the urge to create and promote as many 
applications as possible to attract end users, and vice versa. In general, the 
platforms suggest major potential for benefitting society (Figure 10).  
Figure 10. Perceived Benefits of digital platforms  
 
Source: Public Consultation: Regulatory environment for platforms, online intermediaries, data and 
cloud computing and the collaborative economy, 2015 (European Commission, 2016c).  
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The evolution of the debate on platforms at the EU level has been difficult 
and bumpy over the past few months. The temptation to impose neutrality 
obligations (in the form of non-discriminatory behaviour and “mere conduit” 
rules) is contrasted with the need for responsible cooperation and the 
enforcement of a growing array of rules, from e-commerce to copyright to 
counterterrorism, defamation, parental control and data protection. In 
consideration of (i) the important role that large companies and platforms can 
play in the promotion of entrepreneurship and innovation at all levels, as well as 
(ii) of their almost inevitable role as partners of public authorities in securing the 
promotion of public policy goals, it seems important that EU policy-makers 
realise the need for deep and constructive cooperation between public and 
private players in shaping and implementing legal rules. This can result in a more 
suitable environment for entrepreneurs (who, incidentally, seem to trust large 
intermediaries and platforms more than they do public institutions). Harmonised 
rules at EU level, such as the recently adopted General Data Protection 
Regulation and the Network and Information Security Directive, are important to 
facilitating growth and rapid scaling up of innovative platforms. Online platforms 
are subject to existing EU rules in areas such as competition, consumer 
protection, protection of personal data and single market freedoms which would 
benefit from coordination in support of the platform economy.  
Future regulatory measures proposed at EU level should foster the 
innovation-promoting role of platforms and address clearly identified problems 
relating to a specific type or activity of online platforms in line with better 
regulation principles. For instance, for the moment the collaborative economy is 
a good example where rules designed with traditional and often local service 
provision in mind impede online platform business models (European 
Commission, 2016d).  
Despite limited European proactive policy efforts, a number of industries 
have experienced creative destruction triggered especially by digital platforms 
and their ecosystems (Evans & Gawer, 2016). Herein, both the empirical 
evidence and the emerging literature on digital platforms and the explosive 
growth of their owner companies are attracting wider interest (Evans & Gawer, 
2016; Accenture, 2016). 
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While rapid transformations have on the one hand created multibillion-
dollar platform businesses with a global presence and on the other ruined 
incumbent industries, their wider impact on society at large can be considered 
mixed (European Commission, 2016d). The observations of how digital platform 
businesses are generating growth and shaking both the capital markets and the 
real markets are getting the attention of policy-makers, e.g. the recent 
communications of the European Commission (European Commission, 2016d) 
and at the national level, for instance the reports for the Finnish Government 
(Halén et al., 2016). Eloranta & Turunen (2016) observe that to govern digital 
platforms, complexity should not be reduced, but rather embraced. Herein, 
Autio & Llewellyn (2013) relate the notion of ‘ecosystem’ to platforms by 
referring to platform-centred ecosystems that comprise the core and the 
periphery. 
Both business leaders and policy-makers are perplexed by the governance 
of digital platforms. Platform businesses search the balance between control and 
openness to optimise the exploitation of their current assets and the exploration 
of new innovations to ensure future competitiveness (Könnölä & Unruh, 2007; 
Gawer, 2014). In terms of policy-making, the extant platform endeavours are 
mainly aimed at patching existing development trajectories provided by markets, 
e.g. European Commission (2016). The policies fit with platforms that are built 
on mechanistic paradigms, striving for industry architecture control. Market and 
systems failures resulting from too much control by some dominant players are 
addressed with existing policy measures. Regulation is slow and societal 
‘consensus’ is difficult to match with dynamic and complex platform 
requirements. Sometimes, temporal monopolies may be good for innovation but 
their impacts are broad, multisided, cross-sectoral and difficult to regulate due 
to information asymmetry (Bauer, 2014). In particular, the policies struggle with 
adaptive digital platform ecosystems64 that share common schemata between 
stakeholders, entail emerging properties and resilience, and require policy 
approaches that also align with and adapt to complexity rather than reduce it. 
Unwanted impacts of policy measures in complex systems is the rule rather than 
exception.  
                                                        
64 This also holds true for other types of ecosystems, such as those of innovation (Russell et 
al., 2011) and entrepreneurship (Autio, 2015; Mason & Brown, 2014). 
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Anttiroiko et al. (2014) discuss platform governance that reflects the 
environment of power shared among interdependent actors faced with ‘wicked’ 
problems – for example, complex financial, security and environmental issues – 
that cross organisational boundaries. Such an approach to governance offers a 
framework for supporting policy informatics, which is supposed to bring changes 
notably on two fronts: first, technology can replace structure as a means of 
control by employing technological rather than bureaucratic gatekeepers or 
facilitators; and second, the platform approach has the capacity to increase the 
flexibility and responsiveness of public organisations involved in governance 
processes (Wachhaus, 2011). The concept of ‘connected governance’, in turn, 
builds upon interoperability that enables public agencies to share and integrate 
information using common standards (Dais et al., 2008). 
4.4.3 Recommended actions 
 Promote cooperation between public and private players in shaping and 
implementing legal rules for platforms.  
 Engage with platforms by seeking their cooperation on nurturing 
entrepreneurship, shaping university curricula, and defining technology 
roadmaps to be used as a basis for future policies.   
 
4.5 Europe must courageously speed up a platform economy 
4.5.1 Problem 
Europe is lagging behind in the platform economy. A platform strategy differs 
from a product strategy in that it requires an external ecosystem to generate 
complementary product or service innovations and build positive feedback 
between the complements and the platform. While Europe has emerged as a 
major consumer of platform services, it has generated relatively few platform 
companies. In 2015, the Center for Global Enterprise surveyed the world’s 176 
most significant platform companies, defined as those exceeding a market 
valuation threshold of $1 billion. Only 27 of the 176 most significant platform 
companies (15%) are from Europe, collectively representing a little over 4% by 
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market value (Evans & Gawer, 2016). Platform ecosystems are gaining ground 
through the digitisation of products, services and businesses. The importance of 
platforms is closely linked to the concept of network effects. The more products 
or services it offers, the more users it will attract. Scale increases the platform’s 
value, helping it attract more complementary offerings which in turn brings in 
more users, which then makes the platform even more valuable. While the lack 
of European platform companies is concerning, Europe is also lacking evidence 
for policy formulation to address properly related aspects such as implications 
for employment conditions, competition law, regional development and 
entrepreneurship, for instance.  
4.5.2 Analysis 
Digitisation-driven market complexity and turbulence is prevailing in most 
industries. Companies seek help beyond their organisational boundaries by 
externalising both innovation activities and operations (Chesbrough, 2012). 
Cooperation involves large networks of stakeholders, including competitors. 
Consequently, the unit of analysis for organising business changes from a firm to 
a business ecosystem (Moore, 1993).  
Across various studies in organisation, strategy and product innovation 
research, the notion of “digital platform” has gained considerable traction when 
addressing such managerial challenges of digitisation (Gawer & Cusumano, 
2014). There is as yet no generally accepted definition for the digital platform, as 
the research has progressed simultaneously in different research streams. The 
different lines of work are still relatively weakly cross-referenced, further 
complicating the formation of a common conceptual basis. The literature 
streams merely agree that, in the abstract, the platform consists of slowly 
changing core components, rapidly changing complementary components, and 
the interfaces between them. 
Platform ecosystems are gaining ground through the digitisation of 
products, services and business processes, and in the process are reshaping the 
global landscape. Platform companies contribute significantly to the economy. 
They have driven up productivity in multiple ways. Evans & Gawer (2016) 
separate platform companies into four types: 
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 Transaction platforms. A transaction platform is a technology, product or 
service that acts as a conduit (or intermediary), facilitating exchange or 
transactions between different users, buyers, or suppliers. 
 Innovation platforms. An innovation platform is a technology, product or 
service that serves as a foundation on which other firms (loosely organised 
into an innovative ecosystem) develop complementary technologies, 
products or services. 
 Integrated platforms. An integrated platform is a technology, product or 
service that is both a transaction platform and an innovation platform. This 
category includes companies such as Apple, which has both matching 
platforms, such as the App Store, and a large third-party developer 
ecosystem that supports content creation on the platform. 
 Investment platforms. Investment platforms consist of companies that 
have developed a platform portfolio strategy and act as a holding 
company, active platform investor or both. 
The total value of these platform companies exceeds $4.3 trillion, which 
demonstrates the size and scale that platform companies have achieved in 
recent years. While Asia has a larger number, the value of platform companies 
in North America is collectively much larger. North America has over 72% of the 
value compared to 22% for Asia. Surprisingly, while Europe has emerged as a 
major consumer of platform services, it has generated relatively few platform 
companies. Only 27 platforms (15% of the total surveyed) hail from Europe and 
collectively they represent a little over 4% by market value (Evans & Gawer, 
2016). 
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Figure 11. Platform companies by type; each bubble represents a company 
sized by market cap as of 1 December 2015 
 
Source: Evans & Gawer (2016). 
Similar to any high growth firm, emergent single digital platform 
businesses, however, can be tricky targets for policy-makers, as it is difficult to 
pick the future ‘winners’ based on the publicly available information and past 
performance. Increasingly scholars suggest focusing on the promotion of 
innovation and entrepreneurial ecosystems rather than hand-picked individual 
companies. However, despite the transformative potential of platform 
ecosystems, current policies addressing platforms within the market and system 
failure paradigms attempt to optimise the benefits and mitigate the downturns 
(European Commission, 2016d). Such market and system failure approaches are 
more useful for describing a steady state situation in which public policy aims to 
put patches on existing development trajectories provided by markets, but not 
to dynamically create and shape new trajectories (Mazzucato, 2016). In order to 
harness the disruptive potential of the platform economy for societal 
transformation and direct such developments towards societally beneficial 
pathways, these need to become an integral part of governance rationales.  
The managerial literature on platforms has gradually evolved from 
mechanical optimisation of the one-sided platform infrastructures to federation 
and coordination of evolving and adaptive digital platform ecosystems of agents 
with diverse roles and ambitions (Gawer, 2014). These dynamic and evolutionary 
perspectives have not yet, however, captured sufficient attention in policy.  
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The latest developments in platform research emphasise the 
organisational and evolutionary perspective. So-called ‘industry platforms’, 
‘platform organisations’, ‘service platforms’ and ‘engagement platforms’ refer to 
the platforms’ are not limited to leveraging external innovation or matching 
supply with demand but extend to all business processes, creating overlapping 
and nested structures consisting of many organisations. 
The system evolves organically and cannot be totally controlled by any 
party. In stable environments this would result in performance deficiencies, but 
in rapidly changing markets, the benefits in terms of rapid adaptation outweigh 
the potential process performance losses. Good case industries for these 
platform types are, e.g. smartphone application ecosystems and open source 
software products.  
However, while the European Commission is examining the impact of 
platforms and preparing guidelines for policy, especially within the frameworks 
of the sharing and collaborative economy, to date Europe lacks evidence-based 
research on platforms to inform policy. It is urgent that both European and 
national level initiatives fill this gap and help transform Europe from a reactive 
to a proactive mode of developing the platform economy. At first glance, outside 
innovation policy, interventions on private platforms should be cautious, 
especially when the platforms seem to be developing in a way that stimulates 
open innovation in the long run. That said, platforms could become very 
important allies of government in enforcing rules, and just as key in promoting 
entrepreneurship in a variety of fields.  
The recently adopted strategy to digitise European industry (European 
Commission, 2016a) identifies a series of measures that help to advance these 
ambitions. They include investment in world-class data and computing 
infrastructure for science and innovation, with an estimated investment of €50 
billion of public and private funds to upgrade Europe’s digital innovation 
capacities. There are also measures included in this package for a streamlined 
approach to standardisation that aims to foster the necessary cross-border and 
cross-domain interoperability. 
A number of ongoing initiatives in the research arena and other specific 
funding actions already aim to help the emergence of innovative platform-based 
ecosystems. These include the provision of high-speed Internet access across the 
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EU-11 and support for open service platforms. In this context, the Commission 
could start a reflection on how to shape the future Internet as a powerful, open, 
user-centric, interoperable platform ecosystem, in particular with the support of 
Horizon 2020. Finally, projects such as the Startup Europe initiative provide 
advice and funding, thereby promoting opportunities for start-ups to experiment 
and scale up. 
In sum, Europeans need to take a proactive stand in developing the 
platform economy, for instance by fostering investment in broadband, the 
Internet of things and Industry 4.0, removing unnecessary regulatory barriers, 
addressing market concentration and barriers to competition, preserving the 
open Internet and the free flow of data, and enhancing trust in the digital 
economy. The platforms transform the economy, with diverse implications for 
society that need to be better understood. Europe needs to actively develop its 
own platforms and ensure that their spillover effects will benefit society.  
4.5.3 Recommended actions 
 Develop both at European and national levels initiatives for evidence-based 
research on platforms to inform policy.  
 Launch foresight activities to explore the future of the platform economy and 
its implications for policy and society at large. 
 Improve conditions for the platform economy by fostering investment in 
broadband, the Internet of things and Industry 4.0, by removing unnecessary 
regulatory barriers and by addressing market concentration and barriers to 
competition. 
 Preserve the open Internet and the free flow of data, enhancing trust in the 
digital economy.  
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4.6 More scale-ups are urgently needed! 
4.6.1 Problem 
‘Born global’ mindsets and connections are critically important for the renewal 
of the economy and the success of any innovation policy. The recent efforts 
across Europe have paid considerable attention to the creation of new start-ups, 
while less attention has been given to scale-ups, i.e. firms that have more than 
10 staff and grow more than 20% per year (OECD, 2007). According to Isenberg 
& Onyemah (2016), such firms have the highest spillover effects (inspiration, 
capital, taxes, expertise and job creation). They also have the advantage of being 
selected naturally and able to show new growth in 6 to 12 months. Typically, 10-
20% of existing stock is able to kick-start growth that translates into capital 
efficient use of funds. Maximising the potential of scale-ups to stimulate the 
economy has become imperative for entrepreneurial policy.65  
4.6.2 Analysis 
The ongoing debate about a future European Innovation Council is rightly 
focused on radical innovations and scale-ups, as these are real problems facing 
Europe’s innovation policy. While the scale-ups and their ecosystems are 
increasingly considered important for the economy, they also are considered 
difficult targets for policy. It is difficult to identify scale-ups, when the findings on 
scale-ups are diverse and their growth can be inconsistent. Even the source of 
financing does not ensure that the firm will grow into a scale-up and, more  
important, that  the  high  growth will  be  maintained  over  time (Moreno & 
Coad, 2015). Nevertheless, OECD has concluded that young firms (thanks to their 
growth) are key to economic growth and employment (Figure 12).  
                                                        
65 At the CEPS Task Force, Nicholas Davis (World Economic Forum) pointed out substantial 
differences in growth rates between US and EU companies, which reflect ‘scaling-up’ 
problems for EU players. Similar evidence was presented by Dirk Pilat (OECD).  
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Figure 12. Young firms contribute disproportionally to job creation in all 
countries 
 
Note: The graph shows the share of young firms (less than six years old) in total employment, total 
gross job creation and total gross job destruction, respectively. Data cover manufacturing, construction 
and non-financial business services. Figures for Chile are preliminary. Owing to methodological 
differences, figures may deviate from officially published national statistics. 
Source: OECD (2016). 
 
Despite the difficulties of identifying scale-ups for direct policy measures, 
the rationale remains to develop measures that enhance the odds of generating 
new scale-ups and their sustainable growth. Herein, attention is given to the 
context. The promotion of scale-ups across Europe requires the alignment of 
different policies as well as specific support measures in different levels of 
governance and dimensions of ecosystems (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Key dimensions and stakeholders of entrepreneurial ecosystems 
for high growth firms 
 
Source: Insight Foresight Institute (2016). 
To enable experimentation and firm growth, it is pertinent to reduce 
regulatory barriers to entry, e.g. red tape, growth, e.g. size-specific regulations, 
and firm exit/failure, e.g. penalising bankruptcy legislation, overly strict 
employment protection legislation.66 Policies that favour incumbents, e.g. R&D 
tax credits, some environmental regulations, subsidies that delay exit, visa rules, 
etc., should be revisited.  
Banks have been less willing to provide loans as a result of the financial 
crisis. Meanwhile, venture capital firms have become more risk adverse due to 
pressures on the industry and have focused on later stage investment. Angel 
investors have become more visible and active through groups, syndicates and 
networks but also face challenges. 
                                                        
66 This recipe was presented by Dirk Pilat (OECD) at the CEPS Task Force. 
Businesses
Academia
Government
Investors
Society
Media
104 | PLACES: COLLABORATION SPACES AND PLATFORMS AS DRIVERS OF INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Capital market ‘failures’ arise mostly due to information asymmetries. 
While it can be argued that a financing gap is not a market failure, a number of 
governments have chosen to intervene based on broader objectives. The 
majority of OECD countries have had grants, loans and/or guarantee schemes in 
place for many years. A number of OECD member countries have also put tax 
incentives in place. There has been an increase in the use of equity instruments 
in OECD countries, but the focus has shifted from government equity funds 
investing directly to more indirect models such as co-investment funds and fund-
of-funds. These approaches seek to leverage private investment, and a number 
of OECD countries are experimenting with different incentive structures. While 
supply-side interventions have increased, there is little evidence of the impact of 
these instruments and whether or not they crowd out private investors. A mix of 
public and private venture capital funding may have a positive impact, but 
further analysis is needed (Wilson, 2015). 
Specific programmes such as incubators, accelerators, business angel 
networks and matchmaking services have become increasingly popular in OECD 
countries. Human capital development can focus on both entrepreneurs and 
investors, although the focus is typically on entrepreneurs. 
The development of financial markets and exit opportunities, whether 
through IPOs on a stock exchange or mergers and acquisitions by other firms, 
directly influences the development of seed and early stage financing. 
Bankruptcy regulations, labour market restrictions and other framework 
conditions also impact firm dynamics as well as the creation, financing and 
growth of innovative firms. Regulatory barriers and administrative burdens on 
high growth firms can directly hinder their performance and access to finance. 
In particular, securities legislation and more stringent capital requirements on 
institutional investors could reduce the supply of investment in venture capital 
from banks, pension funds and insurance companies (Wilson, 2015). 
Policy interventions should not be seen in isolation but as a set of 
interacting policies. A systems approach is needed which covers both supply- and 
demand-side intervention, framework conditions and especially policy measures 
that ensure policy learning. In particular, cities and their districts can implement 
strategies that build on the local understanding of the specific dynamics of start-
ups or scale-ups and their ecosystems at hand. To avoid counterproductive policy 
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measures, it is pertinent to engage with the ecosystem actors in learning 
processes that shed light on bottlenecks and possible actions needed from 
diverse perspectives.  
Furthermore, innovation and entrepreneurial ecosystems need to be 
strengthened for innovative firms, e.g. through enhanced access to (risk) capital, 
network development, mentoring of entrepreneurs, skills development, etc. The 
efforts to complete the Single Market and reduce trade barriers has to be taken 
forward so firms can scale more easily across borders (see also “Ideas for Policy” 
below) (Pilat, contribution to CEPS Task Force, 2015). Scale-ups also need a 
supportive culture that can be promoted through education and media, by 
celebrating the success of scale-ups and engaging entrepreneurs to share their 
success stories. 
 
4.6.3 Recommended actions 
 Reduce barriers to entry, e.g. red tape, growth, e.g. size-specific regulations, 
and firm exit/failure, e.g. penalising bankruptcy legislation, overly strict 
employment protection legislation. 
 Address regulatory incumbency: Policies often favour incumbents, e.g. R&D 
tax credits, some environmental regulations, subsidies that delay exit, visa 
rules. 
 Develop ecosystems through enhancing incentives and access to (risk) 
capital, developing networks (including development of research), mentoring 
of entrepreneurs, developing skills.  
 Complete the Single Market and reduce trade barriers, so firms can scale 
more easily across borders. 
 Promote scale-up culture through education and media, celebrate success of 
scale-ups and engage entrepreneurs to share their success stories. 
 Initiate studies providing evidence of the impact of financial supply-side 
interventions.  
106 | 
 
5. POLICIES: HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF 
REGULATION TO PROMOTE INNOVATION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
5.1 Beyond access to finance: Activating public demand  
5.1.1 Problem 
Building vibrant ecosystems through holistic innovation policies requires a 
number of interconnected and interdependent dimensions and interventions 
(Isenberg, 2011; Edquist, 2014). Among them, access to finance and access to 
markets figure prominently in the quest for action to overcome barriers to 
growth as indicated by business and entrepreneurs.  
Access to finance is still one of the key problems facing EU entrepreneurs 
and innovative firms, particularly small and new businesses. On the other hand, 
in Europe, venture capital is still relatively underdeveloped; the banking system 
is still providing insufficient credit to entrepreneurs and innovators, despite 
repeated quantitative easing programmes by the ECB; and new channels such as 
crowdfunding, FinTech and online lenders are still in their infancy, and often 
hindered by existing EU and national laws.67 
Market access can be eased through demand-side innovation policies to 
increase the uptake of innovations in society. Demand is a major potential source 
of innovation, yet the critical role of demand as a key driver of innovation is yet 
to be recognised in EU policies. Public procurement could play significant role in 
innovation policy strategies at the EU level and in a range of European countries, 
and this has been affirmed repeatedly (Aho, 2006). While both national and 
European constituencies have taken up experimentation programmes to spur 
                                                        
67 Regulatory barriers to FinTech and crowdfunding were highlighted by Oliver Gajda 
(European Crowdfunding Network) at the CEPS Task Force. 
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demand for innovation, they are far less developed than supply-driven policies, 
which are implemented widely in the US.  
Indeed, public sector entrepreneurship (Leyden & Link, 2015) through 
cross-departmental schemes such as SBIR concerns both public finance and 
procurement. Sponsored firms receive early support and access to the federal 
system of procurements. This has no equivalent at the European level; the 
European Commission has developed an ‘SME instrument’ which basically 
concerns funding and regards size as the determining factor instead of the age 
of the candidate firm, which as we have pointed out above would be a much 
better indicator. In the European context, funding and procurement are not 
associated, although the budget for the SME instrument is compiled, as in the 
US, from a distributed number of sources (departments and federal agencies in 
the US, DGs in the European Commission context).  
5.1.2 Analysis 
Financial support is one of the key ingredients of successful entrepreneurship 
and innovation. In Europe, the picture is still quite fragmented. Berlin and 
London have made impressive progress in attracting venture capital, often 
thanks to the intermediation and active involvement of large companies 
(especially from the ICT sector). But venture capital is not a silver bullet solution 
to Europe’s innovation and entrepreneurship problems; it is typically very local 
and provides funding at relatively late stages of a company’s life. Seed money is 
often provided by other means: for example, in the US crowdfunding has already 
overtaken venture capital and is proving very useful in providing early-stage 
financial support for innovative ideas and business models.  
At the same time, in the US and even more so in China, IT companies 
provide a valid alternative to the currently stalled banking loans market: from 
Alibaba to PayPal, from WeChat to Amazon and the Funding Circle, the lending 
market is filling gaps that traditional banks are not able to fill in the current 
market situation. Finally, online platforms themselves provide digital 
entrepreneurs with various forms of financial and non-financial support, e.g. 
mentoring, access to a variety of free services, etc. All these developments can 
potentially lead to easier access to finance for entrepreneurs in Europe; 
however, a number of legal and regulatory restrictions, coupled with a relative 
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lack of transparency and accountability on the side of new platforms, are 
standing between the status quo and a more prosperous future.   
Starting with national operations, first in the UK, and then with ‘fund of 
funds’ jointly operated with a number of states (Spain, Turkey, etc.), the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) has established itself as the de facto broker for 
publicly facilitated venture capital and other kinds of support. Risk Sharing 
Finance Facilities sponsored by the European Commission have also been added 
through the Seventh Framework Programme and Horizon 2020, including a 
window for SMEs intermediated by national banks. Looking ahead, the EIB aims 
to launch a European ‘fund of funds’ within the Horizon 2020 timeframe, 
facilitated by the strong support of Commissioner Moedas. 
Concerning demand-driven innovation, policy measures can involve 
legislation that increases consumer confidence in innovative products, safety 
regulations, standards or public procurement. Creating effective links between 
demand-side and supply-side tools can improve the efficiency of the innovative 
system. This is a difficult task for both EU and national policy interventions, as 
competences are dispersed. An interesting recent case is the new Swedish 
Innovation Council created in February 2015 under the auspices of the prime 
minister, with a focus on innovation rather than on research (for which there is 
another council in Sweden), which is successfully addressing functional public 
procurement for innovation (Edquist, 2016). 
In particular, to exert a wider impact, the pooling of public procurement 
for innovation and market access needs to be addressed at the national level and 
also overall at the European level: ‘innovation deals’ recently launched by the 
European Commission might spur innovation where it is currently hard to come 
by or impossible due to regulation (see below for a more detailed analysis). Such 
deals are inspired by the Dutch administration’s experience with ‘green deals’, 
and the ‘circular economy’ would serve as pilot domain at EU level.  
Such efforts are welcome because they go beyond less focused attempts 
to associate innovation with regulation, e.g. European Innovation Partnerships 
(EIP), whose impact has been relatively negligible. Interestingly and fortunately, 
the ongoing debate about the likely set-up of a European Innovation Council (EIC) 
has stressed the importance of regulation to spurring certain forms of innovation 
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in Europe. The debate rightly focuses on the insufficient number of breakthrough 
scale-ups (Science&Business, 2016) and related regulatory action.  
Last but not least, the EIC should also establish a strong and authoritative 
advisory function with EU and national governments, with insights from 
successful European entrepreneurs and innovators themselves, thus helping 
overcome barriers to growth in general and helping scale up start-ups in 
particular. In so doing, the EIC could tackle issues regarding demand and context, 
which are traditionally neglected by the innovation policy portfolios of both most 
member states and EU institutions. This would contribute to mobilising action in 
areas that require more than funding, procurement and innovation-friendly 
regulation in particular.  
 
Figure 14. Average size of start-ups and old firms in manufacturing and services 
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Box 2. ICT vouchers 
One instrument that is being successfully tested by the European Commission to 
facilitate innovation by small enterprises is represented by the so-called ‘vouchers’ 
for value-added ICT services.68 The European Commission created vouchers (valued 
at up to €10,000) for SMEs to innovate by investing in digital technologies in order 
to increase competitiveness and enhance growth prospects. The instrument 
promotes ICT uptake in established companies or by entrepreneurs located in 
regions where the voucher scheme is deployed. ICT services can be provided by 
private companies or public institutions at the market price. The implementation of 
the instrument will be entirely ‘regional’. Each region is called on to identify the need 
for innovation support for business and the implementing body of the voucher 
scheme, and to tailor the scheme to specific local needs. The voucher scheme needs 
to be streamlined and administrative/transaction costs should be kept very low. The 
vouchers often imply the cooperation and approval of regional authorities, e.g. in 
Murcia a ICT voucher for improving internal processes and implementing e-
commerce solutions was approved by the regional innovation agency). Once it has 
obtained the approval, the SME consults the service provider (among a selected list 
of ‘reliable’ providers) and the service is provided. The SME pays for the service with 
the voucher (the voucher does not cover the entire value of the service). The service 
provider gives the voucher to the innovation agency with a justification and payment 
is made to the service provider. 
This is only one among several tools. As structural funds are national/regional, 
the determination to use such tools to implement policies is local. Aside from 
recommendations on tools and their use, the Commission cannot decide. The 
regions have a full range of policy options (besides vouchers), and their decisions are 
based on strategies for spending social funds. The European Commission can steer, 
but not implement, such strategies. 
5.1.3 Conclusion 
Great societal challenges constitute a relatively new field of attention for EU 
innovation policy introduced within the new Horizon 2020 context (Georghiou 
et al., 2008). Access to finance and markets need to be leveraged by innovation 
                                                        
68 Ann Branch’s presentation at the CEPS task Force.  
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policies that are holistic and pervasive while also taking advantage of Europe’s 
social model. 
The EIB is well positioned to tap innovative sources of finance in 
cooperation with EU, national, regional and local stakeholders, in order to 
develop the right mix of capillarity for beneficiaries and boost the contribution 
of its operations to excellence in research and innovation. 
Increased transparency and accountability are necessary conditions for 
the EIB to be perceived not only as the natural but also as the actual facilitator 
at EU level. 
Regarding regulation, the EIC could and should advise regulators in order 
to make certain forms of innovation possible in Europe. This would help meet 
public demand for innovation, by increasing the visibility of good practices at EU 
level to overcome barriers to growth (Leceta et al., forthcoming).  
5.1.4 Recommended actions 
 Integrate systemic innovation with better regulation by refining the guidance 
on innovation impacts in the better regulation guidelines. 
 Align policy-making and better regulation to the EU’s sought-after long-term 
impacts and objectives. 
 Set up mission-led platforms to inform early-stage policy-making on 
innovation impact.  
 Strengthen the better regulation toolkit with more information and guidance 
on adaptive, experimental policy-making that favours systemic innovation. 
 Facilitate intermediation in access to finance through increased transparency 
and accountability. 
 Complement the Single Market by relying on a more strategic use of public 
procurement, and using ‘innovation deals’ to promote efficient compliance. 
 EIC advisory function should provide good practice advice to governments in 
order to overcome barriers to growth and scale for start-ups.  
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5.2 Reframing policy for established versus new firms (rather than 
large versus small firms) 
5.2.1 Problem 
Sadly, one often finds too many ‘mechanistic’ discussions about policy 
instruments, while policy emanates from strategy and strategy from vision; on 
the other hand, there is too often a clear disconnect between innovation policy-
makers’ intentions and actual implementation. It is thus time to rethink 
innovation policies through co-creation spaces, rather than through instruments 
too often focused on funding and innovation linearity (Edquist, 2014). Innovation 
is much more than R&D and both require much more than public funding, and 
we know that science is never enough, and sometimes not even required, for 
successful innovations.   
Regrettably, most innovation policy interventions focus on R&D even 
though most European governments claim their innovation policies and 
strategies are holistic (Edquist, 2014). At EU level, most policy interventions 
foster public-private partnerships between academia and businesses, including 
SMEs. This is questionable for two reasons. On one hand, preferred partners for 
business in R&D differ across sectors and countries; on the other, when it is a 
question of inter-firm collaboration, policies favour consortia that involve both 
large and small businesses.  
Collaboration with academia is useful to science-based innovation and 
specialised suppliers, less so to scale-intensive and supplier-dominated sectors 
(Pavitt, 1984). On the other hand, focusing on firm size rather than age is 
suboptimal for policy (Mazzucato, 2013), because “most of firms start small, but 
most small firms are old” (Coad et al., 2014). In the wake of the crisis, widespread 
awareness of and appetite for new, more experimental innovation models of 
innovation is emerging, coupled with evidence that disruptive innovative models 
can displace long-established firms. More and more voices from the World 
Economic Forum, the OECD and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are 
calling for new policy interventions, replacing emphasis on cooperation between 
large and small partners with more focused efforts between established (both 
large and small) and new ventures. 
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5.2.2 Analysis 
Debunking the myth of the role of the state and focusing on the real issues 
(Mazzucato, 2013) are pre-requisites. Regarding corporate ventures and 
entrepreneurship, for instance, emerging trends such as FinTech and digitisation 
of manufacturers (Industry 4.0) could very well point to some sort of ‘European 
way’ to use venture capital, associating new firms with established businesses. 
Indeed, Europe does not lack national champions, network operators, utilities 
and service providers with global footprints, but their competitiveness is at stake 
and requires radically open and more disruptive sources of innovation. Why is 
this? Because their traditional revenue sources will not necessarily grow, quite 
the opposite, in fact: traditional business models in ‘extractive industries’ are 
increasingly exposed to and eroded by international competition from new 
entrants. On the other hand, sustainability is not guaranteed either (as evidenced 
by Veugelers, 2009), since the average knowledge and technology intensity of 
European firms is lower. Hence, Europe is right to want to narrow the innovation 
gap both for what concerns disruptive innovation (particularly market-creating 
innovative models);69 and radical innovation (based on new breakthrough 
technologies); and also targeting both start-ups and older firms. 
Big firms need to digitise, transform their business and reinvent 
themselves from the inside out. For that to happen, new forms of collaboration 
between the established firms (either large or small) and new (start-ups and 
spin-offs) is a rather unexplored area for policy, though it was recently advocated 
by WEF (2014). Vice versa, new firms can find ‘launching partners’ among 
established firms, helping them grow and accelerate market uptake by exploiting 
their global business footprints. Suitable arrangements need to be established to 
secure balanced and thus sustainable alliances, particularly for what concerns IP 
(WEF, 2015). More widely, governments also need to evolve from the policies of 
older generations, as too of them focus on (not necessarily new) SMEs on the 
one hand, and foster partnerships between (not necessarily established and 
new) large and small firms on the other. 
                                                        
69 According to the 2016 WEF technology pioneer list, only six out of the top 30 companies 
are European, while 21 come from the US. Also, Europe is home to only 19 ‘unicorns’ (start-
ups that have reached a market valuation of over €1 billion) and their combined value is less 
than half the current market value of Facebook. 
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Interestingly, the OECD (as of 2015) is now advising governments to stop 
supporting only established companies and to also and more resolutely support 
newcomers and to achieve balance between direct and indirect aid. Evidence 
shows that direct aid is more effective for launching innovation in companies 
that have yet to innovate, while direct aid ‘builds loyalty’ in companies that are 
already innovating, especially larger ones (Pereiras & Huergo, 2006). Another 
advantage of direct aid is the directionality to meet major challenges. In 
summary, a suitable balance between direct support measures and indirect 
support measures (tax incentives) should also be achieved, as new/small and 
established/large firms do not benefit equally from them. 
Figure 15. Direct government funding of business R&D and tax incentives for 
R&D, 2012 and 2006 
 
More recently, regarding the focus on tax incentives for R&D, IMF (2016) 
finds that “tax preferences should target new firms, not small ones”, arguing that 
preferential tax treatment of small firms should be avoided; it may actually hurt 
growth by creating a ‘small-business trap’ as a result of the higher taxes firms 
would face once they cross a certain size threshold. Well-designed tax relief for 
new firms can promote entrepreneurship and innovation.  
 
 11 
eye to effectiveness. In designing such policies, a focus on high social returns and international good 
practices is essential. R&D tax incentives should be designed to also meet the needs of young, innovative 
firms and avoid amplifying cross-border tax planning opportunities. Young firms often have not yet 
generated taxable income, which may prevent them from using (non-refundable) R&D tax incentives. This 
may inhibit innovation and growth since such firms have particular strengths as R&D performers (e.g. in 
creating radical innovations) and job creators. Measures such as cash refunds, carry forwards, or the use of 
payroll withholding tax credits for R&D-related wages can address this problem. 
29. Governments should also ensure that R&D tax incentive policies provide value for money and 
are relatively predictable for firms. In many countries, overall tax relief for business R&D may be greater 
than government  intended and this may be compoun ed by the rising generosity of tax relief for R&D 
over the past decade (Figure 6). The full costs of R&D tax incentives are not always transparent, since they 
are “off budget”. Governments should systematically evaluate tax relief measures to assess whether their 
targeting and design remain appropriate. Furthermore, OECD analysis also suggests that in countries that 
have experienced a large number of R&D tax policy reversals, the impact of such policies on private R&D 
expenditure is greatly diminished (Westmore, 2013). It is therefore important that governments do not 
repeatedly tinker with such policies to minimise policy uncertainty for firms. 
Figure 6. Direct government funding of business R&D and tax incentives for R&D, 2012 and 2006 
Costs to public budgets, as a per cent of GDP 
 
Source: OECD R&D Tax Incentive Indicators, www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm and OECD, National Accounts and Main Science and 
Technology Indicators, 15 December 2014. Direct funding estimates for Brazil based on national sources.  
30. Policymakers should balance indirect support for business R&D (fiscal incentives) with the use 
of direct support measures to foster innovation. Direct support measures – e.g. contracts, grants, awards for 
mission-oriented R&D or support for networks – can be particularly effective for young firms that lack the 
upfront funds or collateral to finance an innovative project. It is important, however, that any allocation of 
direct support is non-automatic and based on competitive, objective and transparent criteria. Moreover, 
selection process s must be designed to e sure efficiency (including minimal bureaucracy), avoid rent-
seeking activities (especially by vested interests) and support challengers, e.g. young firms and more 
radical innovation. Non-financial support measures, e.g. training, mentoring and network development, 
including for SMEs, are an important component of the overall policy mix, as lack of funding is only one 
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5.2.3 Conclusion 
Overall, there seems to be a surprisingly unanimous opinion among international 
organisations that innovation policies require a different focus. Maybe the crisis 
brought about a much needed shift from more widespread generic public-
private R&D-focused innovation policy to more targeted but transversal and 
contextual policies for high-growth potential.  
Indiscriminate interventions for cooperation between large and small 
firms require more targeted partnerships between existing and new firms, 
whereby the former may provide the scale and the latter the disruptive 
potential.70 
In such a context, a suitable balance needs to be established between 
direct and indirect support schemes in consideration of their different 
implications. 
5.2.4 Recommended actions 
 Refocus policies for large and small to high-growth companies. 
 Promote healthy cooperation between existing and new businesses. 
 Establish a suitable balance between direct and indirect support schemes. 
                                                        
70 In the context of the CEPS Task Force, Nicholas Davis (World Economic Forum) argued that 
collaboration between large companies and SMEs/young entrepreneurs can be built on three 
pillars: i) empowering (setting strategy to foster collaboration); ii) educating (fostering 
proficiency in management of collaborative innovation); iii) enabling (stable legal and 
regulatory framework and developing infrastructures to support collaborative innovation). 
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5.3 Set up a simpler division of labour for multilevel innovation policy 
in Europe 
5.3.1 Problem 
Progress toward establishing a European Research Area71 in particular, and 
achieving the Lisbon and Barcelona objectives more generally, require radical 
policy shifts (Veugelers, 2014). However, in the past years the structure of the 
Framework Programmes for research has remained too rigid, and the strict 
application of principles such as subsidiarity and competition law still limits the 
EU’s ability to engage with public-private platforms to promote research and 
innovation. 
The question is: Why does Europe still need to invest in ‘getting public and 
private partners together’? They know themselves enough already, and through 
such public-private partnerships (PPP) the EU may risk sponsoring the reputation 
of the given partners more than it does the actual excellence of the projects. A 
different notion of European added value is needed; it should denote 
competition at European level and not the geometry of collaboration projects 
per se; national governments could then embrace transnational collaboration as 
part of their national programmes and interventions, including structural funds 
which would help new member states to better position themselves. 
5.3.2 Analysis 
Now, after 35 years of EU Framework Programmes, more focus is needed to 
translate knowledge into action. Also, decisive normative efforts are urgently 
needed in order to encompass policy action commensurate with the challenges 
of our time. There is an apparent dichotomy in discourse and practice, focusing 
on either macro-level policy-setting (government and governance) or micro-level 
performance (firms and entrepreneurs).  
                                                        
71 Representatives of European universities as well as the Italian National Research Council 
have confirmed that the European Research Area is far from being completed, and this 
undermines EU research and innovation capacity, especially when compared to other global 
players such as the US, Japan and China. 
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As the need for policy experimentation becomes more acute, the ‘meso 
level’ efforts of learning innovation agencies and programmes (Breznitz & 
Ornston, 2013; Chesbrough, 2012) will play a very different role: from ‘funding 
and coordinating’ (Lepori, 2011) to ‘facilitation and orchestration’ (Clarysse et 
al., 2015; Chesbrough, 2012). These are some of the key words in this new era 
of entrepreneurial ecosystems (Mason & Brown, 2014; Isenberg, 2011) and 
global clusters of innovation (Engel & del-Palacio, 2009).  
All over the world, an emerging wave of entrepreneurs, technological 
advancements and venture capital investment are co-creating radically new 
innovation models through new business-like vehicles for policy delivery in 
shaping entrepreneurial ecosystems, e.g. KICs of the EIT and mediating 
university-business structures such the IP Group in the UK. Also, firms are 
reverting more and more to open innovation schemes such as IP licensing, 
academic partnerships, open-source platforms and venture capital investment. 
Corporate and university ventures are among the fastest-growing strategies 
(Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Napp & Minshall, 2011; Sahaym et al., 2010).  
In the quest for the most effective schemes for adapting to this new 
business reality, learning is key not only to implementing programmes but also 
to make smarter interventions in terms of efficiency and impact. The results will 
help governments evolve from ‘managing current systems’ (top-down) to 
helping ‘shape new ecosystems’ (bottom-up), with more focus on knowledge 
dynamics and value generation. Policy experimentation of this sort could help 
operationalise more successful and holistic policies and to scale them up.  
Mutual learning among agencies, policy-makers and the research 
community provides a good basis for further developments. Successful local 
ecosystems (Silicon Valley, Israel, Singapore, etc.) demonstrate that 
entrepreneurial talent and global ambition are key constitutional and cultural 
foundations. This section thus focuses on what policies can again make Europe a 
continent of entrepreneurs and innovators.  
Past policy reviews have stressed the importance of policy coherence 
(León et al., 2008), in particular for the following dimensions: 
 Horizontal coherence: coherence of R&D and innovation policies across 
sectors, ministries, departments, directorates, etc. 
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 Vertical coherence: coherence of R&D and innovation policies across 
governance levels, e.g. between EU, national and regional.  
 Temporal coherence (dynamics): coherence of R&D and innovation 
policies over time, and predictability of policy changes.  
As we approach the review of Horizon 2020 and discussions on setting up a 
European Innovation Council (EIC), these same dimensions help us formulate 
conclusions and recommendations: 
 From a horizontal perspective, the number of instruments with the FP7 
and Horizon 2020 has reached a peak, and many commentators and 
stakeholders stress that policy experimentation should now end, and all 
these instruments should now be consolidated. 
 From a vertical perspective, notwithstanding experimentation, the relative 
weight of programmes coordinated at European level has not evolved 
significantly (see Figure 16 below). 
 Policy experimentation at EU level has not always led to learning, because 
more and more instruments are added to the whole set-up. 
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Figure 16. Historical evolution and relative weight of transnational R&D vs. 
total public R&D funding in Europe 
 
Source: Mustar et al. (2006) cited by Deubner (2007).72 
5.3.3 Conclusion 
In view of the above, there is a clear need for consolidation of the various 
communities, instruments and spaces offered by the EU Horizon 2020: KICs, EIPs, 
EIIs, JTIs, etc. Notwithstanding their experimental merit and interest for given 
stakeholders and participants individually, the whole set together multiply 
                                                        
72 No data is publicly available for the more recent history of the Framework Programme. 
However, EUROSTATS has started to produce “R & D budget statistics - transnationally 
coordinated research” with data from 2012 in a third round of experimental data collection 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/R_%26_D_budget_ 
statistics_-_transnationally_coordinated_research#Data_sources_and_availability) from 
which basically three conclusions are drawn, confirming that coordination has stagnated 
recently: i) “On average, about 3.8 % of EU Member States’ R & D budget was directed to 
‘transnationally coordinated research’ in 2010”; ii) “The share of countries’ R & D budget 
directed to ‘transnationally coordinated research’ decreased slightly in 2010 compared to 
2009”; iii) “Framework Programme instruments for coordinating national R & D programmes 
and other Europe-wide R & D programmes are a major driving force for transnationally 
coordinated research activities.” 
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transaction costs and reduce opportunities for entrepreneurs in the periphery – 
precisely those who can make disruptive innovation happen well beyond existing 
or sustained innovation approaches.  
We thus argue that a new paradigm is needed for EU-level policy whereby 
the Commission would adopt a more strategic role by focusing only on things it 
can make happen, such as ERC, EIT, FET, etc., while progressively delegating 
collaborative undertakings, such as ERANETs, JPIs, JTIs, etc., to longstanding and 
experienced intergovernmental networks, such as Eureka (for business-led, 
collaborative R&D) and Cost (for academy-led collaborative R&D). 
Infidel frontier-research is the aim of ERC, on top of existing scientific 
infrastructures and laboratories (ESFRI), while the EIT aims to shape pan-
European ecosystems for people-driven innovation. The ongoing debate about a 
future European Innovation Council (EIC) is rightly focused on scale-ups, as these 
pose the real problems facing Europe’s innovation policy.  
From the above, a possible multilevel division of labour emerges for 
existing schemes and network structures whereby a radically simplified 
architecture for multilevel policy would be advisable in the longer run as follows: 
1. Governments principally responsible as enablers and funders, certainly for 
human capital and capacity building, including basic infrastructure 
(education, regulation, etc.). 
2. Intergovernmental level, pooling together nationally funded programmes, 
the largest share by far of public support in Europe, whereby transnational 
collaboration is not established at EU-level but embedded in nationally 
funded programmes, and projects with:  
o EU-sponsored ‘public-public partnerships’ and ‘public-led R&D 
cooperation’ with business clusters around COST, progressively 
including ‘Joint Programming Initiatives’;  
o EU-sponsored ‘private-private partnerships’ and ‘private-led R&D 
cooperation’ with academia, clustered around Eureka, progressively 
including ‘Joint Technology Initiatives’. 
3. Longer-run EU/community level policy support interventions are 
substantiated in a new interpretation of ‘European added value’, namely, 
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‘the added value which comes from competition at EU level’ (Luukkonen, 
2014, citing the Commission Communication ‘Europe and Basic Research’ 
(European Commission, 2004), which justified the establishment of the 
ERC), thus replacing the traditional interpretation of ‘European added 
value’ as a synonym of transnational collaboration (Muldur et al., 2006). 
5.3.4 Recommended actions 
 Reformulate European added value and focus EU support on interventions 
which make sense only at EU level, such as ERC, EIT, FET, etc. 
 Delegate collaborative undertakings such as ERANETs, JPIs, JTIs, etc., to 
longstanding and experienced intergovernmental networks, Eureka and Cost 
in particular. 
 Empower governments with enabling functions while embedding the 
European dimension fully in their programmes and agencies to create scale 
of policy. 
 Shift policy coordination away from project cooperation, as this has shown its 
limitations and actually reached a plateau in recent years. 
 
5.4 Europe should embark on transformative but simpler innovation 
policies  
5.4.1 Problem 
The current division of labour in the European landscape is far too complex, with 
regional, national and transnational institutions and programmes, whereby 
coordination unfortunately is often the responsibility of the actual beneficiaries 
of funded projects (Granieri & Renda, 2012). Efforts to attempt a higher degree 
of policy coordination at EU level through project coordination have also shown 
limitations (see ERANETs, JTIs, JPIs, etc.), as evidenced by data collected by 
EUROSTAT on ‘transnationally coordinated research’ since 2012.  
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Notwithstanding the above, with very notable exceptions such as the ERC, 
the paradigm for EU-level interventions remains that of promoting transnational 
collaboration in R&D (and not necessarily impact); collaboration, essentially an 
instrument, has become a goal in itself, neglecting its ultimate aim of creating 
value and impact. The proliferation of too many well-intentioned EU-level 
instruments, as indicated above, has further complicated the overall fabric, both 
for policy-makers and participants. It is time for a simplified and stable policy 
framework.  
5.4.2 Analysis 
It is high time for a more critical review of the effectiveness of demand-side 
versus supply-side policies introduced at the EU level. Such a review should 
consider to what extent new policies actually match contemporary ways of 
production and exploitation of knowledge well beyond traditional R&D-based 
model innovation ‘within firm’: open innovation and disruptive innovation in 
particular (JIIP, 2015).  
The character of sustaining and disruptive innovation is quite distinct and, 
similarly, policies fostering them should also be adapted (see Table 2 below). In 
particular, public policies for innovation need to be much more entrepreneurial 
by coupling experimentation with healthy evaluation as a source of learning by 
doing. The debate on the introduction of an ‘innovation principle’, 
complementing the ‘precautionary principle’ in all EU legislation, reflects this 
duality, i.e. by doing the right thing one can simply fail, both in business practice 
and policy-making. 
Table 2. Sustaining vs. disruptive innovation 
Sustaining Innovations Disruptive Innovations 
Better Different 
Premium price Low price 
Next-generation Good enough for now 
Leap forward Lead down  
Complicated  Simple 
Source: Adapted from Christensen (2004). 
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This report advocates a transformation of policies for innovation and 
entrepreneurship if Europe wants to find its approach and place in an 
increasingly competitive and complex knowledge world. Obviously, a 
fundamental change is always more challenging than adding additional layers to 
the already complex innovation policy landscape that characterises Europe. On 
the other hand, many new instruments address given stakeholder groups, e.g. 
rather than reforming the FP to make the whole more business friendly in order 
to attract firms, large ones in particular; JTIs were put in place precisely to attract 
such participants. The same is happening with other stakeholders (research for 
researchers through the ERC, small grants for SMEs with the new SME 
instrument, etc.), which may result in further policy fragmentation. We argue 
that rather than targeting given stakeholders in isolation, policies should focus 
on the right dynamics, e.g. addressing the absence of young leading innovators 
(Veugelers, 2009) may require a policy intervention to activate latent potential, 
but the whole ecosystem also needs to be changed to make not just start-ups 
but also scale-ups a more frequent phenomenon on the Old Continent. 
With the emergence of societal challenges as a focal point of policy 
interventions in Europe, compared to the persistence of mission research in the 
US, the EU has gained a sense of purpose beyond fostering the competitiveness 
of European industry (the theoretical logic of the FP in the early days) or shaping 
the  European Research Area (more recently since the Lisbon strategy). With this 
opportunity, however, there may be a risk of populating the landscape with too 
many instruments. Among them, ‘Knowledge and Innovation Communities’ 
(KICs) are actually contributing to the coordination of programmes following a 
‘business logic’, resulting in a significant leverage factor; at times, €1 of EIT 
funding leverages €3 of national and regional funding. Therefore, KICs have the 
potential to become ‘professional brokering’ structures for the coordination of 
meeting ‘societal challenges’. And if the multilevel coordination could be 
facilitated by existing intergovernmental networks (Cost and Eureka – see 
previous Recommendation), the European innovation fabric could be made 
much simpler and more easily accessible with the ERC and EIT as 
operational/infrastructure providers (frontier research and innovation hotspots) 
coupled with the EIB and EIC as more fluid investors leveraging finance and 
ventures.  
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Table 3. Summary challenges and responses for European-level interventions 
Established EU-level policy paradigm: transnational collaborative projects 
Structural innovation policy problems 
 Fragmentation 
 Innovation gap 
European underperformance explained by: 
 Absent enabling ecosystems  
 Few innovative world leading firms 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
The mindset change that is so often preached to entrepreneurs is equally 
relevant to policy-makers and public authorities. After so much policy 
experimentation at EU level, it is time to create an overarching and stable 
institutional framework whereby:  
 To capture tacit nature of knowledge and wisdom, two councils (ERC and 
EIC) should be tasked to create an interface between R&I and policy-
making, critically contributing to including roadmaps in future impact 
analysis and solving emerging policy problems, such as the need to amend 
legislation to incorporate new technological developments or to 
encourage efforts in basic or applied research to address long-term 
societal challenges. In particular, the new EIC should promote regulatory, 
policy and funding coherence. 
 On the more operative front, a limited number of agencies, e.g. the EIB 
and the EIT, would be called on to launch and orchestrate challenge-led, 
streamlined platforms where research, development and demonstration 
are tackled for specific societal challenges in a multi-stakeholder fashion, 
open to new entrants, new technologies, new business models and 
citizens. There would be only one such platform for every emerging 
societal challenge, with cooperation across platforms in case of 
overlapping issues.  
 Widespread action on the ground by stronger, open and dynamic 
institutions should address innovation and entrepreneurship at the 
regional and local level. These institutions should be designed to include 
intra-preneurs and exchange ideas and practices with the private sector, 
securing high-level commitments. At the same time, they should aim at 
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creating suitable environments for entrepreneurship to flourish, and as 
such involve citizens, academia, civil society, small and large, new and 
established companies to harness the potential of local knowledge and 
talent and its combination within smart specialisation.  
Compared to the US, the EU needs fewer anecdotes and more persistence. Policy 
coordination through project participation has its limits (the current approach); 
coherence is needed regarding approaches through orchestration at EU level of 
interventions and strengthening the European dimension within national 
programmes (see previous Recommendation regarding empowering Eureka and 
Cost with, respectively, industry-led and academy-led collaborative undertakings 
and partnerships currently sponsored and managed by the Commission).   
Let’s insist: transforming is not adding. Europe should now consolidate 
what it has learned from policy experimentation, get its approach to innovation 
right for what makes sense at national and EU level (ERC, EIT, EIC and EIB) and 
then simply keep it simple.  
The EIC should not just be another supply-side intervention; rather it 
should have regulatory power to enact a policy of ‘one in, two out’ for existing 
instruments. If the art of painting is about adding textures and pigments, and 
sculpture about finding the soul by removing matter, the Europe of tomorrow 
needs more sculptors than painters. 
Owing to the turmoil currently affecting the EU in the short term (refugees, 
the euro, etc.), vision is more than ever an essential characteristic for leadership. 
Many long-term challenges facing Europe (climate, security, etc.) can only be 
met through innovation in the broadest sense: collective improvement.  
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Table 4. A potential strategic innovation framework  
Sustained 
Innovation 
= higher unit prices; 
users ask for this 
kind of innovation 
Competence 
enhancing 
Product/Process 
Innovation 
KET (Key Enabling 
Technologies) 
Competence 
destroying 
Radical/Breakthrough 
Innovation 
ERC (European 
Research Council) 
Disruptive 
Innovation 
= lower unit prices; 
users do not ask for 
this kind of 
innovation 
In the same 
market 
Customers consume 
something similar or 
from this industry 
FET (Future 
Emerging 
Technologies) 
In different 
markets 
Customers do not 
consume, since they 
lack either the capital or 
necessary knowledge 
EIT (European 
Institute of 
Innovation and 
Technology) 
Source: Adapted from Vazquez-Sampere (2006), Instituto de Empresa Business School course, 
unpublished. 
 
5.4.4 Recommended actions 
 Structure a stable policy framework at European level consisting of two 
councils and progressive consolidation of instruments around a limited 
number of agencies. 
 Link action on the ground for stronger institutions at regional and local level. 
 
5.5 Europe should align policies with innovation and long-term 
sustainable development goals 
5.5.1 Problem 
In recent years, there has been a very lively debate on the possible role of 
regulation as an obstacle to, or a driver of, innovation. Traditionally, regulation 
has been seen as an obstacle to innovation, especially since it increases red tape, 
raises barriers to entry by dictating compliance with regulatory requirements, 
and, by inserting pro-incumbency biases in the functioning of the market, makes 
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it tougher for innovative business models and new products to attract demand. 
But reality is very different: in many circumstances, well-designed regulation can 
trigger innovation and steer it towards meeting societal challenges.  
5.5.2 Analysis 
Since the 1970s, work at MIT coordinated by Nicholas Ashford has shed light on 
the relationship between regulation and innovation. At the EU level, studies for 
the UK NESTA and later for the European Commission (Pelkmans & Renda, 2014; 
Renda, 2016) have contributed to a better understanding of this relationship. 
Since then, better regulation has become increasingly acknowledged as a 
potential driver of innovation at the EU level. The European Commission also 
adopted a very interesting communication on better regulation for innovation-
driven investment in December 2015, which considered regulation from this 
exact angle. Later, proposals such as the adoption of an innovation principle and 
the launch of ‘innovation deals’ were adopted during the Dutch presidency of 
the EU.  
All in all, however, it is still unclear how these aspects of better regulation 
will be reconciled with the overall methodology that is being used to scrutinise 
new proposals and evaluate existing legislation in the EU. Similarly, the link 
between better regulation and long-term goals (in particular, long-term societal 
challenges) appears weak at best. It would be very important, in the coming 
months, to devote more efforts towards making better regulation a true engine 
of innovation by linking EU rules to the EU’s long-term goals.  
Key aspects of regulation that affect innovation are stringency, time, 
flexibility and certainty (Pelkmans & Renda, 2014). Stringency relates to how 
difficult and costly it is for firms to comply with new regulatory requirements 
using existing ideas, technologies, processes and business models. The amount 
of time that a regulation gives to the targeted stakeholders to comply with the 
regulatory requirements is essential to stimulating innovation, but timing is a 
double-edged sword: too little time might discourage innovation and generate 
an unsustainable increase of compliance burdens, while too much time might 
crystallise innovation efforts due to the lack of pressure to meet the 
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requirements.73 Flexible, performance- or outcome-based regulation stimulates 
innovation more than purely prescriptive regulation does, provided that it is 
coupled with adequate monitoring and enforcement (see, inter alia, Coglianese, 
2015). Also, uncertainty has been found to act as a driver and an inhibitor of 
innovation, depending on the circumstances.74 
Today, four main trends can be observed with respect to the use of better 
regulation tools to foster innovation: the adoption of an ‘innovation principle’ in 
the ex ante impact assessment process; the proposed creation of a European 
Innovation Council (EIC); the consideration of possible ways to foster 
‘innovation-driven investment’ through better regulation; and within this 
framework, the introduction of a non-legislative approach termed ‘innovation 
deals’, to tackle regulatory obstacles to innovation. Below, we briefly describe 
these three new proposed arrangements. 
The innovation principle was proposed in 2013 by a group of industry 
representations, think tanks and large companies’ CEOs, and was enthusiastically 
advocated as a necessary change in the EU policy process.75 Its aim is to ensure 
that “whenever policy or regulatory decisions are under consideration the 
impact on innovation as a driver for jobs and growth should be assessed and 
                                                        
73 BERR (2008) and Centre for International Economics (2006) discuss specifically the timing 
of standardisation. The message is that standardisation should occur neither too early nor 
too late to stimulate and encourage innovation. An early standard can kill alternatives, e.g. 
the GSM standard for mobile communications, creating more intra-standard competition. If 
the standard is imposed too early, this can generate an undesirable lock-in effect, which 
leaves society trapped in a suboptimal standard. Similarly, the selection of a rigid, non-
scalable standard can inhibit both incremental and disruptive innovation, and as such is 
highly damaging to social welfare and progress. 
74 Ashford et al. (1985) claim that “although excessive regulatory uncertainty may cause 
industry inaction on the part of the industry too much certainty will stimulate only minimum 
compliance technology. Similarly too frequent change of regulatory requirements may 
frustrate technological development.” More generally, it is fair to state that whenever 
innovation requires large investment in R&D, the absence of reasonable stability or certainty 
in the regulatory framework can significantly hinder innovation. Our case study of 
competition rules applied in the e-communications sector below can contribute to shedding 
some light on this aspect of uncertainty. 
75 Initially 13 CEOs in 2013, which increased to 22 one year later. The 22 CEOs sent a letter 
to President Juncker upon his election. 
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addressed”.76 One of the key concerns voiced by the signatories is the negative 
effect that increasingly risk-averse legislation is having on European innovation; 
that said, the innovation principle is said to be complementary to the 
precautionary principle. The innovation principle is also said to be open to 
“anyone who is interested in promoting an ‘innovation friendly’ and 
environmentally responsible regulatory environment in Europe”, which 
potentially makes it consistent with long-term decarbonisation objectives, which 
appear to be the only responsible way to tackle environmental issues today.  
The innovation principle was articulated in a more comprehensive way 
over the past year, as exemplified in a recent monograph.77 In addition, it was 
recently endorsed by the Competitiveness Council conclusions of the Dutch 
presidency, and described in some more detail by a new note of the European 
Political Strategy Center (EPSC, 2016). That said, the methodology behind the 
innovation principle is still not very detailed, whereas methodological quality 
would be a decisive factor for the usefulness of adding yet another test to the 
already quite complex ex ante impact assessment process.  
At first glance, it seems that impacts on innovation, as with all economic, 
social and environmental impacts, do not need a dedicated test in the impact 
assessment process. At the same time, however, having a dedicated screen for 
innovation could ‘force’ administrations to address innovation impacts when 
appraising new policies or evaluating existing ones. Ashford & Renda (2016) 
advocate the adoption of a ‘sustainable development test’ – aimed at assessing 
the impact of proposed regulatory interventions in terms of progress along 
indicators of sustainable development, and thus through multi-criteria analysis – 
which would probably be more useful than an innovation principle for the simple 
reason that innovation is a means, not an end, for policy-makers. In addition, any 
innovation-related test that is relevant for sustainable development and 
decarbonisation should avoid any incumbency constraint and be open to 
systemic, disruptive innovation. But we share a number of the concerns voiced 
by the proponents of the innovation principle, in particular, the lack of a focus 
                                                        
76 See www.riskforum.eu/uploads/2/5/7/1/25710097/innovation_principle_one_pager_5_ 
march_2015.pdf. 
77 See www.riskforum.eu/uploads/2/5/7/1/25710097/monograph_innovation_ 
principle.pdf. 
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on coherence in the current better regulation agenda (in particular with respect 
to Europe 2020 goals), and the lack of a framework for using scientific and 
technological inputs in policy-making.  
Finally, it may well be that the EU suffers equally or more so from a 
diffusion deficit, rather than from an innovation deficit.  
At the end of 2015, the European Commission published a Staff Working 
Document, “Better regulation for innovation-driven investment at EU level”, that 
outlines a relatively new approach to better regulation, more oriented towards 
innovation.78 The document, initiated by DG Research and Innovation and 
endorsed by Commissioner Moedas, goes a long way towards acknowledging the 
potential role of better regulation as a driver of innovation. In addition, the 
document acknowledges the systemic nature of innovation and its role in 
addressing societal challenges. Among the problems highlighted by the 
document (which widely quotes a previous CEPS report by Pelkmans and Renda) 
with respect to the existing regulatory framework, some are particularly relevant 
for the purposes of this report. First, the Commission services highlight cases in 
which the regulatory framework i) is de jure or de facto prescriptive in technology 
choice and discourages different solutions and new entrants; ii) establishes a 
level of stringency which is inconsistent with available cost-efficient technology, 
hence delaying investment and deployment of solutions or iii) allows too-
frequent changes in standards that may also limit the incentive for investment if 
a technology is relatively recent. Driverless cars are among the examples 
mentioned.  
Second, the Commission cites cases in which the regulatory framework is 
not sufficiently innovation-friendly due to i) lack of interoperability of the 
regulation across sectors and cases in which rules block cooperation and the 
development of open innovation based on multi-technology sourcing; ii) cases in 
which regulations that are technology specific are not adapted in a timely way to 
technological progress or iii) cases of inconsistencies between regulations, which 
give rise to legal uncertainties and unnecessary additional compliance costs. 
Among the examples mentioned in the document, the most relevant for the 
purpose of this paper is related to energy-efficient buildings. The document 
                                                        
78 See https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/ 
innovrefit_staff_working_document.pdf. 
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identifies a number of pieces of EU legislation that would have to be reviewed to 
boost innovation in the sector, including a recast of the Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive (2010/31/UE), a review of the Construction Products 
Regulation (305/2011) and of the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/UE), plus 
the evaluation and review of the Eco-Design Directive and the Energy Labelling 
Directive.  
Third, the Commission identified cases in which the implementation of 
innovation-friendly regulations can also discourage investment and limit the 
marketing of innovative products, when: i) legislation is not uniformly or not 
appropriately implemented across member states; or ii) European and national 
legislation duplicates, overlaps or is not fully consistent or repetitive controls and 
authorisation procedures are maintained. Here, too, examples include relevant 
areas for decarbonisation such as eco-design for resource efficiency, energy-
efficient buildings and electric vehicles. 
Finally, the Commission document identifies some areas in which there are 
regulatory gaps that might affect innovation, especially by creating 
fragmentation that could hamper the emergence of innovative products. 
Examples include again road vehicle automation, and also low-carbon hydrogen 
in transport. 
This document is, in our opinion, a Commission initiative that offers a 
promising perspective on the policy alignment initiatives that could be achieved 
at EU level. We strongly endorse the overall approach adopted by the document, 
and further encourage the Commission to pursue its efforts with a view to 
promoting systemic innovation, not simply by listening to incumbent 
stakeholders but to permanent, multi-stakeholder platforms that would engage 
in backcast (or double backcast) exercises to offer policy-makers input on what 
set of measures would be needed to stimulate systemic innovation to the benefit 
of long-term decarbonisation. The problem remains, however, that incumbents 
may not adequately represent future disrupting innovation more likely to be 
generated by new entrants displacing incumbents’ technologies. 
In the same Staff Working Document, the European Commission also 
announces that it would pilot so-called ‘innovation deals’, and indeed a first pilot 
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was launched through an open call for expressions of interest in June 2016.79 The 
Commission has clarified that these deals would be a new way to address EU 
regulatory obstacles to innovation in an open and transparent manner, in the 
form of voluntary cooperation between innovators, national/regional/local 
authorities and Commission services to better achieve EU policy objectives. In 
addition, innovation deals are being piloted as one of the actions under the 
Circular Economy Action Plan. An important feature of innovation deals is that 
they seem to be destined for specific cases in which legislation must be clarified 
or interpreted but not amended. They are, in this respect, presented as a tool 
for addressing cases in which legislation is difficult to interpret for new players, 
but never as a way to change EU or national law.80  
In a companion paper for the European Commission, DG Research and 
Innovation, Renda (forthcoming) analyses more closely the virtues and possible 
challenges of such an instrument, by also looking for equivalent experience in 
the US (in particular, in so-called ‘negotiated rule-making’, negotiated 
implementation and negotiated compliance; see Ashford & Caldart, 1999). Based 
on this past experience, while innovation deals might end up becoming an 
important tool for the clarification of EU legislation and the removal of ‘perceived 
obstacles’ to innovative product and service offerings, there are greater 
concerns about the suitability of innovation deals for systemic innovation 
addressing long-term decarbonisation. To mitigate such concerns, it is essential 
that innovation deals are not underpinned by a belief that ‘less is more”, and that 
‘clarification’ of regulation should always mean red tape reduction and slashing 
of regulatory requirements in the name of innovation. On the contrary, as we 
have amply demonstrated in earlier research, regulation often has a positive 
impact on innovation, and certainly a clearer regulation, other things being 
equal, is better than an obscure one. But this does not mean that less regulation 
should be the objective in innovation deals. Similarly, the red tape rhetoric, also 
originated in the Netherlands (according to which reducing administrative 
                                                        
79 See https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-deals/index.cfm?pg=home.  
80 “To offer a pragmatic, flexible and transparent approach to timely address innovation 
obstacles to trigger growth and jobs whilst fully respecting EU law, without derogating from 
the existing legislative framework.”  
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burdens by 25% would lead to remarkable GDP increases) was not confirmed 
empirically after years of experimenting with the Standard Cost Model. 
Second, the likely nature of innovation deals makes them potentially ill-
suited for more disruptive, systemic innovation. Due to their negotiated nature 
innovation deals might suffer from an ‘incumbency’ problem, and as such would 
lend themselves more easily to incremental innovation rather than substantial 
market reshuffling. Adequate control and monitoring by EU institutions would 
thus be essential to ensuring that incumbency problems do not exert a 
disproportionate influence on the way innovation deals are handled.  
Third, and relatedly, the governance of innovation deals should be clarified 
in a number of aspects: How will innovation deals be selected? Where would the 
applications originate (REFIT stakeholder platform)? Would there be multi-
stakeholder advisory boards to avoid incumbency problems? Would the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board advise on their implementation and compatibility with 
existing regulatory frameworks? How would trust be built and nurtured, and 
what arrangements will be in place to sufficiently avoid adverse selection 
problems (offering an easy way out to firms that cannot comply with legislation 
for reasons related to their own inadequacies)? In addition, there are important 
questions over how to offer legal certainty (guidelines on selection, due process, 
time horizon, monitoring of compliance, evaluation); how to ensure technology 
neutrality and avoid the incumbency problem; and how to deal with multi-level 
governance, especially for what concerns the powers of the European 
Commission to request clarifications in national and local legislation. Since it 
seems clear that it will be member state authorities that will have to report on 
their implementation and results, it is still unclear how innovation deals are going 
to work, in a context in which communication between the EU and national levels 
is not always effective and rapid. The involvement of all levels of government 
should also be accompanied by the involvement of all relevant stakeholders. A 
weak rule of law in specific member states should also be taken into account.  
Overall, it is important to offer more certainty as regards the scope of the 
instrument. If the innovation deals are only related to possible “clarification, 
enhanced guidance, existing flexibility and/or demonstration of the innovative 
solution” (see the SWD of 15 December 2015), then it is also important to clarify 
that their use is not going to be a ‘magic bullet’ solution that will bring Europe 
back to growth, let alone sustainable development. If anything, it would be a sign 
134 | POLICIES: HARNESSING REGULATION TO PROMOTE INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
of greater attention given to possible obstacles to innovation disseminated 
throughout the ‘downstream phase’ of EU legislation, i.e. the delivery and 
enforcement phases. The reasonable expectation is that most of these obstacles 
will be found in national legislation; that said, it is not clear whether the 
Commission’s attempt to clarify or streamline national legislation will be well 
received by member states, or if it will be seen as a wild card for the Commission, 
which will lead it to go ultra virus and bypass other EU institutions to recommend 
and de facto impose regulatory changes on member states. All in all, innovation 
deals might prove useful in specific circumstances, but will have to be 
accompanied by a much more ambitious, whole-of-government effort to 
promote systemic innovation through policies that have in mind swift action for 
shorter goals, consistently with a longer-term view of societal well-being. 
All in all, the best way to adopt a better regulation agenda that fits the EU’s 
purpose would be to tie better regulation to the long-term needs of EU citizens 
and industry. The current better regulation guidelines, as revised in May 2015, 
are among the best examples of integrated guidelines for evidence-based policy-
making worldwide. At the same time, they still place insufficient emphasis on 
issues such as policy coherence, long-term impacts, risk analysis, adaptive policy-
making, systemic innovation and sustainable development. In this respect, the 
following changes could be contemplated to improve the extent to which better 
regulation can become more conducive to policy alignment for the long term. 
 The baseline option adopted as a basis for major new policy initiatives 
could be inspired by long-term sustainable development pathways, 
possibly in a way that is made consistent across policy areas. A first 
attempt in the direction of common baseline options across Directorates 
General of the European Commission was made by the Joint Research 
Centre, but so far this idea has not been fully translated into the practice 
of impact assessment in the Commission.81  
 The overall methodology for the selection of the preferred policy option(s) 
for major new initiatives (corresponding to so-called ‘primary legislation’ 
in national legal systems) should make use of multi-criteria analysis, where 
criteria should reflect long-term societal challenges and should be 
                                                        
81 See http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC94069/lb-na-27019-en-
n%20.pdf.  
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measured by means of dedicated indicators. Such indicators could 
extensively borrow from the existing well-established literature on 
indicators of sustainable development, and should be refined and made 
more EU-specific with the help of mission-led platforms and the EIC (see 
above, steps 1 to 3).  
 The role of innovation should be subject to more careful analysis in the 
better regulation guidelines, as recently evoked also by the Council 
conclusions of the Dutch presidency. However, accounting for systemic 
innovation does not mean leading Europe on a deregulatory path. On the 
contrary, the guidelines could devote more attention to the role of policy 
learning and experimentation by offering guidance on so-called ‘adaptive 
policy-making’, or “planned adaptation”;82 and to the consistency of 
prospective policy impacts with long-term sustainable development. 
Possible ways to make policy more flexible and adaptive include: (i) the use 
of regulatory sandboxes and other experimental approaches to allow for 
the ongoing monitoring of the market and social impacts of innovative 
techniques; (ii) the incorporation of technology roadmaps and the opinion 
of multi-stakeholder platforms as input for the policy-making process, to 
ensure that innovative, welfare-enhancing technologies are adequately 
represented in policy processes and outcomes; (iii) the ongoing monitoring 
of policy impacts, including through open government techniques.  
 
Box 3. Is the EU more cautious than the United States? 
One of the most often quoted differences evoked in the debate over the innovation-
friendliness of the US and EU legal systems is the alleged existence of a more 
precautionary approach to regulation in Europe, which would act as a constraint on 
innovation by inhibiting the risk-loving behaviour typical of entrepreneurs, and 
shutting the door on innovative products for fear that they would cause harm. This 
approach has been extensively quoted in areas such as environmental standards, 
health and safety, chemicals, etc. One authoritative scholar, David Vogel, has 
concluded in a widely read book that the EU has gradually come to overtake the US 
in the area of risk regulation over the past three decades, mostly by bringing in a 
                                                        
82 See e.g., McCray et al. (2010). And more recently, IRGC (2015). 
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more precautionary approach to regulation. The issue of the precautionary 
approach is so heavily felt in Europe that a broad debate has emerged on the need 
to incorporate an ‘innovation principle’ in EU policy-making. 
Against this background, it is useful to reflect on a number of open questions, 
which too often receive standardised, not carefully pondered answers.  
First, the statement according to which the EU legal system follows a more 
precautionary (some would say, anti-innovation) approach does not appear to be 
fully substantiated in practice. While Vogel (2010) and others have reported this 
trend based on a limited number of specific, selected cases, a 10-year research effort 
culminating in the publication of a thorough report (Wiener et al., 2011) found that 
reality is much more complex, and there are important cases in which US regulation 
is much more precautionary than the EU’s. Examples include the US standards on 
particulate matter (so-called ‘PM2.5’), which are much more stringent than in 
Europe, and are also more strictly enforced. More generally, the authors have 
expanded the number and diversity of qualitative case studies to risk connected to 
food safety (genetically modified foods, beef hormones, mad cow disease), air 
pollution, climate change, nuclear power, tobacco, chemicals, marine and terrestrial 
biodiversity, medical safety, terrorism and precaution embodied in risk information 
disclosure and risk assessment systems. In addition to detailed case studies, they 
also presented a broad quantitative analysis of specific precaution based on a 
sample of 100 risks drawn from a dataset of nearly 3,000 risks from the 1970s up to 
2004 in both the United States and the EU. The results suggest that the degree of 
precaution exhibited in European and American risk regulation is very similar: 
averaging across the 100-risk sample in a 35-year period, there are 36 risks that show 
greater US precaution and 31 risks that show greater EU precaution. In the 
quantitative analysis the authors find no difference between the relative levels of 
precaution. 
Second, there is not strong evidence in the literature confirming that the 
precautionary principle can harm innovation. Ashford & Renda (2016) survey existing 
wisdom in this field and argue that in many cases, precaution coupled with adequate 
stringency, appropriate timing and overall quality or the legal rules is a very 
important stimulus for innovation, especially of the type of innovation that more 
directly contributes to addressing specific societal challenges.  
Third, the overall effect on innovation of legislation in the field of risk 
regulation must be appraised in a more comprehensive way, in particular accounting 
for the enforcement and compliance phases. Simply comparing the text of the rules 
makes very little sense, if one does not account for the incentives that follow; 
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perhaps the clearest example is the existence of completely different litigation and 
enforcement systems in the US and the EU: a rule that is apparently more flexible 
and lenient in terms of ex ante controls, e.g. US legislation on chemicals, as opposed 
to REACH, might end up being more effective thanks to the threat of opt-out class-
actions fuelled by lawyers paid through contingency fees, and seeking punitive 
damages with the help of relatively favourable access to evidence rules. In Europe, 
the absence of a strong litigation system (no opt-out and in many countries not even 
opt-in collective litigation; no contingency fees; no punitive damages; high cost of 
access to evidence in court) implies that, once ex ante regulations were relaxed, very 
little means would remain to incentivise virtuous conduct on the side of regulated 
businesses.  
Accordingly, it is fair to state that there is insufficient evidence in support of 
revisiting the precautionary approach as an obstacle to innovation. In a recent 
speech, Commissioner Moedas announced the introduction of the innovation 
principle but contended that “this does not mean that there is anything wrong with 
the precautionary principle. Quite the opposite. If the precautionary principle is 
understood correctly, it should support innovation”.83 The judgment must thus be 
made on a case-by-case basis: existing literature only confirms that it is bad 
regulation (including badly enforced regulation), not the precautionary approach, 
that can stifle innovation. Once this myth is dispelled, of course it remains to be seen 
if certain regulatory practices in the US foster innovation more than the homologous 
EU ones.  
 
Below, we show a variant of the proposed reorganisation of the EU policy process 
proposed by Ashford & Renda (2016), limited to the formation of policies phase. 
                                                        
83 See Commissioner Moedas’s speech, “Better Regulation for Innovation”, 26 May 2016 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/moedas/announcements/better-regulation-
innovation_en). 
138 | POLICIES: HARNESSING REGULATION TO PROMOTE INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Figure 17. A reorganised policy process in the EU 
 
Source: Elaboration on Ashford & Renda (2016). 
A recent report for the European Commission (Giovannini et al., 2015) also 
advocated alignment of science and technology policies with the aspirations of 
the 2030 Agenda, and recommended the following three key avenues for 
change: (i) switching the focus, reorienting mindsets and behaviours towards 
sustainable development, reframing the EU’s science and technology challenges, 
and refocusing from technology transfer to building innovation capacity; (ii) 
strengthening partnerships, enhancing engagement with developing countries in 
existing EU instruments, engaging all stakeholders (especially the private sector), 
developing tailor-made international STI initiatives; and (iii) ‘walking the talk’, 
addressing causes of implementation gaps, ensuring domestic integration of the 
SDGs in/with science, technology and innovation policies, improving policy 
coherence, building up opportunities to benefit from the ‘data revolution’, and 
setting up monitoring, evaluation and assessment tools. 
5.5.3 Recommended actions 
 Consolidate and strengthen the role of research and innovation platforms as 
sources of policy inputs. 
 Streamline the role of the EIC and the JRC in converting existing science and 
research into actionable policy recommendations. 
 Refocus REFIT exercises towards coherence with long-term goals, including in 
particular Sustainable Development Goals. 
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6. CONCLUSION: A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
he European Union will likely experience a continuing period of turbulence 
during 2017, after a 2016 characterised by important events such as Brexit 
and the election of Donald Trump in the US. Political instability might not 
help Europe reframe its long-term commitments, especially if short-term 
challenges are not met. This report, however, has shown that a major effort 
would be needed to ensure that Europe does not miss the opportunities that are 
offered by ongoing socio-technological transitions. In particular, the parallel 
evolution of technologies such as broadband connectivity, big data analytics, 
network virtualisation, artificial intelligence, IoT and human-machine interaction 
call for a major effort to restructure EU policies in a way that favours socially 
relevant innovation and create a simpler, comprehensive policy environment in 
which entrepreneurship can flourish. This requires major interventions in various 
fields, and a more general refocusing and realignment of EU policies towards 
sustainable development fostered by innovation and entrepreneurship.  
The European Commission has taken action to ensure that EU policy is not 
an obstacle, and becomes a key driver of innovation. This requires both 
procedural and substantive changes to the way the EU acts and regulates, and, 
at the same time, a multi-level effort towards promoting an integrated, dynamic 
single market. In this report, we have explored a subset of the elements that will 
be needed to help restore Europe’s innovation potential. They were organised 
within a framework that can be summarised as follows: 
 3S principles: Innovation policy has to become more socially relevant, 
systemic and simple. 
 3D criteria: Innovation policy should focus on development, diffusion, and 
direction. 
 3P pillars. Innovation policy should follow three channels, i.e. people, 
places and policies. Below, we report the list of recommendations that we 
have disseminated throughout the work of the CEPS Task Force, and that 
are listed above for each of the three “Ps” we have identified in this report.  
T 
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Recommended actions - PEOPLE 
1. Strengthen policy efforts to promote a variety of skills, including STEM 
education (science, technology, engineering and maths) and coding skills, 
starting in early school years throughout the EU-28. 
2. Promote the inclusion of entrepreneurial skills, managerial skills, creativity 
and the ability to think outside the box as basic skills to be taught during 
school years and university.  
3. Strengthen public-private cooperation to ensure the exposure of young 
European citizens to entrepreneurial role models and success stories to 
encourage emulation among youngsters. 
4. Launch a systematic reflection on the security and flexibility needs of the 
future European job market, with a specific focus on employability, self-
employment features and work-train-life balance for the coming years. 
5. Promote open access to government-funded research and government-
held data to boost data-driven innovation in Europe. 
6. Foster legal certainty for data-driven innovation and more generally for 
text and data-mining activities, especially with respect to EU copyright and 
data protection laws.  
7. Strengthen ‘citizens’ science’ in Europe by creating effective platforms and 
calling on EU-funded research projects to involve citizens and adopt 
bottom-up approaches where possible. 
8. Promote openness to foreign talent in all member states. 
9. Develop guidance on regulatory flexibility to make regulation more 
conducive to innovation, implementing where appropriate the concept of 
‘permissionless innovation’. 
10. Eliminate useless and redundant red tape, by distinguishing it from 
regulatory costs that generate benefits and help achieve policy goals. 
11. Create one-stop-shops for entrepreneurs by consolidating contact points 
for access to EU and national funds and streamlining rules for financial and 
non-financial support.  
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12. Avoid creating perverse incentives with legislation, e.g. by creating rules 
that discourage scale-up.   
13. Design policies to promote public-sector innovation at all levels of 
government, including innovation prizes and awards. 
14. Promote and foster smart institutional design in innovation agencies and 
other relevant institutions. 
15. Consider the creation of ‘entrepreneurs in residence’ and other fellowship 
and mentoring programmes to promote entrepreneurial thinking in 
institutions.    
16. Promote successful role models and success stories more widely, in 
particular among students, especially among women.  
17. Promote, at the local level, the participation of students from late school 
years and older in gatherings of entrepreneurs and start-ups.   
Recommended actions - PLACES 
18. Promote open science and data-sharing and the improvement of data 
quality and management. 
19. Ensure that publicly-funded research communities: i) represent all aspects 
of basic and applied research, innovation, etc., ii) include stakeholders 
from various fields (not only one industry sector) and iii) become the main 
source of information for the drafting of innovation agendas and 
technological roadmaps. 
20. Develop new performance measures for academia that encourage further 
valorisation of research. 
21. Develop skills for open science and promote commonly agreed open 
science standards of research integrity.  
22. Promote cooperation between public and private players in shaping and 
implementing legal rules for platforms.  
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23. Engage with platforms by seeking their cooperation on nurturing 
entrepreneurship, shaping university curricula and defining technology 
roadmaps to be used as a basis for future policies.   
24. Develop initiatives on platforms at both European and national levels to 
encourage evidence-based research to inform policy.  
25. Launch foresight activities to explore the future of the platform economy 
and its implications for policy and society at large. 
26. Improve conditions for the platform economy by fostering investments in 
broadband, the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry 4.0, by removing 
unnecessary regulatory barriers and by addressing market concentration 
and barriers to competition. 
27. Preserve the open Internet and the free flow of data, enhancing trust in 
the digital economy.  
28. Reduce barriers to entry, e.g. red tape, growth, e.g. size-specific 
regulations, and firm exit/failure, e.g. penalising bankruptcy legislation, 
overly strict employment protection legislation. 
29. Address regulatory incumbency: Policies often favour incumbents, e.g. 
R&D tax credits, some environmental regulations, subsidies that delay exit, 
visa rules. 
30. Develop ecosystems through enhancing incentives and access to (risk) 
capital, developing networks (including the valorisation of research), 
mentoring of entrepreneurs and developing skills.  
31. Complete the Single Market and reduce trade barriers, so firms can scale 
more easily across borders. 
32. Promote scale-up culture through education and media, celebrate success 
of scale-ups and encourage entrepreneurs to share their success stories. 
33. Initiate studies providing evidence on the impact of financial supply-side 
interventions.  
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34. Foster pan-European innovation ecosystems that connect diverse and 
disruptive talent across Europe, and stimulate local entrepreneurship 
ecosystems in regional policy. 
35. Reformulate smart specialisation strategies to encompass coordination 
and acceleration across European borders and beyond. 
36. Coordinate better the various funding mechanisms at EU level to ensure a 
sharper focus on innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Recommended actions - POLICIES 
37. Refocus policies for large and small to high-growth companies. 
38. Promote healthy cooperation between existing and new business. 
39. Establish a suitable balance between direct and indirect support schemes. 
40. Facilitate intermediation in access to finance through increased 
transparency and accountability.  
41. Complete the Single Market while pooling public procurement, including 
‘innovation deals’. 
42. The European Innovation Council (EIC) should be sufficiently 
‘authoritative’ to effectively advise governments on good practices to 
overcome barriers to growth and scale for start-ups.  
43. Integrate systemic innovation with better regulation by refining the 
guidance on innovation impacts in the better regulation guidelines. 
44. Align policymaking and better regulation to be in accordance with the EU’s 
long-term impacts and objectives.  
45. Set up mission-led platforms to inform policymaking at an early stage 
about impacts on innovation. 
46. Strengthen the better regulation toolkit with more information and 
guidance on adaptive, experimental policymaking that favours systemic 
innovation. 
144 | CONCLUSION: A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
47. Reformulate European added-value and focus EU support in interventions 
that make sense only at EU level, e.g. the European Research Council 
(ERC), the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) the 
Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) programme, etc. 
48. Delegate collaborative undertakings like ERANETs, JPIs and JTIs to long-
standing and experienced intergovernmental networks, such as Eureka 
and Cost in particular. 
49. Empower governments with enabling functions while embedding the 
European dimension fully in their programmes and agencies to create 
scale of policy. 
50. Shift policy coordination away from project cooperation as this has shown 
its limitations and actually reached a plateau in recent years. 
51. Structure a stable policy framework at European level consisting of two 
Councils and progressive consolidation of instruments around a limited 
number of agencies. 
52. Link action on the ground for stronger institutions at regional and local 
level. 
53. Consolidate and strengthen the role of research and innovation platforms 
as sources of policy inputs. 
54. Streamline the role of the EIC and the JRC in converting existing science 
and research into actionable policy recommendations. 
55. Refocus REFIT exercises towards coherence with long-term goals.  
 
145 | 
 
REFERENCES 
Accenture (2016), “Platform Economy: Technology-driven business model 
innovation from the outside in”. 
Ács, Z.J., E. Autio and L. Szerb (2014), “National Systems of Entrepreneurship: 
Measurement issues and policy implications”, Research Policy, Vol. 43, No. 
3, pp. 476–494. 
Aho, E., J. Cornu, L. Georghiou and A. Subira (2006), “Creating an Innovative 
Europe: Report of the Independent Expert Group on R&D and Innovation 
appointed following the Hampton Court Summit”, European Communities, 
Brussels, January (http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in- 
research/pdf/download_en/aho_report.pdf). 
Anttiroiko, A.V., P. Valkama and S.J. Bailey (2014), “Smart cities in the new service 
economy: Building platforms for smart services”, AI and Society, Vol. 29, 
No. 3, pp. 323–334. 
Archibugi, D., M. Denni and A. Filippetti (2009), “The Global Innovation 
Scoreboard 2008: the dynamics of the innovative performances of 
countries” (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1958833). 
Armstrong, M. (2006), “Competition in two-sided markets”, RAND Journal of 
Economics, 37, pp. 668–691. 
Arnkil, R., A. Järvensivu, P. Koski and T. Piirainen (2010), “Exploring Quadruple 
Helix - Outlining user-oriented innovation models”, Final Report on 
Quadruple Helix Research for the CLIQ project co-financed by the 
European Regional Development Fund, Työraportteja 85/2010 Working 
Papers. 
Arrow, K.J. (1962), “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention,” in R.R. Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, 
pp. 609–625. 
146 | REFERENCES 
Asheim, B., M. Bugge, L. Coenen and S. Herstad (2013), “What does Evolutionary 
Economic Geography Bring to the Table? Reconceptualising Regional 
Innovation Systems”, CIRCLE Working Paper no. 2013/05, Circle, Lund 
University. 
Ashford, N. (2000), “An Innovation-Based Strategy for a Sustainable 
Environment”, in J. Hemmelskamp, K. Rennings and F. Leone (eds), 
Innovation-Oriented Environmental Regulation: Theoretical Approach and 
Empirical Analysis, ZEW Economic Studies, Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, pp. 
67–107. 
Ashford, N. and A. Renda (2016), “Aligning Policies for Low-Carbon Systemic 
Innovation in Europe”, CEPS Special Report, in cooperation with i24c 
(www.ceps.eu/publications/aligning-policies-low-carbon-systemic-
innovation-europe). 
Ashford, N. and G.R. Heaton (1983), “Regulation and Technological Innovation in 
the Chemical Industry”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 46, No. 3, 
pp. 109–157. 
Ashford, N. and R. Hall (2011), “The Importance of Regulation-Induced 
Innovation for Sustainable Development”, Sustainability, Vol. 3, pp. 270–
292. 
Ashford, N., Ayers, C. and R.F. Stone (1985), “Using Regulation to Change the 
Market for Innovation”, Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
pp. 419–466. 
Audretsch, D.B. and M.P. Feldman (1996), “R&D spillovers and the geography of 
innovation and production”, American Economic Review, Vol. 86, pp. 630–
640. 
Autio, E. and T. Llewellyn, (2013), “Innovation Ecosystems: Implications for 
Innovation Management?, in Mark Dodgson, David M. Gann and Nelson 
Phillips (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation Management, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bakos, Y. and E. Brynjolfsson (1999), “Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, 
Profits and Efficiency”, Management Science, December. 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 147 
Bakos, Y. and E. Brynjolfsson (2000), “Bundling and Competition on the Internet”, 
Marketing Science, Winter. 
Bakos, Y., E. Brynjolfsson and D. Lichtman (1999), “Shared Information Goods”, 
Journal of Law and Economics, April. 
Baldwin, C.Y. and E. von Hippel (2011), “Modeling a paradigm shift: from 
producer innovation to user and open collaborative innovation”, 
Organization Science, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 1399–1417. 
Barnett, C. (2015), “Trends Show Crowdfunding to Surpass VC in 2016”, Forbes, 
9 June.  
Battaglia, L., P. Larouche and M. Negrinotti (2011), “Does Europe Have an 
Innovation Policy? The Case of EU Economic Law”, CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. DP8481, July (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1890004). 
Bauer, J.M. (2014), “Platforms, systems competition, and innovation: 
Reassessing the foundations of communications policy”, 
Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 38, Nos 8-9, pp. 1–12. 
Bazelon and McHenry (2015), “Mobile Broadband Spectrum. A Vital Resource for 
the U.S. Economy”, The Brattle Group (www.ctia.org/docs/default-
source/default-document-library/brattle_spectrum_051115.pdf).  
Benjamin, S.M. and A.K. Rai (2009), “Structuring U.S. Innovation Policy: Creating 
a White House Office of Innovation Policy”, ITIF 
(www.itif.org/files/WhiteHouse_Innovation.pdf). 
Benkler, Y. (2006), The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms 
Markets and Freedom, New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Bergvall-Kåreborn, B. and A. Ståhlbröst (2009), “Living Lab: an open and citizen-
centric approach for innovation”, International Journal of Innovation and 
Regional Development, Vol. 1, No. 4. 
BERR (2008), Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform of the 
UK Government, “Regulation and Innovation: Evidence and Policy 
Implications”, BERR Economics Paper No. 4. 
148 | REFERENCES 
Berthon, P.R., L.F. Pitt, I.P. McCarthy and S.M. Kates (2007), “When Customers 
Get Clever: Managerial Approaches to Dealing with Creative Consumers”, 
Business Horizons, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 39–47, 
DOI:10.1016/j.bushor.2006.05.005. 
Bessen, J.E. (2015), “How Computer Automation Affects Occupations: 
Technology, Jobs, and Skills”, Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 15-49, 13 November 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2690435 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2690435). 
Blind, K. (2012), “The Impact of Regulation on Innovation”, Nesta Working Paper 
No. 12/02. 
Blind, K. (2013), “The Impact of Standardization and Standards on Innovation”, 
Nesta Working Paper No. 13/15. 
Bogers, M., A. Afuah and B. Bastian (2010), “Users as Innovators: A Review, 
Critique, and Future Research Directions”, Journal of Management, Vol. 36 
No. 4, July, pp. 857–875, DOI: 10.1177/0149206309353944. 
Boldrin, M. and D.K. Levine (2012), “The Case against Patents”, FRB of St. Louis 
Working Paper No. 2012-035A (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2148738). 
Bonney, R., T.B. Phillips, H.L. Ballard and J.W. Enck (2016), “Can citizen science 
enhance public understanding of science?”, Public Understanding of 
Science, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 2–16. 
Borghi, M. and S. Karapapa (2013), Copyright and Mass Digitization, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Boston Consulting Group (2011), “The New Rules of Openness”, Liberty Global 
Policy Series, January 
(www.libertyglobal.com/pdf/new_rules_%20of_openness6-en.pdf). 
Brandenburger, A. and B.J. Nalebuff (1996), Co-opetition, New York: Currency 
Doubleday.  
Brass, D.J., J. Galaskiewicz, H.R. Greve and W. Tsai (2004), “Taking stock of 
networks and organisations: a multilevel perspective”, Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 47, No. 6, pp. 795–817. 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 149 
Braunerhjelm and Eklund (2013), “Taxes, Tax Aministrative Burdens and New 
Firm Formation”, Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum Working Paper 
2013/23.  
Breznitz, D. and D. Ornston (2013), “The Revolutionary Power of Peripheral 
Agencies: Explaining Radical Policy Innovation in Finland and Israel”, 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 10, pp. 1219–1245 
(http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/46/10/1219?rss=1). 
Brown, I. and C. Marsden (2013), Regulating Code: Good Governance and Better 
Regulation in the Information Age, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Brunswicker, S. and W. Vanhaverbeke (2011), “Beyond open innovation in large 
enterprises: how do small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) open up 
to external innovation sources?” (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925185). 
Brusoni, S. (2005), “The limits to specialization: problem solving and coordination 
in ‘modular networks’”, Organization Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 1885–
1907. 
Brusoni, S. and A. Prencipe (2009), “Design rules for platform leaders”, in A. 
Gawer (ed.), Platforms, Markets and Innovation, Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, pp. 306–321. 
Buhr, D. (2014), “Social Innovation Policy for Industry 4.0”, Friedrich-Ebert 
Stiftung (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/wiso/11479.pdf).  
Cafaggi, F. and A. Renda (2014), “Measuring the Effectiveness of Transnational 
Private Regulation”, 3 October (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508684 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2508684).  
Caillaud, B. and B. Jullien (2003), “Chicken and egg: competition among 
intermediation service providers”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 
309–328. 
Caragliu, A., C. Del Bo and P. Nijkamp (2009), “Smart cities in Europe”, VU 
University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and 
Econometrics, Series Research Memoranda 0048/2009.  
150 | REFERENCES 
Carlsson, B., S. Jacobsson, M. Holmén and A. Rickne (2002), “Innovation systems: 
analytical and methodological issues”, Research Policy, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 
233–245. 
Centre for International Economics (2006), “Standards and the Economy,” report 
prepared for Standards Australia. 
Chesbrough, H.W. (2003), “The Era of Open Innovation”, MIT Sloan Management 
Review, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 35–41. 
Chesbrough, H.W. (2003), Open Innovation: the New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Chesbrough, H.W. (2012), “Open Innovation: Where We’ve Been and Where 
We’re Going”, Research-Technology Management, Vol. 55 (August), pp. 
20–27. 
Chesbrough, H.W., J. West and W. Vanhaverbeke (2006), Open Innovation: 
Researching a New Paradigm, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chesbrough, H.W., W. Vanhaverbeke and J. West (2014), New Frontiers of Open 
Innovation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chien, C.V. (2015), “Exclusionary and Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law”, 
Southern California Law Review, Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 18-15 (http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/882). 
Christensen, C. (2004). Seeing What’s Next: Using Theories of Innovation to 
Predict Industry Change, Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing.  
Christensen, C.M. and M.E. Raynor (2003), The Innovator’s Solution: Using Good 
Theory to Solve the Dilemmas of Growth, Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
Claffy, K.C. and D. Clark (2014), “Platform models for sustainable Internet 
regulation”, Journal of Information Policy, Vol. 4, pp. 463–488.  
Clark, B.R. (1998), Creating Entrepreneurial Universities. Organisational 
Pathways of Transformation, Pergamon: IAU Press. 
Clark, B.R. (2004), Sustaining Change in Universities, Maidenhead, England: 
Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press. 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 151 
Clark, D., and K.C. Claffy (2015), “Anchoring policy development around stable 
points: An approach to regulating the co-evolving ICT ecosystem”, 
Telecommunications Policy 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2015.07.003i). 
Clark, J. (1979), “A Model of Embodied Technical Change and Employment”, 
mimeo, Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University, Falmer Press, 
Sussex. 
Clark, J. (2013), “Text Mining and Scholarly Publishing”, Publishing Research 
Consortium. 
Clark, K.B. (1985), ‘The interaction of design hierarchies and market concepts in 
technological evolution”, Research Policy, Vo. 14, No. 5, pp. 235–251. 
Clarysse, B., M. Wright and J.V Hove (2015), “A Look Inside Accelerators: Building 
Businesses”, February (www.nesta.org.uk/publications/look-inside-
accelerators). 
Clarysse, B., M. Wright and J.V. Hove (2015), “A Look Inside Accelerators: Building 
Businesses”, February. 
Coad, A. et al. (2014), “UK Innovation Survey: Innovative Firms and Growth”, 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills, London, March. 
Cockburn, I.M. and M.J. MacGarvie (2009), “Patents, Thickets and the Financing 
of Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry”, Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 18, No. 3, 
pp. 729–773. 
Coglianese (2015), “When management-based regulation goes global” 
(www.regblog.org/2015/12/23/coglianese-when-management-based-
regulation-goes-global).  
Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990), “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective 
on Learning and Innovation”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 
1, pp. 128–152. 
Conseil National du Numérique (2014), “Platform Neutrality: Building an open 
and sustainable digital environment”, Opinion No. 2014-2, of the French 
152 | REFERENCES 
Digital Council, Paris (www.cnnumerique.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/PlatformNeutrality_VA.pdf). 
Cooke, P. (2010), “Regional innovation systems: Development opportunities 
from the ‘green turn’”, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 
Vol. 22, pp. 831–844. 
Crawford, S. (2013), Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly 
Power in the New Gilded Age, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Curley, M. and B. Salmelin (2013), “Open Innovation 2.0: A New Paradigm”, 
Opgehaald van EU Open Innovation Strategy and Policy Group 
(http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.c
fm?doc_id=21). 
Dais, A. et al. (2008), “Introducing a public agency networking platform towards 
supporting connected governance”, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 
(including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture 
Notes in Bioinformatics), Proceedings of the 7th international conference 
on Electronic Government, pp. 375–387. 
De Soto, J.H. (2009), The Theory of Dynamic Efficiency, London and New York: 
Routledge.  
Deubner, C. (2007), “RTD Policy in the EU and the Deepening of European 
Integration”, unpublished record of an Expert Workshop held in Brussels, 
4 July. 
Doloreux, D. and S. Parto (2005), “Regional innovation systems: Current 
discourse and unresolved issues”, Technology in Society, Vol. 27, pp. 133–
153. 
Dumbill, E. (2010), “The SMAQ stack for big data: Storage, MapReduce and Query 
are ushering in data-driven products and services”, O’Reilly Radar, 22 
September (http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/09/the-smaq-stack-for-big-
data.html). 
Dushnitsky, G. and M.J. Lenox (2005), “When do incumbents learn from 
entrepreneurial ventures?: Corporate venture capital and investing firms 
innovation rates”, Research Policy. 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 153 
Edquist, C. (2014), “Striving towards a Holistic Innovation Policy in European 
countries – But linearity still prevails!”, STI Policy Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 
1–19. 
Edquist, C. (2016), “The Swedish National Innovation Council: Innovation policy 
governance to replace linearity with holism”, Papers in Innovation Studies, 
Paper number 2016/24, CIRCLE, Lund University, Sweden, August 
(http://wp.circle.lu.se/upload/CIRCLE/workingpapers/201624_edquist.pd
f). 
Edquist, C., T. Luukkonen and M. Sotarauta (2009), “Broad-Based Innovation 
Policy, Evaluation of the Finnish National Innovation System – Full Report”, 
Helsinki, Taloustieto Ltd, pp. 11–69. 
Engel, J.S. and I. del-Palacio (2009), “Global networks of clusters of innovation: 
Accelerating the innovation process”, Business Horizons, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 
493–503 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2009.06.001). 
EPSC (2016), “Towards an Innovation Principle Endorsed by Better Regulation”, 
Strategic Notes, Issue 14, June (https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/pdf/publications/ 
strategic_note_issue_14.pdf). 
ERAC (2016), “ERAC Opinion on Open Research Data Delegations", Brussels. 
Erkman, S. (2004), Vers une ecologie industrielle, Paris: Edition Charles Leopold 
Mayer.   
Etzkowitz, H. and L. Leydesdorff (1995), “The Triple Helix-University-Industry-
Government Relations: A Laboratory for Knowledge-Based Economic 
Development”, EASST Review, Vol. 14, pp. 14–19. 
Etzkowitz, H. and L. Leydesdorff (1997), Universities and the Global Knowledge 
Economy: A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations, 
London: Pinter. 
Etzkowitz, H. and L. Leydesdorff (1998), “The Endless Transition: A ‘Triple Helix’ 
of University-Industry-Government Relations”, Introduction to a Theme 
Issue, Minerva, Vol. 36, pp. 203–208. 
154 | REFERENCES 
Etzkowitz, H. and L. Leydesdorff (2000), “The dynamics of innovation: from 
National Systems and ‘Mode2’ to a Triple Helix of university–industry–
government relations”, Research Policy, Vol. 29, pp. 109–123. 
Etzkowitz, H., A. Webster, C. Gebhardt and B.R.C. Terra (2000), “The future of 
the university and the university of the future: evolution of ivory tower to 
entrepreneurial paradigm”, Research Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 313–330. 
Etzkowitz, H.E. and M. Klofsten (2005), “The innovative region: Toward a theory 
of knowledgebased regional development”, R&D Management, Vol. 35, 
No. 3, pp. 243–255. 
European Commission (2004), Europe and Basic Research, Communication from 
the Commission, COM(2004) 9 final, 14 January 2004. Brussels. 
European Commission (2014), “Standardisation in the area of innovation and 
technological development, notably in the field of text and data mining”, 
Report from the Expert Group.  
European Commission (2015), Staff Working Document, “Better regulations for 
innovation-driven investment at EU level”, SWD (2015) 298 final, 15 
December. 
European Commission (2016a), Digitising European Industry: Reaping the full 
benefits of a Digital Single Market, Brussels. 
European Commission (2016b), EU Open Innovation, Open Science, Open to the 
World, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
European Commission (2016c), Online Platforms: Accompanying the document 
Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market, 
Brussels. 
European Commission (2016d), Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market 
Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, Brussels. 
Evans, P.C. and A. Gawer (2016), “The Rise of the Platform Enterprise A Global 
Survey”, Center for Global Enterprise, New York. 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 155 
Fagerberg, J. (2013), “Innovation – A new guide”, TIK Working Papers on 
Innovation Studies, No. 20131119, Centre for Technology, Innovation and 
Culture, Oslo. 
Fagerberg, J., B.R. Martin and E.S,. Andersen (eds) (2013), Innovation Studies - 
Evolution and Future Challenges, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Filippov, S. (2014), “Mapping tech and data mining in academic and research 
communities in Europe”, Lisbon Council, 16/2014. 
Fischer-Kowalski, M. (1998), “Society’s Metabolism. The Intellectual History of 
Material Flow Analysis, Part I, 1860-1970”, Journal of Industrial Ecology, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 61–78. 
Fischer-Kowalski, M. and W. Hüttler (1999), “Society’s Metabolism: The State of 
the Art. The Intellectual History of Material Flow Analysis, Part II: 1970-
1998”, Journal of Industrial Ecology, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 107–137. 
Foray, D. and X. Goenega (2013), “The Goals of Smart Specialisation”, JRC 
Scientific and Policy Reports, No. 1, p. 18. 
Foray, D., P. David and B. Hall (2011), “Smart Specialisation: From academic idea 
to political instrument, the surprising career of a concept and the 
difficulties involved in its implementation”, MTEI Working Paper 2011-001, 
EPFL, Lausanne. 
Fransman, M. (2010), The New ICT Ecosystem – Implications for Policy and 
Regulation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Fransman, M. (2014), “Models of Innovation in Global ICT Firms: The Emerging 
Global Innovation Ecosystems”, JRC Working Papers, JRC-IPTS, Seville.  
Freeman, C. (1987), Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from 
Japan, London: Frances Pinter. 
Freeman, C. (1988) “Japan: A new national innovation system?”, in G. Dosi, C. 
Freeman, R.R. Nelson, G. Silverberg and L. Soete (eds), Technology and 
Economy Theory, London: Pinter. 
Freeman, C. (1994), “The Economics of Technical Change”, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 18, pp 463–514. 
156 | REFERENCES 
Frosch, R.A. and N. Gallopoulos (1989), “Strategies for manufacturing”, Scientific 
American, Vol. 261, No. 3, pp. 144 –152. 
Gassmann, O., E. Enkel and H.W. Chesbrough (2010), “The future of open 
innovation”, R&D Management, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 213–221. 
Gawer, A. (2009), Platforms, Markets and Innovation, Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar.  
Gawer, A. (2014), “Bridging differing perspectives on technological platforms: 
Toward an integrative framework”, Research Policy, Vol. 43, No. 7, pp. 
1239–1249. 
Gawer, A. and M.A. Cusumano (2002), Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, 
and Cisco Drive Industry Innovation, Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
Gawer, A. and M.A. Cusumano (2008), “How companies become platform 
leaders”, MIT/Sloan Management Review, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 18–35. 
Gawer, A. and M.A. Cusumano (2014), “Industry platforms and ecosystem 
innovation”, Journal of Product Innovation Management, Vol. 31, No. 3, 
pp. 417–433. 
Gawer, A. and N. Phillips (2013), “Institutional work as logics shift: the case of 
Intel’s transformation to platform leader”, Organization Studies, Vol. 34, 
No. 8, pp. 1035–1071. 
Gawer, A. and R. Henderson (2007), “Platform owner entry and innovation in 
complementary markets: evidence from Intel”, Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1–34. 
Georghiou, L. et al. (2008), “Challenging Europe’s Research: Rationales for the 
European Research Area (ERA). Report of the ERA Expert Group”, 
European Commission, Directorate General for Research, Brussels. 
Geronikolaou, G. and G. Papachristou (2012), “Venture Capital and Innovation in 
Europe”, Modern Economy, Vol. 3. 
Gillespie, T.L. (2010), “The Politics of ‘Platforms’”, New Media and Society, Vol. 
12, No. 3 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1601487). 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 157 
Giovannini, E., I. Niestroy, M. Nilsson, F. Roure and M. Spanos (2015), “The Role 
of Science, Technology and Innovation Policies to Foster the 
Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals”, Report of the 
Expert Group “Follow-up to Rio+20, notably the SDGs”, European 
Commission DG RTD. 
Gnyawali, D.R. and D.S. Fogel (1994), “Environments for Entrepreneurship 
Development: Key Dimensions and Research Implications”, 
Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 43–62. 
Gomulkiewicz, R.W. (1998), “The License Is The Product: Comments on the 
Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing”, Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, Vol. 13, Fall, pp. 895–904. 
Goodman, E.P. (2014), “Informational justice as the new media pluralism”, LSE 
blog, 19 November 
(http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/11/19/informational-
justice-as-the-new-media-pluralism/).  
Granieri, M. and A. Renda (2012), Innovation Law and Policy in the European 
Union, Milan: Springer.   
Granieri, M. and A. Renda (2012), Innovation Law and Policy in the European 
Union: Towards Horizon 2020, Milan: Springer Verlag. 
Gunderson, L.H. and C.S. Holling (2002), Panarchy: Understanding 
Transformations in Human and Natural Systems, Washington, D.C.: Island 
Press. 
Hagiu, A. and J. Wright (2011), “Multi-sided platform”, Working Paper No. 12024, 
Harvard Business School. 
Halén, M. et al. (2016), “Onko Suomi jäämässä alustatalouden junasta?”, Helsinki 
(www.etla.fi/wp-content/uploads/vnk_raportti_2016_19.pdf).  
Hazlett, T.W., D.T. Teece and L. Waverman (2011), “Walled garden rivalry: the 
creation of mobile network ecosystems”, George Mason Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 11-50 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963427). 
158 | REFERENCES 
Helberger, N. (2012), “Exposure diversity as a policy goal”, Journal of Media Law, 
Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 65–92, DOI:10.5235/175776312802483880.  
Helberger, N. (2012), “Exposure Diversity as a Policy Goal”, Journal of Media Law, 
Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 65–92. 
Heverly, R.A., (2003), “The Information Semicommons”, Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4, Fall (http://ssrn.com/abstract=450280 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.450280). 
Howaldt, J. and E. Beerheide (2010), “Innovationsmanagement im Enterprise 
2.0: Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen Innovationsparadigma?”, in J. Howaldt, 
and H. Jacobsen (eds), Soziale Innovation: Auf dem Weg zu einem 
postindustriellen Innovationsparadigma, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 355–
370. 
Iammarino, S. and C. Jona-Lasinio (2015), “ICT production and labour 
productivity in the Italian regions”, European Urban and Regional Studies, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 218–237. 
IMF (2016), “Fiscal Monitor: Acting Now, Acting Together. International 
Monetary Fund”, Washington, D.C., April 
(www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2016/01/pdf/fm1601.pdf).  
Insight Foresight Institute (2016), “(Re)searching the critical ‘meso’ level: 
learning innovation agencies and entrepreneurial ecosystems” (http://if-
institute.org/agencies-and-ecosystems). 
IRGC (2015), “A short introduction to ‘planned adaptive regulation’” 
(www.irgc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/A_short_introdution_to_Planned_Adaptive_Ri
sk_Regulation-19Nov15.pdf). 
Isenberg, D. (2011), “The Entrepreneurship Ecosystem Strategy as a New 
Paradigm for Economic Policy”, Institute for International European 
Affairs: Principles for Cultivating Entrepreneurship, Dublin, Ireland 
(www.wheda.com/uploadedFiles/Website/About_Wheda/Babson%20Ent
repreneurship%2 0Ecosystem%20Project.pdf).  
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 159 
Isenberg, D. and V. Onyemah (2016), “Fostering Scale Up Ecosystems for 
Regional Economic Growth: The Cases of Manizales-Mas and Scale Up 
Milwaukee”, in Innovations: Technology, Growth, Globalization, MIT Press 
(http://genglobal.org/sites/default/files/INNOVATIONS_GEC-2016.pdf). 
Isenberg, D.J. (2010), “How to start an entrepreneurial revolution”, Harvard 
Business Review, Vol. 88, No. 6, June, pp. 40–50. 
Isenberg, D.J. (2011), “The Entrepreneurship Ecosystem Strategy as a New 
Paradigm for Economic Policy: Principles for Cultivating 
Entrepreneurship”, The Babson Entrepreneurship Ecosystem Project, 
Babson Global. 
Jaffe, A. and J. Lerner (2004), Innovation and its Discontents, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
JIIP (2015), “Study on Contribution of the Framework Programmes to Major 
Innovations: Final Report for the European Commission DG RESEARCH 
AND INNOVATION’, Joint Institute for Innovation Policy, Brussels, April. 
JISC (2012), “The Value and Benefits of Text Mining” 
(www.jisc.ac.uk/sites/default/files/value-text-mining.pdf).  
Kampylis, P., Y. Punie and J. Devine (2015), “Promoting Effective Digital-Age 
Learning - A European Framework for Digitally-Competent Educational 
Organisations”, JRC-IPTS Working Papers JRC98209, Institute for 
Prospective and Technological Studies, Joint Research Centre. 
Kirzner, I.M. (1973a), Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Kirzner, I.M. (1973b), “Producer, entrepreneur and the right to property”, Paper 
presented at the Symposium on the origins and development of property 
rights, Institute of Humane Studies, San Francisco, January.  
Kirzner, I.M. (1997), “Entrepreneurial discovery and the competitive market 
process: An Austrian approach”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, 
No. 1, pp. 60–85. 
Kline, S.J. and N. Rosenberg (1986), “An overview of innovation,” in R. Landau 
and N. Rosenberg (eds), The Positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology 
160 | REFERENCES 
for Economic Growth, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, pp. 275–
305. 
Komarkova, I., J. Conrads and A. Collado (2015), ‘Entrepreneurship Competence: 
An Overview of Existing Concepts, Policies and Initiatives”, JRC Science 
Hub.  
Komninos, N. (2009), “Intelligent cities: towards interactive and global 
innovation environments”, International Journal of Innovation and 
Regional Development, Vol. 1, pp. 337–355. 
Könnölä, T. and G.. Unruh (2007), “Really changing the course: The limitations of 
environmental management systems for innovation”, Business Strategy 
and the Environment, Vol. 16, No. 8, pp. 525–537. 
Kotsemir, M. and D. Meissner (2013), “Conceptualizing the innovation process – 
trends and outlook”, Basic research program working papers, series: 
science, technology and innovation, brp 10/sti/2013.  
Koutroumpis, P., A. Leiponen and L.D.W. Thomas (2015), “ICT innovation in 
Europe: Productivity gains, start-up growth and retention”, EIT ICT Labs. 
Kretschmer, T. (2012), “Information and Communication Technologies and 
Productivity Growth: A Survey of the Literature”, OECD Digital Economy 
Papers, No. 195, OECD Publishing 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9bh3jllgs7-en). 
Landes, W.M. and R.A. Posner (2003), The Economic Structure of Intellectual 
Property Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Langlois, R.N. (2002), “Modularity in technology and organization”, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 49, pp. 19–37. 
Langlois, R.N. and P. Robertson (1992), “Networks and innovation in a modular 
system: lessons from the microcomputer and stereo component 
industries”, Research Policy, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 297–313. 
Latzer et al. (2015), “The Economics of Algorithmic Selection on the Internet”, in 
J. Bauer and M. Latzer (eds), Handbook on the Economics of the Internet, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 161 
Leceta, J.M., A. Tosina, N. Dévora-Quintero and A. Coad (2017 forthcoming), 
“Stimulating High-Impact Entrepreneurship in Europe: the Start-up to 
Scale-up approach of EIT Digital”.  
León, G. et al. (2008), “The governance challenge for knowledge policies in the 
Lisbon Strategy: between revolution and illusion”, Synthesis Report of the 
Expert Group for the follow-up of the research aspects of the revised 
Lisbon Strategy, Brussels, June (http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-
research/pdf/download_en/kin123469enc_web.pdf).  
Lepori, B. (2011), “Coordination modes in public funding systems, Research 
Policy, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 355–367 
(www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733310002350). 
Leyden, D.P. and A.N. Link (2015), Public Sector Entrepreneurship, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Linstone, H.A. (2007), “Out of the dusty labs”, The Economist 
(www.economist.com/node/8769863). 
Listokin, Y. (2008), Learning through Policy Variation, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 
118, No. 3, pp. 480–553. 
Lundvall, B.-Å. (2010), National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of 
Innovation and Interactive Learning, New York: Anthem Press. 
Majer, K. (2015), “From Science 2.0 to Open Science - Turning rhetoric into action?, 
STC Social Networking” (http://stcsn.ieee.net/e-letter/stcsn-e-letter-vol-3-
no-1/from-science-2-0-to-open-science). 
Malerba, F. (2002), “Sectoral systems of innovation and production”, Research 
Policy, Vol. 31, pp. 247–264. 
Malerba, F. (2004), Sectoral Systems of Innovation: Concepts, Issues and Analyses 
of Six Major Sectors in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Malerba, F. and L. Orsenigo (1997), “Technological Regimes and Sectoral 
Patterns of Innovative Activities”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 6, 
pp. 83–117. 
162 | REFERENCES 
Malmberg, A. and P. Maskell (1997), “Towards an explanation of regional 
specialization and industrial agglomeration”, European Planning Studies, 
Vol. 5, pp. 25–41. 
Mansell, R. (2015), “Platforms of power”, Intermedia, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 20–24, 
ISSN 0309-118X. 
Maskell, P. and A. Malmberg (1999), ‘Localized Learning and Industrial 
Competitiveness”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 167–185. 
Mason, C. and R. Brown (2014), ‘Entrepreneurial Ecosystems and Growth 
Oriented Entrepreneurship”, prepared for the workshop organized by the 
OECD LEED Program and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, The 
Hague, Netherlands, November 2013 
(www.oecd.org/cfe/leed/entrepreneurial-ecosystems.pdf). 
Mauthner, N. (2013), “Open access data sharing policies: Implications for 
academic roles, practices and identities”, Society for Research Into Higher 
Education, Final Report, University of Aberdeen Business School, March 
(www.srhe.ac.uk/downloads/MauthnerScopingReport.pdf). 
Mazzucato, M. (2013), The Entrepreneurial State: De-bunking Public vs. Private 
Sector Myths, London: Anthem Press.  
Mazzucato, M. (2016), “From market fixing to market-creating: a new framework 
for innovation policy”, Industry and Innovation, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 140–
156. 
McCann and Raquel Ortega-Argilés (2011), “Smart specialisation, regional 
growth and applications to EU cohesion policy”, Working Papers 2011/14, 
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona (IEB). 
McCray, L.E., K.A. Oye and A.C. Petersen (2010), “Planned adaptation in risk 
regulation: An initial survey of US environmental, health, and safety 
regulation”, Technological Forecasting & Social Change, Vol. 77, pp. 951–959.  
McDonald, F. et al. (2007), “Is There Evidence to Support Porter-type Cluster 
Policies?”, Regional Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 39–49. 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 163 
McGurk, M.R. and J.W. Lu (2015), “The Intersection of Patents and Trade 
Secrets”, Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, 
Summer. 
McKinsey & Co. (2011), “Big data: The next frontier for innovation, competition, and 
productivity” (www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/big_data/pdfs/ 
MGI_big_data_full_report.pdf). 
Merges, R.P. (1995), ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights 
and Collective Rights Organizations”, California Law Review, Vol. 84, 1293. 
Moore, J.F. (1993), “Predators and prey: a new ecology of competition”, Harvard 
Business Review, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 75–86. 
Moreno, F. and A. Coad (2015), “High-Growth Firms: Stylized Facts and 
Conflicting Results”, SPRU Working Paper Series 2015-05, Brighton. 
Muenchen, R. (2014), “The popularity of data analysis software”, r4stats.com 
(http://r4stats.com/articles/popularity). 
Mulgan, G. and C. Leadbeater (2013), “Systems Innovation”, Discussion Paper, 
Nesta.  
Murray, R., J. Caulier-Grice and G. Mulgan (2010), “The Open Book of Social 
Innovation”, The Young Foundation, Nesta. 
Mustar, P. and L. Esterle (2006), “Key Figures on Science and Technology”, 
Observatoire des Sciences et des Techniques, Paris. 
Myers, S. and D.G. Marquis (1969), “Successful Industrial Innovations: A Study of 
Factors Underlying Innovation in Selected Firms”, NSF 69-17, National 
Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. 
Napp, J.J. and T. Minshall (2011), “Corporate venture capital investments for 
enhancing innovation: Challenges and solutions”, Research-Technology 
Management, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 27–36. 
Neck, H.M., G.D. Meyer, B. Cohen and A.C. Corbett (2004), “An Entrepreneurial 
System View of New Venture Creation”, Journal of Small Business 
Management, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 190–208. 
164 | REFERENCES 
Nelson, R.R. (ed.) (1993), National innovation systems. A comparative analysis, 
New York and London: Oxford University Press. 
NESTA (2012), “Our Frugal Future: Lessons from India’s innovation system” 
(www.nesta.org.uk/library/documents/OurFrugFuture.pdf).  
Odum, E.P. (1969), “The Strategy of Ecosystem Development”, Boletín CF+S (26). 
OECD (2007), Eurostat-OECD Manual on Business Demography Statistics, Paris. 
OECD (2008), “Open innovation in global networks”, Paris. 
OECD (2010), “SMEs, Entrepreneurship and innovation”, Paris, p. 32.  
OECD (2011), “Fostering Innovation to Address Social Challenges”, Paris. 
OECD (2013), “Approaches To Protection of Undisclosed Information (Trade 
Secrets)”, Background Paper OECD Trade Policy Paper No. 162, by M.F. 
Schultz and D.C. Lippoldt, TAD/TC/WP(2013)21/FINAL, Paris. 
OECD (2015a), “Inquiries into Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact”, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
OECD (2015b), “Data-Driven Innovation: Big Data for Growth and Well-Being”, 
Paris, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264229358-en. 
OECD (2015c), “OECD Innovation Strategy 2015: An Agenda for Policy Action”, 
Paris (www.oecd.org/sti/OECD-Innovation-Strategy-2015-CMIN2015-
7.pdf). 
OECD (2016), “No Country for Young Firms? Policy failures and regulations are a 
greater obstacle for start-ups than for incumbents”, STI Policy Note, Paris 
(www.oecd.org/sti/ind/Policy-Note-No-Country-For-Young-Firms.pdf). 
Osborne, M. and C. Frey (2013). “The Future Of Employment: How Susceptible 
Are Jobs To Computerisation?”, 17 September 
(www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Empl
oyment.pdf).  
Palacin, M., M. Oliver, J. Infante, S. Oechsner and A. Bikfalvi (2013), “The Impact 
of Content Delivery Networks on the Internet Ecosystem”, Journal of 
Information Policy, Vol. 3, pp. 304–330. 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 165 
Pavit, K. (1984), “Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: Towards a Taxonomy 
and a Theory”, Research Policy, Vol. 13, pp. 343–374. 
Pereiras, M.S. and E. Huergo (2006), “La financiación de actividades de I+D+i: una 
revisión de la evidencia sobre el impacto de las ayudas públicas”, Centro 
para el Desarrollo Tecnologico Industrial y Universidad Complutense, 
Madrid, Spanish (www.cdti.es/recursos/publicaciones/archivos/ 
7396_211121112006133850.pdf). 
Peritz, R.J.R. (2006), “Patents and Competition: Toward a Knowledge Theory of 
Progress”, paper presented at the 2006 ATRIP conference in Parma, Italy. 
Peritz, R.J.R. (forthcoming), “The Political Economy of Progress”. 
Phills, J.A., K. Deiglmeier and D.T. Miller (2008), “Rediscovering Social 
Innovation”, Stanford Social Innovation Review, Fall. 
Porter, M.E. and S. Stern (2002), “National innovative capacity”, in World 
Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2001–2002, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Ranchordás, S. (2013), “Experimental Legislation: The Whys and the Woes”, The 
Theory & Practice of Legislation, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 415–440. 
Redecker, C. et al. (2011), “The Future of Learning: Preparing for Change Seville 
Spain”, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, JRC, Seville.  
Renda, A. (2005), “Telecom Services: a Transatlantic Perspective”, in D.S. 
Hamilton and J.P. Quinlan (eds), Deep Integration. How Transatlantic 
Markets are Leading Globalization, Brussels: CEPS Paperback Books, 
Chapter 11. 
Renda, A. (2007), “The Costs and Benefits of Transatlantic Convergence in 
Telecom Services”, in D. Hamilton and J. Quinlan (eds), Sleeping Giant: 
Awakening the Transatlantic Services Economy, Baltimore, Washington, 
D.C.: Johns Hopkins University and Brookings. 
Renda, A. (2009), “The review of the telecoms framework: a tale of the anti-
commons”, paper for the first report of the Monitoring ICT European 
Regulation initiative, NEREC, Madrid.  
166 | REFERENCES 
Renda, A. (2010), “Competition-regulation Interface in Telecommunications. 
What’s left of the Essential Facilities Doctrine”, Telecommunications Policy, 
Vol. 34, Nos 1-2, February-March, pp. 23–35.  
Renda, A. (2012), “Competition, Neutrality and Diversity in the Cloud”, 
Communications & Strategies, No. 85, 1st Quarter, pp. 23–44. 
Renda, A. (2013), “Net Neutrality and Mandatory Network-Sharing: How to 
disconnect the continent”, CEPS Policy Briefs, 18 December 
(www.ceps.eu/system/files/PB309%20AR%20Net%20Neutrality_0.pdf).  
Renda, A. (2015a), “Antitrust, regulation and the ‘neutrality trap’”, CEPS Special 
Report no. 104, April. 
Renda, A. (2015b), “Cloud Privacy law in the United States and the European 
Union”, in C.S. Yoo and J.-F. Blanchette (eds), Regulating the Cloud: Policy 
for Computing Infrastructure, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Renda, A. (2016), “Regulation and R&I policies. Comparing Europe and United 
States”, report for the European Commission, DG Research and Innovation 
(https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/expert-
groups/rise/renda_innovation_report.pdf). 
Renda, A. and C. Yoo (2015), “Telecommunications and Internet Services: The 
digital side of the TTIP”, Paper No. 8 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the 
Balance” and CEPS Special Report No. 112, July, now published as Chapter 
12 in Hamilton, D. and J. Pelkmans (2015), Rule-Makers or Rule-Takers? 
Exploring the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield.  
Renda, A. et al. (2006), “Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in 
Europe”, Study for the European Commission, DG COMP 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_
paper/impact_study.pdf).   
Renda, A.,  F. Simonelli, G. Mazziotti, A. Bolognini and G. Luchetta (2015), “Study 
on the implementation, application and effects of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society (InfoSoc) Directive and of its related instruments”, 
Study for the European Parliamentary Research Service 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 167 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/558762/EPRS_ST
U(2015)558762_EN.pdf).  
Richter, C.H., J. Xu and B.A. Wilcox (2014), “Opportunities and Challenges of the 
Ecosystem Approach”, Futures, Vol. 67, pp. 40–51. 
ROARMAP (2016), “Welcome to ROARMAP” (http://roarmap.eprints.org/). 
Robertson, D. and K. Ulrich (1998), “Planning for product platforms”, MIT Sloan 
Management Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 19–31. 
Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole (2003), “Platform competition in two-sided markets”, 
Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 990–1029. 
Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole (2006), “Two-sided markets: a progress report”, RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, pp. 645–667. 
Rosenberg, N. (1976), Perspectives on Technology, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rosenberg, N. (1982), Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rothwell, R. (1976), “Innovation in Textile Machinery: Some Significant Factors 
in Success and Failure”, Science Policy Research Unit, Occasional Paper 
Series, No. 2, June. 
Rothwell, R. (1991), “External Networking and Innovation in Small and Medium-
sized Manufacturing Firms in Europe”, Technovation, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 93–
112. 
Rothwell, R. (1992a), “Industrial Innovation and Environmental Regulation: Some 
Lessons from the Past”, Technovation, Vol. 12, No. 7, pp. 447–458. 
Rothwell, R. (1994), “Towards the Fifth-Generation Innovation Process”, 
International Marketing Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 7–31. 
Rothwell, R. and L. Soete (1983), “Technology and Economic Change”, Physics in 
Technology, Vol. 14, No. 6, November, pp. 270–277. 
Rothwell, R. and W. Zegveld (1985), Reindustrialization and Technology, Harlow, 
UK: Longman. 
168 | REFERENCES 
Rothwell, R., C. Freeman, A. Horsley, V.T.P. Jervis, A.B. Robertson and J. 
Townsend (1974), “SAPPHO Updated: Project SAPPHO Phase II”, Research 
Policy, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 258–291. 
Russell, M.G. et al. (2011), “Transforming Innovation Ecosystems through Shared 
Vision and Network Orchestration”, Triple Helix IX International 
Conference: Silicon Valley: Global Model or Unique Anomaly?, Stanford 
University, H-STAR Institute Center for Innovation and Communication, pp. 
1–21. 
Sachwald, F. (2015), “Europe’s twin deficits: Excellence and innovation in new 
sectors”, Policy Paper by the Research, Innovation, and Science Policy 
Experts (RISE), EUR 27371 EN, European Commission 
(https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/expert-
groups/rise/sachwald-twin_deficits.pdf). 
Sahaym, A., H.K. Steensma and J.Q. Barden (2010), “The influence of R&D 
investment on the use of corporate venture capital: An industry-level 
analysis”, Journal of Business Venturing.  
Schumpeter, J.A. (1934), The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into 
Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Schwartz, P.M. (2013), “EU Privacy and the Cloud: Consent and Jurisdiction under 
the Proposed Regulation”, BNA Privacy and Security Law Report 12, pp. 1–
3. 
Shapiro, C. and H. Varian (1999), Information Rules. A Strategic Guide to the 
Network Economy. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Soete, L., B. Verspagen and B. ter Weel (2009), “System of innovation”, UNU-
MERIT Workingpaper series no. 2009-062, Maastricht. 
Spilling, O.R. (1996), “The entrepreneurial system: On entrepreneurship in the 
context of a mega-event. Entrepreneurship and New Firm Development”, 
Journal of Business Research, Vol. 36, No. 1, May, pp. 91–103. 
Sunstein, C.R. (2009), On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe 
Them, What Can Be Done, Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 169 
Taylor, S. (2015), “Think the blockchain is interesting but the bitcoin isn’t? Think 
again” (www.sytaylor.net/2015/05/17/think-the-blockchain-is-
interesting-but-bitcoin-isnt-think-again/#sthash.BzSxoDly.dpbs).   
Teece, D.J. (1980), “Economics of scope and the scope of the enterprise”, Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 1, pp. 223–247. 
Teece, D.J. (1982), “Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm”, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 39–63. 
Tiwari, R. and C. Herstatt (2012a), “Open Global Innovation Networks as Enablers 
of Frugal Innovation: Propositions Based on Evidence from India”, 
Hamburg University of Technology, Working Paper No. 72, December.  
Tiwari, R. and C. Herstatt (2012b), “India - A Lead Market for Frugal Innovations? 
Extending the Lead Market Theory to Emerging Economies”, Working 
Paper No. 67, Institute of Technology and Innovation Management, 
Hamburg University of Technology, Germany. 
Tran, E. and G. Scholtes (2016), “Open Data Literature Review” 
(www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ 
Final_OpenDataLitReview_2015-04-14_1.1.pdf). 
Trippl, M. (2006), “Cross-Border Regional Innovation Systems”, SRE - Discussion 
Papers, 2006/05. Institut für Regional- und Umweltwirtschaft, WU Vienna 
University of Economics and Business, Vienna. 
UK Intellectual Property Office (2012), “Modernising Copyright: A modern, 
robust and flexible framework”, 20 December. 
Valdez, J. (1988), “The entrepreneurial ecosystem: Toward a theory of new firm 
formation”, Working Paper 
(www.sbaer.uca.edu/research/sbida/1988/PDF/11.pdf). 
Van Schewick, B. (2009), Internet Architecture and Innovation, Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Veugelers, R. (2009), “A lifeline for Europe’s young radical innovators”, Bruegel 
Policy Brief, Brussels, March (www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-
detail/publication/289-a-lifeline-for-europes-young-radical-innovators/). 
170 | REFERENCES 
Veugelers, R. (2011), “Mind Europe’s early-stage equity gap, Bruegel Policy 
Contribution. 
Veugelers, R. (2014), “Undercutting the future? European Research Spending in 
times of Fiscal Consolidation”, Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2014/06, 
June (www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/829-
undercutting-the-future-european-research-spending-in-times-of-fiscal-
consolidation/). 
Veugelers, R. and M. Cincera (2010), “Europe’s missing yollies”, Bruegel Policy 
Brief, Issue 2010/06. 
von Hippel, E. (1988), The Sources of Innovation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
von Hippel, E. (2005), Democratizing Innovation, Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
von Hippel, E. (2013), “Open User Innovation”, in M. Soegaard and R. Dam (eds), 
The Encyclopedia of Human-Computer Interaction, Aarhus, Denmark: The 
Interaction Design Foundation. 
von Hippel, E. and G. von Krogh (2003), “Open Source Software and the ‘Private-
Collective’ Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science”, 
Organization Science, pp. 209–223. 
Wachhaus, T.A. (2011), “Governance as a Framework to Support Informatics”, 
The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, Vol. 16, No. 
1, pp. 1–14. 
WEF (2014), “Enhancing Europe’s Competitiveness: Fostering Innovation-driven 
Entrepreneurship in Europe”, World Economic Forum, Geneva, June 
(http://provexis.org/wp-
content/uploads/WEF_EuropeCompetitiveness_FosteringInnovationDrive
nEntrepreneurship_Report_2014.pdf). 
WEF (2015), “Collaborative Innovation: Transforming Business, Driving Growth”, 
World Economic Forum, Geneva, August 
(www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Collaborative_Innovation_report_2015.pdf). 
West, J. (2009), “Policy Challenges of Open, Cumulative, and User Innovation”, 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, Vol. 30, pp. 17–41. 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 171 
West, J. and M. Bogers (2014), “Leveraging External Sources of Innovation: A 
Review of Research on Open Innovation”, Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, July. 
Wilson, K.E. (2015), “Policy Lessons from Financing Innovative Firms”, OECD 
Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 24, OECD Publishing, 
Paris (http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js03z8zrh9p-en). 
Yawson, R.M. (2009), “The Ecological System of Innovation: A New Architectural 
Framework for a Functional Evidence-Based Platform for Science and 
Innovation Policy”, The Future of Innovation Proceedings of the XXIV ISPIM 
2009 Conference, Vienna, Austria, 21–24 June. 
Yoo, C.S. (2014), “U.S. vs. European Broadband Deployment: What Do the Data 
Say?”, University of Penn Institute for Law and Economic Research Paper 
No. 14-35, 3 June (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2510854). 
 
172 | 
ANNEX: LIST OF TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS AND 
INVITED GUESTS AND SPEAKERS 
Chariman: José Manuel Leceta  
Chairman and Co-founder  
Insight Foresight Institute (IFI) 
Rapporteurs:  Andrea Renda 
Senior Research Fellow, CEPS 
Totti Könnölä 
Managing Director 
Insight Foresight Institute (IFI) 
Felice Simonelli  
Research Fellow, CEPS 
ACADEMIA 
PhilippeAghion 
Professor,  
Harvard University 
Nicholas Ashford 
Professor of Technology and policy 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Robert U. Ayres  
Emeritus Professor of Economics, 
Political Science, Technology 
Management INSEAD 
Dan Breznitz  
Co-Director  
Innovation Policy Lab 
Daniel Buhr  
Professor  
Universiteit Tuebingen 
Koenraad Debackere  
Professor  
KU Leuven 
Jan Fagerberg  
Professor University of Oslo 
Martin Fransman  
Professor  
University of Edinburgh 
Daniel Isenberg  
Professor of Entrepreneurship Practice, 
Babson College 
Alea López de San Román González 
Policy Officer  
League of European Research 
Universities (LERU) 
Elena Ruskovaara  
Director of Entrepreneurship Education  
Lappeenranta University of Technology 
(LUT) 
Johan Schot  
Director of SPRU (Science Policy 
Research Unit) 
University of Sussex   
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 173 
Luc Soete  
UNI-MERIT and RISE Group 
Maastricht University 
Alberto Tejero Lopez  
Innovation and Technology Intelligence  
Universidad Politécnica de Madrid 
Juan Pablo Vazquez Sampere 
Professor, IE Business School 
Angelo Volip  
Head of Unit, CNR 
Charles Wessner  
Georgetown University 
 
Companies and EU associations 
Typhaine Beaupérin-Holvoet  
CEO, Federation of European Risk 
Management Associations 
Kumardev Chatterjee  
Founder and President 
European Young Innovators Forum 
Patrice Chazerand  
Director  
DIGITALEUROPE 
Stéphane Ciriani  
Responsable des Etudes Economiques  
Orange 
Giustino de Sanctis  
CEO 
Vectis SpA 
Steven Dewaele 
Director EU Policy and Strategy Huawei 
Technologies Co.,Ltd Brussels Office 
Loïc Forgeois  
European Affairs Advisor  
Orange 
David Garlot  
Founder & Managing Director  
Athena DG 
Tony Graziano  
Vice President  
Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd  
Brussels Office 
Vianney Hennes  
Director  
Orange 
Hannah Herscheid  
EU Policy Manager  
Bayer SA-NV 
Sebastian Hufnagel  
Government Affairs Manager EMEA 
Dell 
Martha Ivanovas  
Government Affairs EMEA  
Dell 
Lenard Koschwitz  
Director  
European Affairs Allied for Startups 
Juraj Kosturik  
Public Affairs & Events Executive 
Telefonica S.A 
Marie Laenen  
Co-Founder  
Sendabee 
Paul Leonard  
Head, Innovation & Technology Policy 
BASF SE 
Zou Liqiang  
EU Public Affairs Manager  
Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd 
Brussels Office 
174 | ANNEX: LIST OF TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS AND INVITED GUESTS AND SPEAKERS 
Nicklas Lundblad  
Senior Director, Public Policy Europe  
Google 
Mario Mahr  
Strategy Director  
Insight Foresight Institute (IFI) 
John Midgley  
Senior Global Manager  
Intuit Ltd.   
Agustin Moro Canada  
Head of Business Development and 
Strategic partnerships  
Telefónica Open Future   
Thanh Nguyen  
Deputy Head  
Orange 
Dorte Gram Nybroe  
Senior Advisor  
Confederation of Danish Industry 
Will Parker  
Government Affairs Director EMEA  
Dell 
Fabrizio Porrino  
Vice President  
FacilityLive 
Stéphane Reboud  
Executive Director for EMEA Services 
Sales and Head of DELL for 
Entrepreneurs EMEA  
Dell 
Thomas Reynaert  
President UTIO Europe  
United Technologies International 
Operations 
Luca Rossettini  
CEO 
D-ORBIT (De Orbital Devices), IT 
Eduardo Salido Cornejo  
Public Affairs and Policy Manager 
Telefónica S.A 
Jonny Shipp  
Head of Digital Confidence  
Telefonica S.A 
Ondrej Socuvka  
Public Policy and Government Affairs 
Manager  
Google Belgium 
Benoit Tanaka  
Head of Mobile Economic Policy EMEA, 
Google 
Elena Toson  
Head of Program Management Deputy  
D-ORBIT (De Orbital Devices), IT 
Alexander Ulrich  
Advisor  
Confederation of Danish Industry 
Monica Valli  
Program Manager of the SME 
Instrument Phase 2  
D-ORBIT (De Orbital Devices), IT 
Fabian Vandenreydt  
Head of Markets Management, 
Innotribe Swift 
Miguel Vidal  
Senior Economist  
Deutsche Telekom AG   
Imelda Vital  
Head of EU office  
Amway 
 
UNLEASHING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EUROPE | 175 
 
INSTITUTIONS (Public institutions and Research & Innovation networks) 
Katalin Alföldi  
Policy Officer  
Cost 
Roman Arjona  
Chief Economist 
Head of Unit Analysis and monitoring 
of national research policies  
European Commission 
Robert D. Atkinson 
President  
Information Technology and 
Innovation Foundation 
Roberto Battiston  
President 
Italian Space Agency  
Marc Bogdanowicz  
European Commission 
Ann Branch Adviser  
European Commission 
Nicholas Costello 
Deputy Head of Unit “Job Creation” 
European Commission 
Giuseppe Giovanni Daquino  
SPACE research, Research Programme 
Officer  
European Commission 
Pedro Das Neves Moreira 
IT Portfolio Manager - Team leader - 
data analytics policies and projects 
European Commission 
Nicholas Davis  
Head of Society and Innovation  
World Economic Forum 
Shiva Dustdar  
Head of Innovation Finance Advisory  
European Investment Bank 
Christopher Folkeson Welch 
Programmes Director  
Swedish Foundation for Strategic 
Environmental Research (Mistra) 
Oliver Gajda  
President  
European Crowdfunding Network 
Robert Gampfer  
Policy Analyst  
European Commission 
Bonifacio Garcia Porras  
European Commission 
Harald Gruber  
Head of Division  
European Investment Bank 
Henry Kattago  
Deputy Head of Strategy Unit  
Estonian Government Office 
Helen Köpman  
Deputy Head of Unit  
European Commission 
Tomasz Kozlowski  
Head of Innovation & Alternative 
Financing Programmes  
European Investment Fund 
Giovanni La Placa  
Policy Analyst  
European Commission 
176 | ANNEX: LIST OF TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS AND INVITED GUESTS AND SPEAKERS 
Isidro Laso Ballesteros  
Head of Sector at Startup Europe 
European Commission 
Robert Madelin  
Senior Adviser for Innovation  
European Commission 
Andres Martinez  
Chief Representative  
Spanish Office for Science and 
Technology  
Philippe Pierre Moutot  
Principal Advisor  
European Central Bank 
Dirk Pilat  
Deputy Director  
OECD 
Juan Manuel Revuelta  
General Director  
Fundación Finnovaregio 
Alexander Riedl 
European Commission 
Christine Simon  
Policy Officer  
European Commission 
Kadri Sirg  
Head of Brussels Office  
Estonian Liaison Office for EU RTD 
Daniel Straka  
Head of Office  
SLORD  
Rudolf Strohmeier  
European Commission 
Katarzyna Szkuta  
Policy Analyst  
European Commission 
Tanja Tanayama  
Head of Knowledge Programme 
European Investment Bank 
Ana Tomasek  
Strategic Advisor  
EUREKA Secretariat 
Martin Ulbrich  
Policy Officer  
European Commission 
Christoph Weiss  
Economist European  
Investment Bank 
Jan Wessels  
}Senior Innovation Researcher and 
Policy Adviser VDI/VDE Innovation +  
Technik GmbH 
Laurent Zibell  
Policy Adviser 
IndustriAll European Trade Union 
Eva Maydell  
Member of the European Parliament 
(EPP)  
European Parliament 
9 789461 384850
Unleashing Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship in Europe
People, Places and Policies
Jose Manuel Leceta
Andrea Renda
Totti Könnölä
Felice Simonelli
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
C
EP
S 
U
N
LE
A
SH
IN
G
 IN
N
O
V
AT
IO
N
 A
N
D
 E
N
TR
EP
R
EN
EU
R
SH
IP
 IN
 E
U
RO
PE
 –
 P
EO
PL
E,
 P
LA
C
ES
 A
N
D
 P
O
LI
C
IE
S
This report sets out the elements for the design of a streamlined and future-proof 
policy on innovation and entrepreneurship in Europe. It is the result of a collective 
effort led by CEPS, which formed a Task Force on Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
in the EU, composed of authoritative scholars, industry experts, entrepreneurs, 
practitioners and representatives of EU and international institutions. 
The result of these deliberations is a set of policy recommendations aimed at 
improving the overall environment and approach for entrepreneurship and 
innovation in Europe and a new paradigmatic understanding of the role that 
innovation and entrepreneurship can and should play within the overall context 
of EU policy. These recommendations are based on a new, multi-dimensional 
approach to both innovation and entrepreneurship as social phenomena and to 
the policies that are meant to promote them.
